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PREFACE
Max Weber is today perhaps the classic author in the cultural and social
sciences, recognized by scientists in many subject areas and on all conti-
nents. But his widely felt intellectual presence has not eliminated wide-
ranging discussions about his intentions and the foundations of his work.
Many use his œuvre only as a quarry for concepts and ideas, unaware that
only a coherent and systematic reading will penetrate to the foundations of
his thought, open up its possibilities, but also its inner tensions.
This is particularly true with regard to his essays on «The Economic
Ethics of World Religions» and to his much shorter writings on the laws
of these religions, for they appear to be based on an inner contradiction.
On the one hand, Weber insisted that only by specialization, by putting on
blinders, so to speak, the scientist can achieve something that will endure.
But, on the other hand, he wrote about religions and cultures and their le-
gal systems – in India, China, Buddhism, ancient Judaism –, and he com-
mented on other cultures - Islam, Orthodox Christianity, and occidental
Christianity - about which he certainly could not claim much specialized
knowledge. What characterizes his œuvre, however, is his approach: he
proposed a refined and coherent method of comparative social study with
a largely historical dimension which was intended to contribute to the un-
derstanding of the characteristics of Western culture even when he wrote
about Asian cultures. At the same time he asked which attitude towards
the world remains for Western man, and what kind of conduct and which
price and sacrifices it requires.
Weber's questions are not self-evident for sinologists, indologists, semi-
tists or historians of Christianity, and they are also new for scholars and
students of comparative religions and of the comparative history of law.
For Westerners they provide a wider than usual perspective. At the same
time, Weber did not want to teach the people of Asia anything about how
their cultures should develop. His approach allows people of all cultures to
turn the mirror around and, while adapting Weber's approach to their per-
spective, to look at their own roots. May this book contribute to the dis-
semination of Weber's comparative macrosociological analysis and of his
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The German scholar Max Weber (1864-1920) left a wide-ranging oeuvre,
including political and methodological essays as well as essays in the field
of political sociology, the sociology of law, of economics, of religion and
of music. Although some of his major publications remained fragments,
the new German edition of his collected writings (MWG), including let-
ters, contains more than forty volumes. Weber's work stands out by its
combination of empirical research and systematic thought. What charac-
terizes most of it is his comparative approach which includes his views of
Western Antiquity and the Middle Ages as well as of the major Asian cul-
tures. His studies of what he called the «world religions» are probably the
most obvious and important example. In this introductory chapter the nec-
essary foundations will be laid for the understanding and interpretation of
Weber's comparative studies.
The Texts
«The Economic Ethics of World Religions» is the title of a part of Max
Weber's Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Religionssoziologie (Collected Essays
in the Sociology of Religion), Vol. 1-3, Tübingen 1920/21, a three volume
publication which also contains his revised essays on the Protestant ethic
and the Protestant sects. The essays on the world religions (mainly Confu-
cianism, Hinduism, Buddhism and ancient Judaism) were originally pub-
lished between 1915 and 1919 in the Archiv für Sozialwissenschaften und
Sozialpolitik, a journal of which Weber was one of the editors. A year be-
fore his death in 1920 Weber revised and extended these earlier publica-
tions and started to publish them as a whole under the title Gesammelte
Aufsätze zur Religionssoziologie.
Volume I contains a Preceding or Preliminary Remark ( Vorbemerkung,
translated, not quite correctly, by T. Parsons as «Author's Introduction»),
the extended essay on «The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism»
(originally published in 1904/05), and a revised version of an article enti-
tled «The Protestant Sects and the Spirit of Capitalism». This is followed
by the revised «Introduction» to the section on «The Economic Ethics of
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World Religions», then the substantially extended essay on «Confucian-
ism and Taoism» and finally an «Intermediary Reflection». Volume II
contains the slightly revised essay on «Hinduism and Buddhism», and
Volume III contains «Ancient Judaism» and a short text entitled «The
Pharisees».
Weber's early death prevented him from doing more, but readers of his
letters, now published in the Max Weber Gesamtausgabe (MWG), will
come to realize that his ambitions had gone further. He had also wanted to
add studies on Islam and on Christianity (MWG II/9: 69-70) and, as an an-
nouncement of his publisher Siebeck in the fall of 1919 indicated, the de-
piction of Christianity was to be divided into ancient Christianity, oriental
Christianity and occidental Christianity.1 In fact, after his tour of Asia We-
ber wanted to return to the Occident with a widened perspective and, as he
also pointed out in the announcement, the object of all these completed
and planned essays would be the question of the particular characteristics
of the Occident and of the development of the European citizen. Today we
can only draw some indications of what he might have written on the eco-
nomic ethics of Islam and Christianity from some parts of his work which
is traditionally known as Economy and Society (ES), particularly the sec-
tions on the sociology of religion, the sociology of domination and the so-
ciology of law. These sections in Economy and Society were considered
by Weber as complementary and explanatory to the collection of essays on
the «Economic Ethics of World Religions». In particular the section on
«The Sociology of Law» (Chapter VIII in ES) contains short paragraphs
on the laws of all major world religions, including Islam).2
1 This announcement, prepared by Weber himself, has been quoted in Johannes
Winckelmann: Max Weber's hinterlassenes Hauptwerk, Tübingen: Mohr (Siebeck)
1986, p. 45/46; now also in MWG I. 19, p. 28
2 According to F. Tenbruck (in his article of 1980 on the thematic unity in the works
of Max Weber) the continuing insights of Weber's sociology cannot be found in
Economy and Society, but in the sytematic chapters of the Collected Essays in the
Sociology of Religion, namely the «Preliminary Remark», the «Introduction», and
the «Intermediate Reflection», where the realization of the inner logic of religious
ideas came to him. But it should not be forgotten that Weber himself saw the rela-
tionship between Economy and Society and the Collected Essays in the Sociology of
Religion as complementary and explanatory, as clearly stated in the first footnote of
the «Introduction» to the «Economic Ethics of World Religions» which, regret-
tably, has not been translated by Gerth and Mills in their volume From Max Weber.
The editorial history of Economy and Society contains a number of disputes. A new
controversy has flared up since its publication in five volumes in the Max Weber
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The Collected Essays in the Sociology of Religion have never been
translated into English as a whole. Instead, separate translations which
leave the reader unaware of the interrelations have been published of the
various parts. The «Prefatory Note» or «Author's Introduction» which in-
troduces the whole three-volume series and which at the same time sums
up the results, has been included by Talcott Parsons with his translation of
«The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism» in a separate volume.
The «Introduction» and the «Intermediate Reflection» which are of major
importance for the understanding of the theoretical structure of the argu-
ment, have also been published separately under partially new and mis-
leading titles («The Social Psychology of World Religions» and «Reli-
gious Rejections of the World and their Directions» respectively) by Gerth
and Mills in their From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology (FMW). The es-
say on «Confucianism and Taoism» has been translated and published
separately by H. Gerth under the misleading title The Religion of China
and the essay on «Hinduism and Buddhism» has been translated and pub-
lished separately by H. Gerth and D. Martindale under the equally mis-
leading title The Religion of India. The Sociology of Hinduism and Bud-
dhism. No wonder, then, that the interrelations between these works which
must be interpreted in each other's light, are often misunderstood in the
English-speaking scholarly community.
Equally important, however, for the understanding of many reactions to
Weber's writings among specialists of Asian studies is the poor quality of
some of the translations. Some of them are a disgrace.3 Not only have
most English translations been given new titles which do not reflect We-
ber's intentions, but passages of major importance have been subjected to
major changes. One example should suffice here:
Indian scholars, especially if they were interested in modern develop-
ment, have often taken exception to the following statement:
«It is quite evident that no community dominated by inner powers of this sort
(caste order and karma theory - A.B.) could out of its substance arrive at the
Gesamtausgabe. What was known as Weber's sociology of law is now called «Die
Entwicklungsbedingungen des Rechts» in MWG I, 22-3. (The developmental con-
ditions of the law). Vide H. Orihara «From a torso with a wrong head to five dis-
jointed body parts without a head» in Max Weber Studies 3,2 (2003).
3 A revealing article on the subject of the English translations of Weber's studies on
world religions has been Kantowsky's Max Weber on India and Indian interpreta-
tions of Weber» in: Contributions to Indian Sociology (NS) vol. 16, no. 2 (1982)
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«spirit» of capitalism. It was also unable to take over the economically and
technically finished form as an artifact, as occurred in Japan.There appeared
here clearly and undoubtedly greater difficulties than in Japan.» (RI: 325).
If we compare this translation with the German original, we find that the
statement «It was also unable to take over the economic and technically
finished form as an artifact» simply does not appear in the German text.
Therefore, a more correct translation would be:
«It is quite evident that no community dominated by inner powers of this sort
could out of its substance arrive at the «spirit» of capitalism. Even the take-
over of the economically and technically finished form as an artifact, as oc-
cured in Japan, encountered clearly and undoubtedly greater difficulties than
in Japan...» (GARS II: 359)
Clearly, this passage expresses a very different idea from what the English
reader, interested in modern development, is led to believe. In fact, the
breakup of the closely interrelated essays into seemingly unrelated mono-
graphs and the plethora of incorrect or misleading translations of passages
in Weber's essays have produced a certain lack of interest in Weber's gen-
eral intentions, and it is therefore not surprising that many misunderstand-
ings have arisen. For the moment we may leave aside the fact that an ap-
propriate understanding of these essays is possible only on the basis of
some knowledge of Weber's methodological writings and of his sociology
of domination and of law.
What were Weber's intentions?
It was not Weber's intention to provide us with a well-rounded picture of
major world religions, or with a series of monographs.
«The studies do not claim to be complete analyses of cultures, however brief.
On the contrary, in every culture they quite deliberately emphasize elements
in which it differs from Western civilization. They are, hence, definitely ori-
ented to the problems which seem important for the understanding of Western
culture from this view-point.» (PE: XL).
Weber knew that a more balanced presentation would have to add other
features, but he was interested in certain features of religions from a defi-
nite point of view, namely how they related to economic rationalism of the
type which has developed in the modern Occident. In other words, he
studied Asian cultures only to the extent that he deemed necessary to find
points of comparison with Occidental characteristics as all his questioning
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turned around the uniqueness of the West. Moreover, Weber was well
aware of the sketchy charcter of these studies and of his inability to read
the sources in their original language. If he published them nevertheless, it
was because he thought that they might perhaps be useful as a supplement
to the problems raised in the sociology of religion and in the sociology of
economics. That studies of this kind or, in fact, of any kind, can never be
«final», was obvious to him.
Before considering Weber's intentions in «The Economic Ethics of
World Religions», it is necessary to remember his purpose in the essay on
The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism. There he had analysed
the economic impact and relevance of the Protestant ethic for the spirit of
capitalism (as opposed to its economic determinedness), and he had not
been concerned with the exact extent or degree of its cultural significance
but only with a general elective affinity or perhaps with its causal adequa-
cy (more on this in chapter IV).
But then he wrote at the end of his revised essay in1920, that he wanted
to correct the isolation of his study on Protestantism which, as has been
mentioned, originally appeared in 1904/05, and to place it in relation to
the whole of cultural development (PE: 262). This may have meant that
1. he wanted to validate his PE thesis by means of comparisons or control
tests (AC: 54) and thus to ascertain that only in the Occident modern
rational capitalism could develop from indigenous sources. But, while
this was probably one of Weber's intentions, it was not the only one;
2. while he had earlier investigated the significance of ascetic Protes-
tantism for the development of the modern capitalistic mentality, he
would now want to reverse the point of view which he had taken in the
Protestant Ethic and to investigate how religious ethics were in turn in-
fluenced by the totality of social conditions (PE: 125), for he thought
that both interpretations are equally possible. In fact, in the «Economic
Ethics of World Religions» both sides of the relationship are consid-
ered.
3. But there is more: the essays on the economic ethics of world religions
are not limited to an investigation of the religious influences on the
economy and on the economic influences on religious ethics, but they
also contain investigations about the relationship between religion,
economics, political domination and law. Why was there this extention
of the topic area? As Wolfgang Schluchter has suggested, Weber had
begun to realize, perhaps as a result of his comparative study in the so-
ciology of music (RSM) which also touched on Asian music, that a
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particular kind of rationalism pervaded not only Western music but the
whole of modern European culture.4 The subject matter of capitalism
or of the capitalistic spirit thus turned into the more general subject
matter of the development of modern Western rationalism, and this in
many areas of life: not only in economic ethics, but also in the politico-
legal orders. And thus, even in his essays on Asian cultures Weber
wanted to come to grips with the particular kinds of rationality which
he found in all areas of occidental social life, and he realized that his
essays turned out to be «contributions to a sociology and typology of
rationalism» (FMW: 324). Rationalism, according to Weber, exists in
all cultures, but cultures have rationalized different areas of life. Weber
wanted to explain the peculiarity of Occidental rationalism as com-
pared to the forms of rationalism elsewhere. He thought, for instance,
that Protestantism had rationalized an attitude of world domination,
Confucianism had rationalized world adaptation and the Indian soteri-
ologies had rationalized world renunciation. But, as will be seen, there
was not only a certain kind of rationalization of world domination in
the Occident, but also a certain kind of legal rationalization. This
would have become clearer, if Weber had been able to complete a
study on Christianity.
There is, however, a certain tension in these essays to the extent that
they permit two different interpretations of the view which Weber had of
the place of Western civilization in relation to the cultures of Asia. On the
one hand, it can be said that Weber produced a typological comparative
universal history or that he conceived his essays on the ethics of world re-
ligions as «contributions to the sociology and typology of rationalism».
Here, Western rationalism is considered as simply one among many, so
that, for instance, Confucian rationalism can be opposed to to Puritan ra-
tionalism. On the other hand, China and India are also viewed by Weber
as impregnated by traditionalism, and this places Western civilization on a
more advanced level of development. It is not easy to integrate these two
views, even if it must be said that Weber looked towards the future of
Western civilization with apprehension as he foresaw mechanized petri-
faction and a lack of brotherliness. It cannot be stressed enough that We-
4 Weber's wife Marianne wrote that according to her husband the process of rational-
ization in the Occident moved on several tracks; it penetrated the economy, the law,
the sciences and art and combined both theoretical and practical rationality (Max
Weber. Ein Lebensbild, 1984, p. 348). English version p. 333/4
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ber's interest in rationality and in the typologies of rationalization did not
imply a preference for the Western type of rationalization or a normative
«ethnocentric» treatment of other cultures. Weber viewed Western civi-
lization as diseased, a dead-end street or an iron-cage without escape
which suffocates the individual and which certainly does not have any-
thing to offer to other civilizations. To be convinced of this, one need only
read the last pages of The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism:
«For the last stage of this cultural development, it might well be truly said:
Specialists without spirit, sensualists without heart; this nullity imagines
that it has attained a level of civilization never before achieved» (PE:
124). 5
The Critiques
Essentially three kinds of critiques have been formulated with regard to
Weber's œuvre in the fields of Asian studies. The first kind is related to the
so-called «Protestant Ethic thesis», supposedly contained in Weber's writ-
ings. Weber himself hoped that nobody would be so simplistic as to im-
pute to him the thesis that «confessional membership alone would conjure
up a specified economic development to a degree that Baptist inhabitants
of Siberia would automatically become wholesale traders and Calvinistic
inhabitants of the Sahara would turn into factory owners» (AC:34). In
5 On occasion it has been claimed that Weber's comparative sociology is a classical
statement of sociological orientalism (in the sense proposed by Edward Said), im-
plying a) the opinion of the superiority of the West over the more or less homoge-
nous and immobile East, and b) the importance of internal factors and a disregard
for the role of colonialism. The above quotation about «specialists without spirit»
should take care of the first claim, and with regard to the second claim (the influ-
ence of colonialism) it can simply be stated that there is hardly any disagreement in
the scholarly community about the distinctness of the European path prior to the ad-
vent of colonialism. A more detailed analysis of these arguments can be found in
Mohammad Nafissi «Reframing Orientalism: Weber and Islam' in: Ralph Schroeder
(ed.) Max Weber, Democracy and Modernization, London: MacMillan 1998
Moreover, it should not be forgotten that Said connected his concept of orientalism
mainly to the practices of British colonialism whereas German orientalists (in the
original sense of the term) on whom Weber mainly relied, were not tied to colonial-
ism and were rather interested in religious ethics and world views. Vide Kippenberg
(2005: 169) who mentions J. Wellhausen, a specialist of Judaism, I. Goldziher, an
islamist, and H. Oldenberg, an indologist.
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spite of this, many Asian readers of Weber seem to have felt that they
must either refute what they believed to be the «Protestant ethic thesis» or
accept lack of development and stagnation for many years to come. Oth-
ers, perhaps under the influence of functionalist interpretations of Weber's
œuvre, have tried to point to functional equivalents of the Protestant ethic
or to capitalistic «strands» in their own countries or cultures. Weber him-
self never considered the issues of industrializing and modernizing less
developed countries, at least not directly, and he certainly knew that the
thesis about a relationship between Protestantism and capitalism was not
his own, but almost as old as Protestantism itself. Only the characteriza-
tion of this relationship was open to debate. While many Asian and West-
ern authors have tried to prove that there is a potential for capitalistic de-
velopement in their region – in some regions proof is obviously not neces-
sary any longer –, Weber would not have denied that possibility. Predic-
tions of trends were abhorred by him; more than anyone else he foresaw
the possibility of unexpected consequences of historical phenomena and
actions and he would not have tried to predict a future of any kind.
The second kind of criticism is related to the interpretation of details
which the simple advance of historical research and anthropological re-
search would have made unavoidable. We may note, as examples for Chi-
na, the too close identification of literati and gentry, or Weber's limited
understanding of Neo-Confucian philosophy; and, as examples for India,
some interpretations of Indian sects and of the bhakti movement. Many
facts and details which have been made available by modern research, ob-
viously were unknown in Weber's time and, as far as these new findings
are concerned, Weber must be corrected. But Weber's arguments cannot
be judged merely by the yardstick of what is historically true from today's
point of view. His were arguments which formulated new questions and
new problems. His purpose was different from that of the historian (of the
historicist tradition) and of the modern ethnographer who consider all his-
torical epochs and cultures as totally different and unique and who want to
paint a picture «of life as it really was» (Ranke) or is. It is precisely here
that the third kind of critique is often advanced.
The third kind of critique relates to questions of ethnocentrism and
comparative sociology. The accusation of normative ethnocentrism or Eu-
rocentrism cannot be raised against Weber because he certainly did not
consider the Western world as superior to other cultures, but he had a
heuristic ethnocentric perspective as he looked upon world history from a
consciously Western standpoint in order to understand by constant com-
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parison the distinctiveness of the West's development. Max Weber's wife
Marianne6 wrote in the biography of her husband that the essays on world
religions were contributions to the characterization of Western man and
his culture. In fact, Weber's points of comparison and his concepts have an
Occidental origin because the comparisons are made to better understand
certain aspects of the Occident. For instance, central to the understanding
of Weber's sociology of religions is the concept of theodicy which may
have to be redefined in non-monotheistic contexts like India. Weber cham-
pioned comparative research because, among other reasons, he believed
that without comparisons it is impossible to arrive at causal explanations
(always of a probabilistic nature) in history and social science. No matter
how clear an interpretation appears to be from the point of view of mean-
ing, Weber thought that it cannot, on this account, claim to be a causally
valid interpretation. Rather, it remains a hypothesis; and, in order to deter-
mine the degree of probability of such hypotheses, it is, according to him,
necessary to compare a large number of historical and contemporary
events by means of «mental experiments». For example, in order to test
the probability of his hypothesis about the Protestant ethic, Weber studied
the world religions.
In fact, the motives for studying another culture than one's own can be
manifold, but they can generally be divided into two categories. There are
those who proclaim the desire to understand the other culture as such, out
of pure curiosity perhaps or as a result of an attitude of escapism, the long-
ing for a «better» political system or a «truer» religion or the intention to
use the knowledge gained to better dominate that culture; and, on the other
hand, there is the motive pursued by some who study a different culture to
better understand their own. Men like Alexis de Tocqueville or Louis Du-
mont in France and Max Weber in Germany belonged to this second cate-
gory. In Tocqueville's The Old Regime and the Revolution the centre of
interest is France, although we learn a lot about England and Prussia.
France is the positive case, the others are negative cases used for compara-
tive purposes. But what makes England England and Prussia Prussia obvi-
ously cannot be discovered in a theory of France. Similarly, Louis Dumont
in his Homo Hierarchicus on the Indian caste system wrote: «We (occi-
dental man) must convince ourselves that the castes can teach us some-
6 Marianne Weber Max Weber. Ein Lebensbild. Tübingen: Mohr (Siebeck) 1984
(1926), p. 346; Engl. p.331
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thing about ourselves», and he continued: «what good is there in going to
India, if not in order to discover how Indian civilization... represents a
form of the universal?».7 To see our culture in its specificity, we must see
it in perspective by contrasting it with other cultures. It is possible here to
speak of heuristic ethnocentrism or eurocentrism, but not of normative eu-
rocentrism.
This is precisely the purpose of comparative sociology as opposed to
those scientific endeavours which purport to study the uniqueness of other
cultures.8 We are dealing here with a philosophical question which is at
the very heart of the debate between comparative «Weberians» and spe-
cialists in the various fields of Asian studies. In fact, the more one ratio-
nalizes one method or scientific approach, the more there is the likelihood
that a tension is created with other principles of rationalization, with other
scientific approaches.
But one can legitimately ask what Weber's approach can mean or give
to a scholar from Asia who is not, in the last analysis, interested in the
charcterization of Western man and culture, but rather in the tradition or in
the more recent developments and styles of modernization of his or her
own culture and conduct of life. It has been suggested that a scholar from
Asia should look at the history of his country and should then ask the ba-
sic questions which Weber asked when he attempted to understand the
European situation: Who are we? How did we get here? Where should we
go? Weber's essays on India and China and his views on Islam and Ortho-
7 Louis Dumont Homo Hierarchicus. Essai sur le système des castes. Paris: Galli-
mard 1966, p. 14 & p. 16.
8 There is a humorous Hassidic parable which was recounted by Heinrich Zimmer in
Myths and Symbols in Indian Art and Civilization (Princeton U. Press 1972) and
which describes well the way of comparative sociology: A rabbi of the name of
Eisik lived in the ghetto of Cracow in Poland. He had several dreams which en-
joined him to go to Prage where he should discover a hidden treasure beneath a
bridge. Finally, he went to Prague and discovered that sentries guarded the bridge
day and night. Therefore he did not venture to dig, but loitered around until a cap-
tain of the guards inquired whether he had lost anything. The rabbi recounted the
dream that he had had and the officer stood back and laughed: «Poor fellow», he
said, «what sensible person would trust a dream? Look, if I had been one to go
trusting dreams, I should be doing just the opposite now.» And he recounted of a
voice which had commanded him to search for a great treasure in the house of a
rabbi in Cracow whose name was Eisik. The rabbi listened eagerly and then hurried
straightway back to his home, dug in a neglected corner of his house and discovered
the treasure which put an end to all his misery.
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dox Russia would then be no more than a quarry from which fruitful hy-
potheses can be extracted, although his method might still be useful Be-
cause of the undoubted impact of Western culture in Asia, Indian or Chi-
nese or Muslim scholars may also ask themselves whether they agree with
Weber's analysis of the West. Is Western civilization, which is in the pro-
cess of penetrating the East, such as Weber sees it? If the answer is in the
affirmative, then Weber's essays may also be of some value to Asians who
are interested in precisely those aspects of their own culture which present
the greatest contrast and the greatest challenge to the West, because these
are aspects which Weber intended to stress. To be sure, this approach will
not grasp the «essence» of any culture. At best, it will help to comprehend
those aspects of it which are meaningful and important to the scholar at
the given time and under the given circumstances. Science cannot do
more.
Scientific Concepts and Points of View
It has been mentioned earlier that, according to Weber, whatever approach
one chooses, one will not grasp the essence of any culture. In fact, there is
no «objective» scientific analysis of cultural life (CMW: 113), indepen-
dent of one-sided points of view. The scientist or scholar starts from an
interest which may come from his cultural environment or his personal
views and which directs his questions. This is unavoidable, but it is impor-
tant to realize it. In his address «Science as a Vocation» Weber explained
that science can lead the scholar to clarity about himself, his own stand
and the subsidiary consequences of his choices which will likely occur
(FMW: 151), but it cannot prescribe the values according to which one
should live nor the point of view which directs one's scientific endeavours.
Reality is a multiple chaos or a «heterogeneous continuum» of an infi-
nite number of facts or appearances which the scholar approaches from a
precise perspective provided by certain values. As human beings are en-
dowed with culture, they have the capacity to take a position, to evaluate
the events and to consider certain aspects of reality as significant, Weber
wrote (CMW: 119). In contrast to the situation in the natural sciences
which reduce the empirical reality to laws, no law can inform the cultural
scientist in what sense reality is significant as this is determined by the
values or the meaning context in the light of which we look at any culture.
Moreover, not only the questions which the scholar asks are tied to the
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values of his culture, but also the concepts which he formulates. In fact,
Weber accepted the distinction of his philosopher-friend H. Rickert be-
tween generalizing (in the natural sciences) and individualizing concept
formation (in the humanities). Concepts may be simply classificatory (as
in Linné's classification of plants, formed according to the schema genus
proximum, differentia specifica) and are then applicable to many cultural
environments. They describe what is common to empirical phenomena. In
this case they are likely to have fluid boundaries (such as «capitalism»
which, according to Weber, has existed everywhere in the world and can
be subdivided into adventure capitalism, political capitalism, tax farming
etc.). But there are concepts like for instance «romantic» or «en-
trepreneur» or «modern capitalism» which it would be difficult to use in a
classificatory way. In fact, the more we are dealing with the conceptual
shaping of complex historical relationships which are culturally significant
and are related to a particular culture and epoch, the more the concepts
will have the character of ideal types of an individual character, although
some classificatory characteristics are also assumed to exist. They will be
used for heuristic purposes which accentuate unilaterally a point of view
in order to understand a section of reality in its significance for modern
culture. They will not be intended to grasp any «substance» or «true» real-
ity (CMW: 127); rather, they will diverge from empirical reality which
can only be compared or related to them. If for example the scholar takes
the concept of sect, he can try to understand the meaning context of the
religious dogma which predominates in sects and form it into a homoge-
nous thought-out structure towards which all sects or sect members must
strive if they take the logical consequences of their confession seriously.9
The aim of this ideal-typical concept formation is always, according to
Weber, to bring out the individualising aspects and not what is general in
cultural phenomena. Weber's «Protestant ethic» also is such an ideal type,
a «historical individual», as it accentuates those aspects which were sig-
nificant for modern culture. Many other concepts which Weber used are
also ideal types, and their use implies several things:
1. They never describe the substance or the essence of reality which
rather is characterized by the infinity of its aspects.
9 Dieter Henrich Die Einheit der Wissenschaftslehre Max Webers Tübingen: Mohr
(Siebeck) 1952, p 93
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2. They are the result of a utopian construction which can never be found
as such in empirical reality.
3. This utopian construction should not be confused with an ideal. It is
simply the result of a unilateral choice of certain factors in reality
which seem to be significant to the researcher from his point of view.
The one-sidedness and also intensification of certain aspects of reality
gives coherence to the ideal type while reality itself is much more unstruc-
tured and confuse. The scientific task is then to estimate to what extent the
empirical data approach the ideal type.
As for the rest, Weber's theory of science implies that it is impossible to
construct a complete and definitive synthesis of reality. We are necessarily
limited to partial views, and other ideal types regarding the «same» relity
are always possible and will in fact be constructed as soon as «the light
shed by the great problems of (our) culture moves on» (CMW: 138). 10
Rationality and Rationalisation
Among the ideal-types which Weber used in order to project a mental or-
der unto the «chaos» of reality of Western society were, of cause, capital-
ism, and then the process of rationalisation which, according to him, had
penetrated all the spheres of Western social life: not only economics, but
also religion, law, and even music. When Weber published his essay on
the Protestant ethic in 1904/05, he tried to establish an elective affinity be-
tween the ethics of certain Protestant groups and the «spirit» of capitalism.
But, as has been mentioned earlier, when he published the augmented es-
say in 1920, his interests and preoccupations had become wider and, as he
explained in the «Preliminary Remark» of the Collected Essays, capital-
ism had become for him only an aspect of a more general process of ratio-
nalisation. Rational scientific research practiced by specialists, rational bu-
reaucracy, the corner stone of the modern state, rational harmonic music, a
rational juridic doctrine, a rational organization of business with rational
accounting and based on the existence of formally free labour - all of these
are examples of the specific rationalism of Western civilization.
10 Weber's reflections on the ideal type can be found in his «The ‹objectivity› of
knowledge in social science and social policy» (CMW: 100-138).
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One must remind oneself that Weber repeatedly insisted that the term
rationalism or rationalisation may refer to extremely diverse things and
that the areas of social life as well as whole civilizations may be rational-
ized in regard to very different ends and values. What is rational from one
point of view may become irrational from another standpoint so that, for
instance, for the unbeliever every religious way of life is irrational. It is
possible to talk of the rationalisation of mystical life in India although this
kind of life may be considered irrational from our economic point of view.
Even magic can be rationalised and systematised, for the first therapeutics
which may be considered rational implied the refusal to treat empirical
symptoms by potions and rather tried to get rid of the presumed «true
causes» of an illness by exorcism. Nevertheless, Weber tried to find the
distinctive characteristics of Western rationalism and then to analyse the
different forms of modern rationalism
The rationalisation of life in the Occident does not imply a collective or
individual progress; it is not an ideal but rather an ideal-type which Weber
used to structure reality. Living in modern rationalised society human be-
ings have not become less aggressive, and they have not always become
more free. On the contrary, rational modern bureaucracy encloses us, ac-
cording to Weber, in an «iron cage» which drove him to despair. Simi-
larly, there has perhaps been rational progress in the technique of painting
since the discovery of the perspective, but this does not imply that primi-
tive art was less beautiful. But rationalisation implies an increase, a spe-
cialization and a systematization of knowledge on the societal level. Al-
though it may be true that the passengers of an air plane or the users of a
computer do not normally know the principles of their functioning, they
know that they could learn them if they wanted, and that there are no mys-
terious magical forces in this machinery which cannot be mastered. To the
extent that modern man has ceased to believe in magical forces, the world
has become «disenchanted», in Weber's terminology, and there is the be-
lief in the calculability of all events.
Rationalisation can appear in several forms: There is, of course, the sci-
entific and technical rationality, but in his essays on the world religions
Max Weber was mainly concerned with practical rationality, referring to
orientations in the conduct of life and to the ensuing kinds of personality;
he was also concerned with metaphysical rationality which is the conse-
quence of the need of man to understand the world as a coherently struc-
tured cosmos which has a meaning. In his sociology of law Weber was
concerned with the institutional orders of life, and there he distinguished
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between formal and substantive rationality. Weber thought, though, that
there is an inevitable tension between certain kinds of rationalism and that
if, for instance, one produces more rationality in the scientific or technical
sphere, the rationality on the metaphysical level - the meaning structures
of the cosmos as a whole - will diminish. Moreover, Weber was also
aware of the limits of rationalism and that the rational in the sense of inner
consequence, although it may have power of man, is always limited and
unstable (FMW:324) and he pointed to the fact that the rationally most co-
herent solutions often collide with the «injustices of the world» (FMW:
275/6).
The Method of Analysis
All social phenomena have, according ot Weber, an exterior and an interi-
or side. To the exterior side belong the economic, political, and legal cir-
cumstances which can affect peoples» situation in a positive or negative
way. The inner side refers to the disposition of humans to lead a certain
rational conduct of life. With regard to capitalism Weber distinguished be-
tween the capitalist system or form (the exterior side) and the capitalist
spirit (Geist, the inner side).11 By system or form he meant the capitalist
organization within a formally rational and predictable legal system, the
technically rational means of production, double entry accounting, the sep-
aration of household and enterprise, and free labour; by spirit of capitalism
he meant a methodical-ethical conduct of life in one's profession and a ra-
tional tempering of the irrational impulse of gain. The form of capitalism
had totally different origins than the spirit, but both may exist in close
affinity (Wahlverwandtschaft) with each other even if the form would
have been unable to produce the spirit out of itself. In the answers to his
critics (AC) Weber pointed out that a capitalist spirit has sometimes exist-
ed without a capitalist system, and a capitalist system without a capitalist
spirit - in the same way as we might find an army organized according to
the German model of an army but without a militaristic spirit. A historical-
ly given form of capitalism, Weber wrote, can be filled with very different
kinds of «spirits» which may have varying degrees of affinity with the
11 The opposition of spirit and form had already been used by Nietzsche in the first
part of his Unzeitgemäße Betrachtungen where he wrote about the defeat if not the
extirpation of the German spirit for the sake of the German Reich after 1871.
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form (favorable, indifferent, or even obstructive). But when the form or
system and the spirit have a particularly high degree of affinity, a develop-
ment of unbroken homogeneity is likely to commence. If, however, the
degree of affinity is low, there will be tension between the economic sys-
tem and the spirit, the ethical life-style, as was the case in Florence (AC:
49, fn.2)
Western man lives today, according to Weber, in an iron cage (Talcott
Parson's translation of stahlhartes Gehäuse), namely the shell or form of
capitalism from which the spirit has escaped long ago (PE: 123). With re-
gard to India, Weber talked of the «spirit» of the whole system (RI: 112),
and he also mentioned the shell (Gehäuse), namely the caste system (RI:
121); with regard to China, Weber wrote of the firm shell (festes Gehäuse)
of patrimonial bureaucracy (RC: 61) which was the seat of the «spirit» of
the literati and of Confucianism (RC: 129; 203). There can be little doubt
then that any study of the development or the diffusion of capitalism,
modernization, or industrialization in Asia, if it claims Weberian roots or a
Weberian frame of reference, must specify whether it refers to the inner
«spirit» of these phenomena or simply to the outer form or structure. The
diffusion of and the adaptation to the outer form of capitalism or modern-
ization or of a Western legal system is one thing, the development of the
«spirit» from within is quite another. This is particularly so because We-
ber saw affinities not only between the capitalist system and the capitalist
spirit, but also between the occidental politico-legal system and its world-
dominating spirit.
As already mentioned, Weber distinguished between the exterior sys-
tem and the inner spirit in all world religions. With regard to the spirit, a
further comment is necessary, for it is not simply a shorthand term for reli-
gious foundations or dogmas, constructed in a coherent way by intellectu-
als or theologians. Besides the constructed dogmas there are always also
the salvational interests and psychic reactions of the faithful. Religious
ideas have an influence on the course of historical development only
through the interaction between them and the salvational interests of the
believers or the psychological premia which they hope to attain. It is this
interaction which produces the spirit. Weber repeatedly pointed to the fact
that while the doctrines of the theologians may well require a certain kind
of conduct, for instance frugality and hard work, these doctrines do not
necessarily create in the people the psychological motives which will pro-
duce the required type of conduct. Nor do worldly wisdom or the doctrines
of the literati create such motives. Catholic doctrine, for instance, insists
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on hard work, but the highest premia which the Catholic can attain are the
result of other kinds of conduct, and there is, moreover, in the confession a
means to relieve one's conscience. Protestantism, on the other hand, sets a
very high psychological premium on the methodical conduct of life in pro-
viding the idea that only by proving oneself in one's life and vocation can
one attain the inner reassurance of salvation (certitudo salutis).
Weber's insistence that he is concerned with the psychological sanc-
tions created by the religious and institutional context, and not simply with
the theories of theologians and literati, must be kept in mind by anyone
who wishes to find equivalents of the Protestant ethic in Asia. The analyst
needs sources of the respective religious foundations as well as of the sal-
vational interests of religious communities. It must be conceded, though,
that Weber used both types of sources in the Protestant Ethic, but that in
the essays on the world religions he often contented himself with an analy-
sis of the dogmatic foundations.
A Short Outline of the Material
Chapter II is concerned with Weber's Protestant Ethic studies. It provides
a summary of the original version of 1904/05, followed by a summary of
Weber's article on the Protestant sects. Furthermore, there is a section on
Weber's replies to his critics in the years following the original publica-
tion, and, finally, a short analysis of the main additions which Weber in-
troduced in the 1920 version of the Protestant Ethic.
Chapter III provides summaries and commentaries of Weber's pub-
lished essays on the economic ethics of world religions (China, India/
Buddhism and ancient Judaism) as well as Weber's views of the economic
ethics of those world religions on which he was unable to publish com-
plete essays (Islam, ancient Christianity, Orthodox Christianity and Occi-
dental Christianity). In some cases, when Weber's analysis seems too
sparse from today's point of view and knowledge, short additions have
been inserted in accordance with Weber's general trend of thought. All of
this is, of course, preceded by Weber's «Introduction» and augmented by
his «Intermediate Reflection». The analysis of each world religion is di-
vided into parts: 1. the sociological foundations (the political and adminis-
trative system), 2. the religiously motivated orientation of life of the reli-
gious carrier groups, 3. the distinction between orthodox and heterodox
movements, and 4. the distinction between elite and mass religiosity in the
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respective religious tradition. With regard to each religion the major cri-
tiques which have been addressed to Weber's essays and views are pointed
out and commented upon in extended footnotes.
Chapter IV intends to show how Weber's comparative studies of world
religions serve as «indirect causal validation» of Weber's Protestant ethic
thesis. It starts with an analysis of the concept of «elective affinity» and
shows that it can be divided into two aspects: adequacy on the level of
meaning and causal adequacy. Whereas Weber's Protestant Ethic shows
mainly an adequacy on the level of meaning between the Protestant ethic
and the spirit of capitalism, his essays and views of the economic ethics of
world religions try to establish a causal adequacy. They verify and vali-
date the PE-thesis, they also suggest an adequate causal relationship be-
tween certain kinds of sects in other cultures and a generalized concept of
capitalism, they exclude other theories related to technical advances, pre-
cious metals, population increases etc., and they finally underline the pow-
er and efficacy of religion in the formation of cultural and social phenom-
ena.
Chapter V is to a certain extent the counterpart of chapter II. Whereas
in chapter II the Protestant ethic, the inner side or the spirit of Western de-
velopment, is analyzed, chapter V analyzes the exterior side and particu-
larly its main aspect, the law.
The first section is merely an introduction to Weber's sociology of law.
It shows the distinction which Weber makes between the sociology of law
and jurisprudence; and it then disusses four kinds of law, based on We-
ber's distinctions between rational and irrational as well as between sub-
stantive and formal law. There are, moreover, two kinds of formally ratio-
nal law: English common law and continental European law, based on
codes. The developmental conditions of the rationalisation of law can
largely be derived from its inner logic and from its carrier groups.
The second section provides a short outline of the legal ideas and sys-
tems within all the cultures which were considered in chapter III. Weber's
own observations are left intact but are often complemented and, as in the
case of Buddhist and Russian-Orthodox law, completely new observations
have been added with Weber in mind. Again, the critiques addressed to
Weber and recent advances in scholarship have received some comments
in the footnotes. The center of this section, however, is the development of
European secular law. In the comparison with Confucian, Indian, Buddhist
and Islamic legal concepts and ideas, the particular characteristics of the
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modern Occidental legal structures, their unique formal rationality, be-
comes visible.
Although Weber had integrated some considerations of the respective
laws in his essays on India and China, it has seemed preferable here to re-
consider these laws in a separate chapter, based mainly on his «sociology
of law» in Economy and Society, in order to clearly establish the differ-
ence between Western and Asian laws and also to clearly characterize
Western law as an exterior counterpart of the interior spirit of capitalism.
In the Conclusion, Weber's Preliminary Remark («Author's Introduc-
tion») is examined and interpreted. After viewing the panorama of the oth-
er world religions and their laws, Weber's focus, saturated with compara-
tive information, returns to his original question about the distinguishing
features of the West (of his time), he describes briefly the rationalisation
which took place in Western science and music, and then points to the par-
ticular kind of rationalisation which took place in Western law and in the
Western «spirit», as well as to the elective affinity which combined and
strenghtened them. It becomes apparent, though, that Weber had an am-
bivalent attitude to all these kinds of rationalisation.
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THE PROTESTANT ETHIC STUDIES
The Protestant Ethic and the «Spirit» of Capitalism of 1904/05
Basic Literature
Max Weber The Protestant Ethic and the «Spirit» of Capitalism and Other Writings
(edited and translated by Peter Baehr & Gordon Wells) London: Penguin 2002
Max Weber «Die protestantische Ethik und der ‹Geist› des Kapitalismus» in: Archiv
für Sozialwissenschaft und Sozialpolitik 20 (1904) pp 1-54 and 21 (1905) pp. 1-110
Max Weber noted in the «Introduction» to his essays on «The Economic
Ethics of World Religions» that he assumes that the reader has knowledge
of his studies on Protestantism. Let us therefore turn to these studies and
start with his essay «The Protestant Ethic and the «Spirit» of Capitalism»
as it appeared in its original version of 1904/05.
A glance at the occupational statistics of European countries of mixed
religious composition brings to light, according to Weber, the mainly
Protestant character of capital ownership and a reduced participation of
Catholics in modern business life. Weber believes that the prevailing ex-
planations of his time which underline the «other-worldliness» of Catholi-
cism and the «materialism» of Protestantism are not tenable. On the con-
trary, it might be possible to see an affinity between other-worldliness and
Protestant asceticism on the one hand and capitalistic acquisition on the
other. Already the Spaniards of the seventeenth century knew that the
«heresy» of Calvinism promoted the desire for trade, and the Quakers and
the Mennonites became rich although no joy of living can be ascribed to
them. Indeed, the affinity between certain aspects of Protestantism and the
modern capitalistic culture does not seem to lie in its alleged joy of living




What is to be understood by the «spirit»12 of capitalism? Weber does
not provide a definition but rather an illustration. The writings of Ben-
jamin Franklin are evidence of an ethos: the obligation which the individu-
al feels to work with prudence and honesty for the increase of his capital
as an end in itself. The summum bonum (the highest good) of this ethic,
the acquisition of more and more money while avoiding all spontaneous
enjoyment of life, is completely devoid of any hedonistic or eudaemonistic
aspects.
The outer form of an economic order and the spirit which lives in it or
in the people can find themselves in some sort of adequate relationship to
each other (but not in a relationship of necessary interdependence). When
Weber used the expression «spirit of capitalism» to describe that style of
life which seeks profit rationally and systematically (like Benjamin
Franklin), he felt that this was justified by the historical fact that this atti-
tude or spirit has found its most adequate form in the capitalist enterprise.
But the capitalistic spirit and the capitalist form or order may well occur
separately. At the beginning of modern times capitalistic enterprises were
often led in a traditionalistic spirit. When this spirit, in some cases, turned
into a capitalistic one, this was interpreted by others as the result of the
auri sacra fames (greed for gold). For the idea of money-making as an end
in itself, as a calling, was contrary to the ethical feelings of the Middle
Ages and, in fact, of most epochs; money-making was at best considered
as ethically indifferent, it was tolerated, but deo placere vix potest (it was
not thought to be pleasing to God).
How, then, did the idea of gain in Franklin’s sense grow out of tradi-
tionalism and how can the affinity between the spirit of capitalism and
certain religious characteristics of the Reformation be illustrated? The de-
12 The term «spirit» was fashionable in Weber’s time. One of Nietzsche’s books was
entitled The birth of tragedy from the spirit of music, and v. Ihering had written
The Spirit of the Roman Law. The use of the term can be traced to the eighteenth
century when the French esprit de siècle turned into Herder’s Volksgeist. (spirit of
a people) and then, in the nineteenth century, into Hegel’s Weltgeist (world spirit).
Geist (spirit) was for Weber the quintessence of values, motivations and goals of
the dominating strata of a society and also something related to style. In the PE:17
Weber described the capitalistic spirit as an «ethos in the sense of an ethically
coloured maxim for the conduct of life» and in his so-called anticritical writings
(AC: 64) he added that it is a habitus or a conduct of life within the orders of the
world (as opposed to an ethos of monks) which is characterized by matter-of-fact-
ness, calculability, rational consequence and specialization.
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velopment of this new conduct of life and of a calling which is completely
irrational from the point of view of purely eudaemonistic self-interest,
needs to be traced.
Before the development from traditionalism to the modern capitalistic
spirit is analysed, Weber interjects some methodological remarks. The
founders of the Protestant religious movements did not intend to promote
what has been called the spirit of capitalism. To the extent that they con-
tributed to it, it was the unforseen and even unwished-for result of their
labours.13. Besides, Weber’s inquiry is limited to the question of what in
modern culture which is itself the result of innumerable different historical
factors, can be imputed to the influence of the Reformation. Therefore,
there is no intention of maintaining that the spirit of capitalism (or even
the capitalistic system) could only have arisen as the result of certain ef-
fects of the Reformation; rather, it will only be ascertained whether and to
what extent religious forces have taken part in the qualitative formation
and in the quantitative expansion of that spirit throughout the world. This
will be done first by ascertaining at what points certain elective affinities
between forms of religious beliefs and practical ethics (Berufsethik) can be
recognized. In this way it may be possible to clarify the manner and the
general direction in which the religious movements have influenced the
development of economic life. Afterwards, one could attempt to estimate
to what extent modern culture can be attributed to religious motives.
The German word Beruf as well as the English word calling, in its mod-
ern meaning among the Protestant people, has its source in the Bible trans-
lations as the result of the spirit of the translators, not that of the original
text. The meaning of the word – a life-task, a definite field of work –, took
on a new colour: the valuation of the fulfilment of duty in worldly callings
as the highest goal which the moral activity of the individual can achieve.
The Catholic division of ethical precepts into praecepta (commandments
for lay people) and consilia (supererogatory recommendations for monks)
was discarded. To surpass worldly actions in monastic asceticism had be-
come impossible: for Luther, the fulfilment of innerworldly duties was the
13 Here, as quite often in Weber’s writings, the reader is reminded of an aphorism of
the German writer and poet J.W. Goethe whom Weber knew well: «Everything
that we do has a consequence. But wise and just actions do not always produce
something favourable. and wrong actions do not always produce unfavourable
consequences; on the contrary, just the opposite sometimes happens.» Goethe to
Eckermann, 25 december 1825.
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only way of living acceptably to God. But as Luther insisted on the sola
fide (justification can be achieved only by faith), his concept of calling re-
mained traditionalistic, and one’s calling and status were things which
man had to accept as a divine ordinance, to which he must adapt himself.
Moreover, mystical influences played a role in Luther’s thought. The idea
of calling in the Lutheran sense is, therefore, of questionable importance
for the development of the conduct of life which concerns Weber in his
Protestant Ethic.
A very different relationship between religious life and worldly action
in a calling can be found in Calvinism to which Weber now turns. Here,
without any doubt, the doctrine of predestination was of particular cultural
and historical significance. By God’s absolutely free decree, and without
human merit or guilt playing a role in it, one part of humanity is saved, the
rest is damned. To apply earthly standards of justice to God’s double de-
cree is meaningless in the context of this doctrine. In this situation nobody
can help, no priest, no sacraments, no Church and no God (Christ had died
only for the elect) and the individual is torn away from the close ties with
which he was bound to the community. The consequence of this doctrine
was a disillusioned individualism and it would have led to fatalism with-
out the development of another doctrine and other ideas and motivations.
Weber can show these motivations as he is less concerned with the
question of what was theoretically and officially taught in the ethical com-
pendia of the time than with the psychological motivations which originat-
ed in religious belief and practice.
It seems at first an enigma how the superiority of Calvinism in social
organization could combine itself with this tendency to tear the individual
away from the closed ties which bound him to this world, but a compari-
son with Luther’s thought can clarify the issue. In Calvinism the Lutheran
unio mystica, in which the soul is thought to be the vessel of the Divine,
was impossible. Because of the absolute transcendency of God (finitum
non est capax infiniti, i.e. finite man is incapable of grasping the infinite),
the community with God could only take place to the extent that man’s ac-
tions were influenced by God, that man felt himself to be the tool of God,
a tool in maiorem Dei gloriam (to the higher glory of God), God’s tool to
dominate the world by work in one’s vocational calling.
Moreover, Calvinism added to the doctrine of predestination the idea of
proving one’s faith and election in worldly activity and it thus provided a
positive incentive to innerworldly asceticism. Although good works and
an ascetic lifestyle were not considered to be the means of attaining salva-
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tion, they were indispensable as a sign of election – on condition that they
were not simply individual good works but the result of a unified and sys-
tematic conduct of life. This idea of proof as a psychological basis for a
methodical way of life can be studied in its purest form in connection with
the doctrine of predestination, but it is a recurring framework for the un-
derstanding of the connection between faith and ethical conduct not only
in Calvinism, but also in other Protestant denominations.
The monastic rules of the Benedictines, the Cistercians and even more
the Jesuits had all rejected any planless otherworldliness and had de-
veloped a systematic method of rational ascetic conduct; they had brought
the monks’ actions under constant self-control and had turned them into
workers in the service of God. And, as Weber mentioned, it is the paradox
of all rational asceticism that it creates the very wealth that it rejects, that
monasteries become the very loci of rational economies and occidental
monks the first men of vocation (Berufsmenschen). But what was new af-
ter the Reformation was the fact that one was now forced to work in a call-
ing and to pursue ascetic ideals within mundane occupations. Christian as-
ceticism had slammed the door of the monastery behind it and strode into
the world (PE: 101). While the monks had practiced an outworldly ascesis
in conformity with the consilia evangelica ( in Catholicism the recom-
mended ascetic life-style of monks), now every Protestant had to lead an
ascetic life in the world.
Lutheranism did not yet create the same motivations for a methodical
regulation of one’s life and the non-Calvinistic ascetic movements, con-
sidered purely from the view-point of the religious motivation of an as-
cetic and methodical conduct of life, formed an attenuation of the inner
consistency of Calvinism. In Pietism, one finds a greater emphasis on the
emotional side of religion; it practically led its followers to strive for the
enjoyment of salvation in this world rather than to engage in the ascetic
struggle for certainty about the future. The doctrine of predestination was
tempered by the doctrine of «terminism» (grace is offered by God once
only). In comparison with Calvinism one finds a lesser intensity of the
methodical conduct of life. The dogmatic theory, for instance in Spener,
lacked consistency, as he was influenced by mysticism.
Also the Methodist ethic appears to have rested on a foundation of un-
certainty and inconsistency. The aspiration to the «second blessedness»
served as a sort of substitute for the doctrine of predestination. The Baptist
movement, finally, and the sects which adopted its religious thought (the
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Baptists, Mennonites and Quakers) is an independent source of Protes-
tantism.
On the whole, in the non-Calvinistic Protestant movements the religious
community was no longer looked upon as a sort of trust foundation, in-
cluding both the just and the unjust, for supernatural ends, whether for in-
creasing the glory of God (Calvinistic) or for bringing the means of salva-
tion to men (Catholic and Lutheran), but solely as a community of person-
al believers and of the reborn. In other words, not as a church but as a sect.
All Baptist communities desired to be pure in the sense of the blameless
conduct of their members. They could also be characterized by the expec-
tant waiting for the «inner light», but with time an accommodation took
place to worldly activity in a calling. Their attitude implied a weakening
of the Calvinistic conception of the calling although the intensity of inter-
est in economic occupations was considerably increased by their refusal to
accept office in the service of the State.
The decisive point in all Protestant denominations was the conception
of the state of religious grace which could not be attained or guaranteed by
any magico-sacramental means, by a confession or by any individual good
works but only by proving oneself in a specific type of conduct. From this
followed for the individual the incentive methodically to verify his own
state of grace in his practical conduct, a rational planning of the whole of
one’s life in accordance with God’s will.
After having shown the religious foundations of the Puritan idea of the
calling14, Weber examines the effects of this idea in the business world.
Since English Puritanism which grew out of Calvinism gives the most
consistent religious basis for the idea of the calling, he places the writing
of one of its representatives, Richard Baxter’s «Christian Directory», at
the centre of the discussion.
There is a continually repeated passionate preaching of hard, continu-
ous bodily or mental labour; waste of time is the deadliest of sins; the real
moral objection is to the relaxation in the security of possession; what God
demands is not labour in itself, but rational labour in a calling, although a
change of calling is not objectionable. While successful work is proof of
salvation, to strive for riches in order to live well is sinful.The sponta-
neous enjoyment of life is rejected whereas the specialized division of
14 Only in passing Weber mentions another cultural influence of Puritanism: It is, ac-
cording to him, one of the fathers of modern military discipline (PE: 196).
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labour is ethically justified. The ascetic compulsion to save while living
frugally leads to an accumulation of capital. Weber also underlines the
pharisaically good conscience of the Puritans in the acquisition of money.
Every trace of the Deo placere vix potest (the Catholic idea that the accu-
mulation of wealth cannot please God) has disappeared.
Although the ascetic literature of almost all religions is saturated with
the idea that faithful labour is pleasing to God, the Protestants deepened
this idea and created the psychological motives for it which alone are de-
cisive: the conception of labour as a calling and as the best, often the only
means of attaining certainty of grace. It may therefore be said that one of
the fundamental elements of the spirit of modern capitalism: rational con-
duct on the basis of the idea of the calling, was born from the spirit of
Christian asceticism.
Already Goethe expressed the idea that the limitation to specialized
work and the renunciation of the Faustian universality of man is a precon-
dition of any valuable work in the modern world. The Puritan, as Weber
said, wanted to work in a calling while we are forced to do so. Routiniza-
tion has set in and the spirit which was under discussion here, today has
left the «iron cage» of the capitalist system; the victorious system no
longer needs its support in order to determine with irresistible force the
lives of all those who are born into it. At the end, Weber asks with Nietz-
sche whether mechanized petrifaction is about to paralyse us or whether
we are about to become specialists without spirit or sensualists without
heart.
The Protestant Sects and the Spirit of Capitalism
Basic Literature
«The Protestant Sects and the Spirit of Capitalism» in From Max Weber. Essays in So-
ciology. (translated and edited by H. H. Gerth & C. Wright Mills) Oxford 1958 pp.
302-322
«Die protestantischen Sekten und der Geist des Kapitalismus» in Max Weber Gesam-
melte Aufsätze zur Religionssoziologie vol. 1 Tübingen: Mohr 1920, pp. 207-236
While in the essay on the Protestant Ethic Weber had considered only one
of the factors which had contributed to the conduct of life in the worldly
activity of a calling, the essay on the Protestant sects provided the oppor-
tunity to consider another factor: the influence of religious institutions and
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communal forms, i.e., the external conditions rather than the inner motiva-
tions, which contributed to the conduct of life of the Protestants.
The distinction between church and sect is relevant here. A church is an
institution of sacramental grace, membership is obligatory for all and does
not prove anything with regard to the members’ qualities; a sect is a vol-
untary association which one can only join after a religious probation.
Membership in a sect signified that the person involved had certain moral
qualifications and it especially certified a certain level of business morals.
It was particularly important for the conduct of life of the members of a
sect that the congregation as a self-governing and sovereign local commu-
nity was jointly responsible for keeping unworthy individuals away from
participation in the Holy Communion, that the congregations were small
enough in order to guarantee church discipline and that the administration
of church discipline was vested in the hands of lay people. A member, be-
fore he was allowed to join, had to have certain qualities which happened
to be important for the development of modern rational capitalism, and
then he had to prove repeatedly within the circle of his sect that he was
endowed with these qualities, that he was worthy of being a sect member.
There is, according to Weber, no stronger means of producing a desired
conduct of life than through the necessity of holding one’s own in the cir-
cle of one’s group if one’s whole existence in this world depends on
«proving» oneself to its members, certainly much stronger than if in a
church one can obtain forgiveness.
Membership in a sect had an influence on credit-worthiness, for the
«children of the world», so it was said, distrusted one another in business
but they had confidence in the religiously determined honesty of the pious,
controlled by sect discipline.
The predominance of clubs in American society is largely the product
of a process of secularization of these voluntary religious associations, the
sects. Until relatively recent times it has been important, if one wanted to
succeed in business, to be recruited by ballot as a member of a sect, a club
or an association.




The Protestant Ethic Debate. Max Weber’s Replies to his Critics 1907-1910 (edited
and translated by D. Chalcraft, A. Harrington & M. Shields) Liverpool University
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Max Weber Die protestantische Ethik II. Kritiken und Antikritiken (edited by J.
Winckelmann) Gütersloher Verlagshaus 1978
In his replies to the critics of his Protestant Ethic essay during his lifetime
Weber attempted to clarify once again some often misunderstood points.
He underlined in particular that he had never thought of identifying the
economic system of capitalism with the capitalist spirit, and he stressed
that it is quite possible in the study of history to find at certain times the
capitalist spirit without the capitalist economic system, while at other
times one may encounter the capitalist system without a capitalist spirit
(AC: 71) – just as it is possible to have an army which is organized ac-
cording to the Prussian model but without a militaristic spirit (AC: 94).
The distinction between, on the one hand, a system or form and, on the
other hand, a «spirit» which lives in this form, was central for Weber.
When, as he said, the capitalist economic system was at its highest point
of development in Italy before the Reformation, a capitalist spirit in his
sense of the word was absent. Rather, among serious men there was the
feeling of a profound tension between the economic system and the ethical
conduct of life, or between action and conscience, with all the compromis-
es which resulted from the conviction that economic efforts are not pleas-
ing to God (deo placere non potest) AC: 74). Even today capitalism as a
system may exist comfortably without a capitalist spirit as a fatalistically
accepted necessity.
A historically given form of capitalism, Weber said, can be filled with
very different «spirits» and can have very different levels of elective affin-
ity with a historically given spirit. Form and spirit can be in a relationship
of high or low adequate affinity or even without any adequate affinity.
There is no doubt that the level of adequacy is not without influence on
the historical course of development and that in those cases when a system
and a spirit of high adequacy or elective affinity meet, a development of
high inner homogenousness sets in (AC: 75).
Such a high elective affinity was present in the economic development
of the seventeenth and eighteenth century when the great inner tensions
3.
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and conflicts which often exist between professional life and ethics, were
adjusted and reduced by Puritanism in a characteristic way and in a geo-
graphical area where the traditions of Antiquity and of the Middle Ages
pointed to different directions and where today again, as Weber believed
(AC: 73), we experience cultural tensions of the highest order.
Weber rejected the foolish idea that the Reformation alone has created
the capitalistic spirit or even capitalism as an economic system for, as he
insisted, important forms of capitalism are older than the Reformation –
and Calvinist inhabitants of the Sahara do not automatically become facto-
ry-owners. He was really only interested in the analysis of one component
of the capitalist spirit, a component which had a particular affinity to the
capitalist system: the ethos of a bourgeois conduct of life or the rational
conduct of life on the basis of the idea of the calling which gave a specific
direction to the methodical conduct of life.
While during the Middle Ages the entrepreneur felt at best tolerated by
God, so that an inner tie between economic activity and the ethical centre
of the personality was lacking– with the consequence that money earned
by usurious profiteering was often returned at the end of one’s life –, We-
ber found among the Protestants the entrepreneur with an unbroken good
conscience, the professional who felt at one with his actions. The specific
characteristics of a conduct of life which was completely impregnated by
the spirit of capitalism, i.e., impersonalism, a calculating spirit, rational
consequence, a specialized narrowing of the outlook, a seriousness of out-
look deprived of all naïveté, had found here their ethical self-justification.
When elsewhere or at other times these religious motivations of the
Protestants were lacking in the life-style of entrepreneurs, their capitalist
activities were not normally the expression of a style of life based on the
unity of the personality – and it would be an error to believe that this fact
would be without consequence for the position of capitalism within the
whole culture, its cultural effects and its destiny (AC: 102).
Thus, the primary purpose of Weber’s anti-critiques is the differentia-
tion between the capitalist spirit and the capitalist system15 and, further,
15 The difference between «spirit» and «system» in Weber’s writings can be inter-
preted in such a way that the spirit motivates people from the inside and produces
an inner habitus while the system is the net of actions which people complete be-
cause of exterior circumstances.
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the accentuation of a high elective affinity16 of one component of the capi-
talist spirit, created by Protestantism, with the modern capitalist system.
At the same time, though, Weber mentions – just as in his essay on the
Protestant sects – that besides the religiously induced motivations for eco-
nomic action there were also those motivations which were supported by
the religious and social institutions created by the sects. This becomes par-
ticularly apparent in the central sacrament of the Eucharist. For, on the one
hand, every Protestant asked himself whether he was qualified to partici-
pate in the Eucharist – and this question was not answerable by a precise
accounting of particular sins and merits, but only by an evaluation of the
ethical conduct of life as a whole, the total personality –, but, on the other
hand, he was under the constant control of his equals, the members of his
congregation who, as the guarantors of congregational discipline, had the
responsibility to see to it that the Eucharist would not be desecrated by the
unworthy who bore the visible signs of rejection, and thus to maintain the
ekklesia pura. This congregational discipline had a considerable influence
on the conduct of life, particularly if one adds to it the ethical training
which was given to the members and also the necessity for businessmen to
legitimize themselves and to prove their ethical standards by their mem-
bership in a sect (AC: 110).
The 1920 Version of the «Protestant Ethic»
Basic Literature:
Max Weber The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism (translated by T. Parsons
with an introduction by A. Giddens) London: Routledge 1992
Max Weber Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Religionssoziologie vol. 1 Tübingen Mohr 1920
4.
16 The so-called «Weber thesis» has sometimes been interpreted as referring to a
causal hypothesis and at other times to an «adequate relationship» between the
capitalist structure and the capitalist spirit. Weber himself, particularly in AC: 95,
referred to an adequate relationship, but he did not indicate whether the relation-
ship was «meaningfully adequate» or «causally adequate» – whether the meaning
relationship of the parts should be considered as typical or whether in our experi-
ence there is a chance that a sequence of events always happens in a similar way
(as formulated in the chapter «Basic Sociological Terms» in ES: 11). Instead of
adequacy, Weber sometimes uses the term «elective affinity».
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The essays on the Protestant Ethic and on the economic ethics of world
religions which had originally appeared in the Archiv für Sozialwis-
senschaft und Sozialpolitik were republished by Weber in 1920/21 with
some changes and additions as parts of the Collected Essays in the Sociol-
ogy of Religion. The essay on the Protestant Ethic which appeared in the
first volume of the Collected Essays in 1920, and on which most English
translations are based, was not a verbatim reproduction of the original es-
say of 1904/5. This was already visible in the title, for the quotation marks
which in the original version were set around the word «spirit» were omit-
ted in 1920. Weber insisted, however, in a footnote on the first page that
he had not changed, reinterpreted or softened a single assertion and that he
had not added any divergent assertions.
In part the newly added passages are repetitions or continuations of
Weber’s Replies to his Critics (AC), sometimes without naming the ad-
dressee. Repeatedly and with much insistance Weber tried to clarify that
there exist different kinds of capitalism.17 Capitalistic phenomena in the
sense of a class concept18 can be found everywhere in the world and at all
times, in China, India, Babylon and Antiquity. But this was the capitalism
of adventureres, usurers, war suppliers, tax farmers and financial magnates
and had no relationship whatever with the specifically modern capitalism
and its particular ethos.
Secondly, it mattered to the Weber of 1920 that his readers understand
the difference between simple ethical teachings and concepts and the psy-
chological motives created by religions.19 It was important to him to show
that Protestantism put psychological premia on diligent work. In a four
pages long footnote (PE: 140, fn. 12) Weber analyzed the worldly wisdom
17 In many places of the final version of the PE Weber inserted such comments, e.g.
PE:135: fn.13; PE: 17; PE: 22; PE: 148: fn. 22 & 23; PE: 229, fn. 7; PE: 122.
18 As mentioned earlier, Weber distinguished two kinds of concepts: one kind is a
class concept which describes in conceptual purity that which is everywhere the
same (capitalism in general), the other is of an individual character, an ideal type,
and underscores those features which are unique (e.g. modern Western capital-
ism).
19 These allusions to the fact that Weber was interested in religiously created psycho-
logical premia and not in ethics or wisdom literature can for instance be found in
PE: 141, fn. 12 (a five pages long footnote) or in PE: 236, fn. 31. But even in the
original version of 1905 Weber had said: «What a religion has sought after as an
ideal and what the actual result of its influence on the lives of its adherents has
been, must be sharply distinguished» PE: 137, fn. 24 or PE1: 47, fn. 17.
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teachings of the versatile genius of the Renaissance, Leon Battista Alberti,
and he attempted to show that this kind of literary theory, quite unlike any
religious ethic, did not have at its disposition any psychological sanctions
of a non-economic character and did not produce a life-transforming pow-
er from within. In the case of Alberti, he said, we simply find a paradigma
of immanent economic rationalism. Further on Weber mentioned some
theologians of the fourteenth century who presented the profit of the mer-
chant as a reward for his industria and therefore ethically justified. But the
most important thing was lacking, according to him: the proof of one’s
own salvation in a calling and thus the psychological sanctions which
Protestantism set on diligent work. In the examples discussed by Weber
there was only ethical teaching or concessions to practical necessity and
not religious premia.
The distinction between ethical teachings and psychological motivation
was also used by Weber in regard to new examples which he had un-
earthed while examining the other world religions. Thus he noted that In-
dian religious teaching connected economic traditionalism with the
chances of a favourable rebirth (PE: 236, fn. 31), an excellent example by
which to show the difference between mere ethical theories and psycho-
logical motives. And with regard to ancient Judaism and its ethical dual-
ism which permitted a behaviour towards strangers which was not permit-
ted towards brothers, Weber stressed that success in the area of simply
permitted behaviour (an ethical adiaphoron) cannot become a sign of reli-
gious proof and a motive for a methodical conduct of life, for the psycho-
logical motivations led to a different result (PE: 244).
In the already mentioned footnote on Alberti (PE: 144/5) Weber applied
his distinction between ethical teachings and psychological motivations to
the whole of his essays on the economic ethics of world religions20:
«What … a religiously oriented rationalization of conduct looks like may
be seen, outside of the Puritans of all denominations, in the cases of the
Jainas, the Jews, certain ascetic sects of the Middle Ages … the Skoptsy
and Stundists in Russia and numerous monastic orders. The essential point
is that an ethic based on religion places certain psychological sanctions
(not of an economic character) on the maintenance of the attitude pre-
20 While Weber did emphasize that it is not enough to study religious doctrines with-
out considering their psychological effects in a given context, it is nevertheless
true that in large parts of his essays on world religions he limited himself to the
interpretation of classical texts.
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scribed by it, sanctions which merely worldly wisdom like that of Alberti
does not have at its disposal. Only in so far as these sanctions work, which
is often very different from the doctrine of the theologians, does such an
ethic gain an influence on the conduct of life and also within the economy.
This was the point of the essay on the Protestant Ethic».
The aforementioned additions in the version of 1920 may be considered
as clarifications of what Weber had written in 1904/5 or as comparisons
and examples drawn from the essays on the economic ethics of world reli-
gions. But one also finds in the PE version of 1920 completely new in-
sights which would have been impossible without the knowledge of the re-
sults of the studies of the world religions. There is for instance Weber’s
allusion to the great historical process of the disenchantment (Entzau-
berung) of the world which had begun with the old Hebrew prophets and,
in conjunction with hellenic scientific thought, had repudiated all magical
means of salvation and came to its logical conclusion in Protestantism
(PE: 61). The concept of religious disenchantment did not appear in the
original edition of the PE, as it presupposes the essay on ancient Judaism,
but can be found several times in 1920.21
Furthermore, Weber turned in 1920 to the concept of theodicy: «The
complete elimination of the theodicy problem and of all those questions
about the meaning of the world and of life which had tortured others, was
as self-evident to the Puritan as, for quite different reasons, to the Jew»
(PE: 65). Indeed, in his study of ancient Judaism he had already pointed to
the economy of psychic ressources which manifests itself if all rumination
about the meaning of the cosmos is precluded.
And, finally, Weber mentioned for the first time the immense tension
which it was the unavoidable destiny of the Calvinist to endure as no
priest and no sacrament could provide him with certainty with regard to
salvation (PE: 71). This tension in which the Puritan, as opposed to the
Confucian, found himself played an important rôle in the last part (Result)
of the essay on Confucianism and Taoism.
21 The English translation by T. Parsons does not use the term disenchantment at all,
but rather uses «elimination of magic from the world» (e.g. PE: 61, as translated
from GARS I: 94) or «rationalization of the world» (PE: 71, as translated from
GARS I: 114). Weber’s terminological precision is lost in the process.
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Max Weber «The Social Psychology of World Religions» in: Gerth & Mills (transl.&
ed.) From Max Weber. Essays in Sociology Oxford University Press 1958, pp.
267-301
Max Weber «Einleitung» in Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Religionssoziologie I, Tübingen:
Mohr (Siebeck) 1920, pp. 237-275
The «Introduction» is fundamental for the understanding of Weber’s
«Economic Ethics of World Religions»; it provides some basic interrelat-
ed concepts and a method of comparing religions in their socio-economic
context, as socially relevant as well as socially conditioned.22 Weber re-
marks at the outset that by «world religions» he understands those systems
of life-regulation which have had a large multitude of adherents, such as
the Confucian, the Hindu, the Buddhist and the Christian religious ethic,
and also ancient Judaism because of its historic significance for the mod-
ern economic ethic of the Occident. Later in this text Weber discusses sal-
vation religions (which promise the release from suffering), and it will be-
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22 H. Kippenberg (1995) has suggested that in the newly developing discipline of the
history of religions Weber found ideas which, in contrast to the ideas of the En-
lightenment, saw religion as an independent phenomenon, having its own value
and right to exist and the possibility to follow «the laws of its own» (ES: 341), not
those of the economy. This allowed him to suggest that a historic process in the
religious development of the Occident led to the foundation of modern rational
culture as well as to different kinds of rationalization in other cultures. From
scholars in the history of religions (Max Müller, C.P. Tiele, Troeltsch) Weber may
also have taken many of the concepts which he used in his essays on the world
religions, for instance the distinction between nature religions, cvilizational reli-
gions, and salvation religions, the distinction between a personal and an imperson-
al god, the idea that there are levels and directions in religious development, and
the suggestion that the experience of the irrationality of the world is the driving
force of salvational conceptions and of theodicies (FMW: 123).
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come possible to say that Confucianism and Islam are world religions or
civilizational religions, whereas Hinduism, Buddhism and Christianity are
also salvation religions. All world religions, however, have this in com-
mon, that they have broken out of magical world views and developed a
conduct of life, oriented by a coherent and systematized set of values, that
their adherents follow duties and ritual and do not live with tabu-like
norms or magical coercion, or that they distinguish between what is and
what ought to be.23
Weber mentions two kinds of religious ethics: on the one hand, there
are ritualistic and legalistic ethics which lead to stereotypes of ethical be-
haviour, and on the other hand, there is the ethic of conviction which sys-
tematizes the religious requirements and leads to a distinction between
morals and law. It results in a coherent conduct of life, the constancy of
one’s inner relations to ultimate values and the formation of a personality.
When Weber talks of the economic ethic of a religion, he does not refer
to the ethical theories of theological compendia, but he points to the prac-
tical motivations for action, founded in the psychological and pragmatic
contexts of religions. Economic ethics are not simply «functions» of a
form of economic organization; rather it may be possible to say that
among the determinants of an economic ethic is the religious influence on
the conduct of life, combined, however, with the constellations of interests
and the respective personality formation. It is true, moreover, that exter-
nally similar forms of economic organization may be compatible with
very different economic ethics.
23 A more extensive distinction between magic and religion is provided by Weber in
Economy and Society. He stresses that the magical world view consists of a com-
plex of heterogeneous oracles, prescriptions and prohibitions which cannot be uni-
fied or systematized (ES: 437). «Magical ethics» can be seen as benefit calculating
coercion of a god or spirit so that the distinction between the two oppositions use-
ful/harmful and good/bad is blurred. The religious world view, on the other hand,
particularly the world view of the so-called axial religions characterized by Karl
Jaspers (1949), is dualistic; it assumes that behind the real things and events there
is something else, of which real events are only symptoms or symbols, and it pre-
supposes the concept of a radically other world, meaningfully ordered, coherent
and systematized (ES: 451), and a tension between this world and that other world.
It also includes a system of norms, so that not coercive magic, but a conduct of life
according to these norms can influence the fate of humans. But, even when the re-
ligious world view turns away from magic, it is rare that magic is completely elimi-
nated.
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In the following essays, Weber writes, it will be attempted to uncover
the conduct of life of the social strata which have most strongly influenced
the practical ethics of their respective religions: Confucianism was the sta-
tus ethic of secular-rational prebendaries, the mandarins, earlier Hinduism
was borne by the hereditary caste of the Brahmins, Buddhism was propa-
gated by world-renouncing monks, post-Exile Judaism was the religion of
a pariah-people and Christianity that of urban artisans, citizens of the quite
singular occidental city. However, in spite of these social influences, reli-
gious ethics received their stamp primarily from religious sources. Even
Nietzsche’s theory of resentment of the disadvantaged and of the «slave
revolt in morals» does not change this fact although his references to suf-
fering have, according to Weber, some justification.
Suffering was originally considered to be a symptom of the wrath of a
god, for the fortunate is seldom satisfied with the fact of being fortunate:
he also wants to know that he has a right to his good fortune. Thus, reli-
gion was often used to legitimate the good fortune of the propertied, the
mighty, the victorious or the healthy. But before, on the other hand, the
religious glorification of suffering could arise, it was necessary to realize
that certain forms of abstinence and of chastisement could awaken or fur-
ther the charisma of ecstatic or visionary states that were considered as
holy. It was assumed that certain kinds of suffering provoked through
chastisement are avenues to the attainment of superhuman powers. To this
must be added the development of cults of salvation which took a new
position in the face of individual suffering. While the primeval cults of po-
litical associations left all individual interests out of consideration, there
developed within or besides them myths of a saviour (and hence a rational
view of the world) who promised salvation from suffering for individuals
qua individuals, particularly among the less favoured strata. In many ca-
ses, some kind of theodicy of suffering has originated from the hope for
salvation, and such rational theodicies provided individual suffering with a
positive valuation.
The need for an ethical interpretation of the meaning of suffering and of
the distribution of good and bad fortunes among humans furthered a grow-
ing rationalization of the conceptions of the world; the experience of the
meaninglessness of the world led the religious development on the path of
rationalization or of an inner logic which systematized the explanations.
Among the many explanations of suffering and injustice which one en-
counters, only three gave rationally satisfactory answers: the Indian doc-
trine of karma, Zoroastrian dualism and the predestination decree of the
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protestant deus absconditus (the God whose reasons for his decisions are
inaccessible and thus hidden to the human mind).
The theodicies of suffering may indeed sometimes be coloured by re-
sentment; but the distrust of wealth and power which as a rule exists in
genuine religions of salvation, must be explained by the fact that those
strata which are satiated and favoured in this world, have generally only a
small urge to be saved and are less «devout». Moreover, the development
of a rational economic ethic in the lower strata has the following reason:
while the sense of dignity of the higher strata tends to feed on their actual
or assumed being, the sense of dignity of the lower strata is often nou-
rished by the belief that they have a special mission or that they follow an
ethical imperative. The source of the power of ethical prophecies among
the socially disadvantaged strata lies in this fact.
Salvational goods, even when they are understood as «otherworldly»,
have a this-worldly character. The Puritan certitudo salutis (feeling certain
of one’s salvation), the Indian’s bhakti (fervent love in the possession of
God), the radenie (joyful ecstasy) of the Khlysts in Russia were sought be-
cause of their psychic extraordinariness. Even if the rationalized religions
imputed a metaphysical meaning to these goals, the salvational good was
for the devout a psychological state in the here and now. One can distin-
guish between religious and profane states only by referring to the extraor-
dinary character of the religious states.
The kinds of salvational goods that are sought after by religions have
varied according to the social strata which were foremost in adopting
them. The business classes (merchants and artisans) have often been the
exponents of practical rationalism while a more theoretical rationalism has
been advanced by intellectuals. It has always been the work of intellectu-
als and priests to sublimate orgy into sacrament and to transform un-
formed and irrational religious beliefs into a rational system of thought
concerning salvation. It depended on these rational systems of religious
thought or world views, be they Confucian, Indian, Islamic or Calvinist,
from what and for what one wished to be saved, what in the actual world
appeared to be particularly meaningless and to what kind of salvation one
aspired. Even if material or ideal interests determine men’s conduct, these
1. Max Weber’s Introduction
51
rationally constructed world images have, like switchmen, determined the
tracks along which human action has been pushed (FMW: 280).24
Hierocracies have sought to monopolize the administration of religious
goods of salvation in the form of sacramental or institutional grace; politi-
cal bureaucracies have generally been suspicious of individual pursuits of
salvation and have insisted on social obligations and on the ritualistic
character of religion; peasants have generally been inclined towards mag-
ic.
Bourgeois strata are the most ambiguous with regard to the religious
options they have chosen, yet elective affinities or mutual attractions be-
tween these strata and certain special types of religion stand out. Because
of the nature of their way of life which is detached from economic bonds
to nature and because their whole existence is based upon technological
and economic calculations, there existed the possibility that a tendency to-
wards an ethical and rational conduct of life might develop, particularly if
a prophecy provided a religious basis for it.
Weber distinguishes, on the one hand, exemplary prophecy which
points out the ideal of a contemplative life-style, of being a vessel of the
divine, by exemplary living25 and, on the other hand, emissary prophecy
which addresses demands of an ethical and ascetic character to the world
in the name of a god and where the individual regards himself as an instru-
ment of this god. The active asceticism propagated by emissary prophecy
has often been the preferred religious attitude of bourgeois strata – in op-
position to the contemplative mysticism of exemplary prophecy which
was preferred by intellectuals. Moreover, emissary prophecy and asceti-
cism have had a profound elective affinity to the conception of a supra-
mundane personal god of creation, in contrast to the impersonal and im-
manent supreme being of exemplary prophecy. The first conception has
dominated the Near-Eastern regions and the Occident, the second one has
dominated Indian and Chinese religiosity.26
24 Weber thought that interests are blind, and no continuous rationalization can pro-
ceed from them, as adventurer or booty capitalism have often shown. Images of
the world, articulated by ideas, must discipline and lead the interests in the sense
of a methodical and in this sense rational conduct of life. All societies have faced
this situation, but they have found different solutions.
25 Another aspect of exemplary prophecy, according to Weber, is the Socratic dia-
logue in which the opponent is led ad absurdum by rational arguments (RI: 225).
26 Peter Berger has developed the contrast between a transcendent god and asceti-
cism on the one hand and an immanent god and mysticism on the other hand in
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The rational elements of a religion, its «doctrine», e.g. the Indian doc-
trine of karma or the Calvinist concept of predestination, have their inner
logic (Eigengesetzlichkeit), and the rational pragmatism of salvation which
flows from them, for instance from the nature of the conception of God
(transcendent or immanent), has often had far-reaching results for the
fashioning of a practical conduct of life. The mystic Meister Eckhart, for
instance, could not realize the pantheist experience of the mystic without
sacrificing some of the decisive elements of the Occidental belief in a
transcendent God, and the Muslim mystic al-Hallaj was executed in Bagh-
dad in 922 for his formula «I am truth», implying identification with God.
It may therefore be said that, on the one hand, the nature of the desired
salvational goods has been strongly influenced by the external interests
and the conduct of life of the ruling strata but that, on the other hand, the
direction of the conduct of life, in so far as it was methodically rational-
ized, was profoundly determined by religious values of the doctrinal sys-
tem and its inner logic.
In this context it is important to point to the fact that men have unequal
religious qualifications: heroic or virtuoso religiosity is opposed to mass
religiosity, the religiosity of those who are religiously «unmusical». The
hierocratic and official authority of a church which organizes the masses,
fights principally against all virtuoso-religion and its autonomous develop-
ment: the religiosity of the Ulema stood against that of the Dervishes in
Islam, the early Christian bishops against the pneumatics, the Russian
state church against the sects, the Confucian officials against Buddhist and
Taoist pursuits of salvation. Religious virtuosi have often seen themselves
compelled to adjust to everyday religiosity in order to maintain ideal or
material mass-patronage. The nature of their concessions has been of pri-
mary significance for the way in which religion has influenced everyday
life. In most parts of the Orient, the religious virtuosi allowed the masses
to remain entangled in magical traditions while in the Occident they have
undertaken to ethically rationalize the life of the masses.
Clearly also the peculiar nature of the virtuoso-religiosity has been of
decisive importance: wherever it was of a contemplative or orgiastic-ec-
static character, there has been no bridge between it and everyday life, be-
cause no psychological motives for innerworldly economic action could
more detail. He calls it the opposition between Jerusalem and Benares. P. Berger
The Heretical Imperative London: Collins 1980
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be derived from it. Contemplative and ecstatic religions are rather hostile
to economic life, and where they are dominant, a deep abyss separates the
way of life of the «laymen» from that of the virtuosi. While the virtuoso
might be a directeur de l’âme (spiritual guide) of the «laymen» – as the
Buddhist bhikku or the Russian starets – the influence would be in merely
ritualist and conventional particulars, for action in this world remained in
principle religiously insignificant.
Things were very different where the religious virtuosi attempted to
mould the world according to the will of a god. In this case, the salvational
goods were not of a contemplative character, like a unio mystica, nor were
the means of salvation of a magical or sacramental kind, for these means
tend to devalue action in this world as insignificant and they do not link
salvation to practical and everyday events. Thus, two things were
achieved: the disenchantment of the world and the turning away of the
path of salvation from a contemplative «flight from the world» towards an
active fashioning of the world. Apart form small rationalist sects which
are found all over the world, this has happened mainly in Occidental
Protestantism. Why did this happen?
Partly it was the influence of the stratum that was decisive for this reli-
gion, i.e., the bourgeois stratum, partly, however, it was the conception of
a supra-mundane God and the specificity of the method of salvation.
Where the religious virtuoso saw himself as an instrument of God, under
the necessity to prove himself or his ethical qualifications before God, he
might reject the world as it is (in the sense that he despised the values of
dignity or beauty or worldly power), but he would not flee from the world,
as in the case of contemplative mysticism. He remained oriented towards
the world in a more specific and thoroughgoing sense than did the naive
«affirmation of the world» of unbroken humanity in Antiquity or in lay-
Catholicism. Thus, the Occidental sects of religious virtuosi have ferment-
ed the methodical inworldly rationalization of conduct, including econo-
mic conduct. Between the polar opposites of world-fleeing contemplation
and world-dominating asceticism, however, one finds the most varied
transitions and combinations.
On the whole it can be said that, with regard to salvation religions We-
ber uses in the «Introduction» four criteria for their characterization. 1.
Their concept of God (transcendent or immanent), 2. their method of sal-
vation (world fleeing contemplation of world dominating asceticism), 3.
their salvational goods (knowledge of the world or knowledge of personal
destiny) and 4. the carrier strata of these religions (intellectuals/monks or
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bourgeois strata). The characterization of the other world religions is more
pale: Confucianism, based on a stratum of secular prebendaries and with
the concept of an impersonal eternal order, pursues «cultural» qualifica-
tions or the ideal of a «cultivated» man, and Islam, a warrior religion with
a transcendent God.
The «Introduction» concludes with some methodological comments.
The world religions which are to be discussed here, are not simply types
which represent stages of development. Neither a systematic typology of
religion nor a purely historical work is intended. The essays are typologi-
cal in the sense that they consider what is typically important in connec-
tion with the great contrasts of the economic mentalities of the world; the
world religions are presented in greater logical consistency and unity than
has ever been the case in their actual development in order to underscore
the differences of those features which have been decisive for the practical
way of life. These features interest Weber primarily from a definite point
of view, namely their relationship to economic rationalism, i.e., that type
of rationalism which, since the sixteenth century, has come to dominate
the Occident.
It must be underscored here that «rationalism» may mean very different
things. The systematic rationalization of a conception of the world by
means of abstract concepts is very different from the methodical-rational
attainment of a given practical end by means of precise calculation and ad-
equate means. And even the rationalization of the conduct of life, which is
of particular interest here, can assume enormously different forms: Confu-
cianism is «rational» in the sense of the absence of all metaphysics and al-
most all residues of religious anchorage; the artistic ideal of the Renais-
sance was «rational» in the sense of a belief in a valid canon; the Indian
practice of yoga and certain aspects of later Buddhism are «rational» in
the sense of methodicalness; finally, all practical ethics which are system-
atically oriented to fixed goals of salvation, are «rational» in the sense of
methodical conduct and also in the sense that they distinguish between
valid norms and the empirically given reality. It is this last type of ratio-
nalization process which will play a major role in the following presenta-
tions.
The ethics of individual religions are presented more systematically
than they have ever been in their actual development. The presentations do
not claim to offer a well-rounded picture of world religions in the same
sense as monographs do.
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Finally, some terminological peculiarities which recur in the following
presentations and which concern the external conditions under which eco-
nomic ethics develop, should be clarified. All ruling authority, political or
religious, can be considered as a variation of three ideal types constructed
on the basis of the legitimacy which the ruling authority claims to have.
1. «Charisma» should be understood to refer to an extraordinary quality
of a person, be it actual or only presumed. The magician, the prophet,
the demagogue may have it. Charismatic rule does not follow general
norms and in this sense it is irrational. It is revolutionary as it does not
feel bound to the existing order.
2. «Traditionalism» is the belief in the everyday routine as an inviolable
norm. Its most important type is patriarchalism, the authority of the fa-
ther, the senior of the household, the lord of servants and officials and,
as a variety of patriarchalism, the patrimonial lord, the sovereign over
his subjects. Central norms are considered sacred, but there is also an
area of arbitrariness where the lord makes decisions in terms of person-
al considerations.
Throughout history only charismatic leaders were able to integrate new
laws into the sacred tradition and custom, but, as charismatic periods
never lasted very long, the charismatic leaders and the staff supporting
them (disciples, apostles, military followers) soon succumbed to rou-
tinization. The followers soon depended on their leader for mainte-
nance through income in kind, usufruct of land, appointments, or more
generally prebends, and felt entitled to them. In this way the leader’s
prerogatives became patrimonial in nature.
But often there developed a struggle between the patrimonial leader
and the erstwhile followers who as a status group felt to have a right to
their prebends and privileges. If the struggle was decided in favour of
the ruler so that he could attach to himself a staff of officials who de-
pended solely on him, he acquired administrative means and finances
of his own and gradually expropriated the privilege holding groups.
The new stratum of officials was often composed of literate clerics, in
the Middle East of slaves and clients, of secularized literati in China
and of jurists in the modern Occident. It must be noted that the triumph
of princely power has often resulted in the introduction of a rational
administration which, however, could take two forms: substantive and
formal rationalization. The former is utilitarian, the patrimonial leader
bestows social blessings upon his subjects; the latter appears when
trained jurists carry out a rule of general laws applying to all citizens.
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The «triumph of formalist juristic rationalism» (FMW: 299) leads to
the third category besides charismatic and traditional authority: legal
authority.
3. Legal authority is based on rationally established rules (enactments,
agreements), in turn resting upon a rationally enacted constitution. Of-
ficials hold their power as trustees of an impersonal Anstalt (compulso-
ry institution)27 and this is not only true in regard to the state but also
in regard to the hierocratic association, the church. In fact, legal au-
thority based on formal rationalization gave birth to the modern occi-
dental «state» as well as to the Church as an institution. In its purest
form it is bureaucratic rule and implies an impersonal bond of the of-
fice holder to the duty of office, the obligation to work sine ira et stu-
dio (neither with anger nor with affection) according to rationally es-
tablished norms and regulations.
Weber did not claim that all empirical structures of domination must cor-
respond to one of these ideal types. On the contrary, most are in a state of
transition between several of these types so that he often felt compelled to
form new expressions like «patrimonial bureaucracy» which point to its
hybrid status. But Weber felt that his concepts are useful for orientation.
Confucianism and Taoism
Basic Literature
Max Weber The Religion of China New York / London: MacMillan 1951
Max Weber Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Religionssoziologie I Tübingen: Mohr (Siebeck)
1920 pp. 276 - 536
Wolfgang Schluchter Rationalism, Religion and Domination (Chapter III, Confucian-
ism and Taoism), University of California Press 1989
Weber begins with an historical analysis of the Chinese monetary system,
the fluctuating availability of monetary metal and the difficulties with pa-
per money, and he then immediately points out that, although a strong in-
2.
27 Weber defined Anstalt as an organization which imposes, within a specified sphere
of operations, its order on all action conforming with certain criteria – as opposed
to an organization which claims authority only over voluntary members (ES: 52).
For a slightly different explanation of Weber’s use of this legal term, vide footnote
85 in the section on Occidental Christianity.
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crease of wealth in precious metals can be detected since the 16th century,
this did not stimulate a capitalist development. Nor was capitalist develop-
ment stimulated when, after the pacification of the empire under the Qing
and after the edict of 1713, the controls of occupational choice and the
barriers to free mobility were eliminated and an astounding population in-
crease occurred (from 50-60 million people in the middle of the 17th cen-
tury to 350-400 million at the end of the 19th century). While the intensity
of Chinese acquisitiveness at all times cannot be doubted, and while it is
certain that entrepreneurial communities, small-capitalist in nature and or-
ganized as communal workshops (ergasteria), did exist, large private capi-
talist factories can scarcely be traced in Chinese history. It is Weber’s cen-
tral problem, then, to explain why, despite apparently many favourable
conditions, not the slightest beginnings of capitalist development did ap-
pear. He finds the reasons in the structure of the Chinese state and in the
interests which supported it, on the one hand, and, on the other hand, in
the intellectual and religious circumstances.
The Patrimonial Domination
Weber’s distinction between the time of the Warring States and the united
empire is fundamental for his understanding of China. The competition of
the Warring States (before 221 A.D.) for political power caused their lead-
ers to initiate rational economic policies as well as a rational administra-
tion and organization of the army; but the elimination of political competi-
tion after the creation of the world empire put an end to the rationalization
in administration and in economic policies. Moreover, during the period
when the Warring Kingdoms competed for political power, there existed a
capitalism of moneylenders and purveyors, and under the Han dynasty,
there are said to have lived multimillionaires in mining and trade, but the
political unification in the world empire, like the unified orbis terrarum of
Imperial Rome, resulted in a regression of this capitalism. Finally, the uni-
fied empire eliminated the competition of the intellectual doctrines and
imposed a unified orthodox doctrine: Confucianism. It is noteworthy that
Weber’s evaluation of the smothering effects of the unified Chinese patri-
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monial empire is closely related to his understanding of the development
in the Roman empire.28
This unified empire – characterized mainly by its bureaucracy – pre-
vented, according to Weber, all industrial capitalist development. It is a
patrimonial bureaucracy we are dealing with here, to be distinguished
from modern bureaucracy. While modern bureaucracy means the purpo-
sively rational organization with a staff of specialized officials trained in
the law who apply the law and the decrees without respect of persons, pat-
rimonial-bureaucratic organization does not distinguish between office
and person, between legal procedure and administrative procedure, be-
tween formal law and material justice. In China, incidentally, the relation-
ship of the official to the patrimonial and caesaro-papistic emperor was
one of personal subjection.29
28 Weber’s «Agrarverhältnisse im Altertum» of 1909 in Handwörterbuch der
Staatswissenschaften (Agrarian Sociology of Ancient Civilizations - SAC) is im-
portant for the understanding of his essay on China, for the study of the social con-
ditions of the Roman empire first called his attention to the smothering effects of a
large bureaucracy for capitalism. Certainly, in ancient Rome there was no modern
capitalism, but only tax farming, slave labour and political capitalism, but while
republican Rome had favoured these kinds of capitalism, the increasing bureaucra-
cy during the Monarchy obstructed all sources of profit, according to him.
29 G. Hamilton in «Patriarchalism in Imperial China and Western Europe» (Theory
and Society vol 13, no.3 (1984), p. 393 sqq.) has argued that Weber generated
some of his concepts, such as patrimonialism and charisma, from an analysis of
Western history. For instance, patriarchalism is based on the patria potestas in Ro-
man law, the fathers’s authority over the household which demands piety toward
tradition and to the master (ES: 1008) who can exercise personal discretion. State
justice stopped at the threshold of the household. Patrimonialism, according to
Weber, is a variety of patriarchalism and refers to the ruler’s authority over the
state. In China, on the other hand, there is xiao, filial piety or rather faithfulness to
the duties of one’s position in life: not only the duties toward one’s father but to-
wards all persons to whom one is related. It implies a denial of individual desires
and, as Hamilton writes, a negation of personal magic which Weber calls charis-
ma. Not personal loyalty towards one’s father or relatives or to the emperor is re-
quired, but loyalty to one’s rôle. Patria potestas and xiao cannot be equated as the
first is related to power and the second to an order created by a relationship of
roles, and therefore the concepts of patriarchalism and patrimonialism are inade-
quate for the analysis of China, according to Hamilton, as they are not useful in
developing a genuine understanding of Chinese history (ibid. 419).
Although this seems to be a serious challenge to Weber’s use of terminology, it
must nevertheless not be forgotten that a «genuine» or «true» understanding of
China or of anything else was not in Weber’s intentions. In fact, he considered this
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Appointment to office in the bureaucracy was generally reserved to the
literati-class whose members had qualified themselves in the official ex-
aminations. Such positions were treated as non-hereditary prebends, of-
fered on the basis of individual qualifications.
The officialdom as a whole had good reasons for the traditionalism
which characterized it. While it is true that their prebends were not indi-
vidually appropriated, they were, nevertheless, appropriated by the whole
stratum of removable literati. Therefore, the literati opposed collectively
all interventions which conflicted with their interests. They were able to
prevent the refeudalisation of the administration by the nobility as well as
the introduction of oriental sultanism by the imperial eunuchs; they were
in a position to thwart the creation of an expert officialdom in the 11th cen-
tury because it would have threatened their prebendary interests.
The administration of this patrimonial bureaucracy was not intensive at
all so that in the villages the power of the sibs was able to blossom: the
sibs supported the self-sufficiency of the households, thereby reducing the
necessity of a market. The professional organizations, merchant and craft
guilds, were in fact autonomous, but the cities had less guarantees of self-
government than the villages, and they were therefore unable to create the
legal foundations for capitalist «enterprise» which can already be found in
the commercial law of the Italian cities of the Renaissance. The character
of the patrimonial form of state which upheld a sacred tradition alongside
a realm of prerogative and favouritism impeded the development of indus-
trial capitalism, for it lacked a rational and calculable administration and
law enforcement.
The Spirit of Confucianism
In this patrimonial structure there lived the «spirit» of Confucianism. It
was acquired during the course of the literary-Confucian education and
during the preparation for the official examinations and expressed in the
conduct of life of the officials and the literati. In fact, patrimonialism was
impossible. His comparative sociology produces questions from a specific per-
spective, pointing the investigation in a particular direction within a thought-out
reseach program. The cultural sciences consist, according to him, in a constant
process of reshaping our concepts by means of which we seek to grasp reality
(CMW: 133/4).
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the form of state fundamental to the Confucian spirit. The spirit of a life-
long «pennalism» was instilled by unceasing study of the old classics
combined with grace and dignity in the sense of a ceremonially ordered
court-style, and the examinations leading to official positions tested
whether the candidates possessed the ways of thought suitable to a cul-
tured man. This education towards the ideal of a «cultured man» was in
accordance with the material and ideal interests of a literary officialdom.
The idea of (religious) salvation was completely absent from the Confu-
cian «spirit». Abhorring orgiastic and any kind of ecstatic behaviour, the
Confucian literatus desired only to be saved from the undignified bar-
barism of social rudeness to a virtuous life. His god was an unpersonal
power, no supra-mundane lord creator made ethical demands on him;
magic, although he did not doubt its existence, appeared to him without
significance for salvation, but he did not try to systematically transform
the magical popular cults.
For this Confucian «spirit» economic income represented the «little
path»; it viewed specialized professional training as a conditioning in
philistinism for, as it was said, «a cultured man is not a tool», nor is he a
means for a specified useful purpose. Thus, specialized training in any
field, be it law or economics for administrative purposes, as in modern
Western societies, was not the desired outcome of the Chinese education
process. Rather, the examinations tested whether or not the candidate’s
mind was thoroughly steeped in literature and whether or not he possessed
the ways of thought suitable to a cultured man (RC: 121). One could not
achieve anything in the world, not even in the most influential position,
without the virtue derived from this kind of education – nor, it is true,
without influential position. And therefore the Confucian literatus coveted
such a position, not profit.
Heterodoxies
Weber then asks whether perhaps the non-classical popular religion, par-
ticularly Taoism, a heterodoxy which was not rejected by Confucianists30,
has been the source of a differently oriented methodical way of life. Again
30 As opposed to sects which are in an inner conflict with the socio-political system,
heterodoxies are not directly connected with it because of exterior circumstances,
but do not reject it in principle. Heterodoxies can sometimes turn into congrega-
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he uses a comparison with classical antiquity. While in ancient Greece the
cult of the Homeric gods was recognized as an official institution and the
teaching of the philosophers an optional private matter, quite the opposite
relationship between popular cult and philosophical teaching was found in
China: here the Confucian teachings had been canonized by a caesaro-pa-
pistic regime while the popular cults were suspiciously tolerated and
viewed as a private affair. On the other hand, there existed officially unau-
thorized cults, often of a soteriological kind, in the Roman Empire; but
while here the development led to an alliance between one of these soteri-
ological communities, i.e. Christendom, and the state, Chinese history fol-
lowed a different course.
While it seemed for a time as if Buddhism in China might play a role
similar to Christianity’s role in the West, the interests of the Confucian bu-
reaucracy prevented such a development. The Chinese adoption of Bud-
dhism, the effect which it had on the conduct of life and the kind of indi-
vidualism which was introduced by it, will be touched upon in the section
on Hinduism and Buddhism.
Among the popular religions Weber discusses mainly Taoist mysticism
which, although it minimized action, did not lead to the conclusion of the
absolute rejection of the world, for it did not reject in principle the ideal of
the educated literatus and gentleman. It is a paradox, a lack of inner conse-
quence in Lao-tse’s system,31 that he does not completely reject inner-
worldly action. As, moreover, a supra-mundane personal god was lacking,
the possibility to develop an asceticist ethic which contrasts God and crea-
ture was precluded. All religiously motivated, active antagonism to the
world was lacking, and lacking was also, finally, a vocational ethic which
could only have sprung from an asceticist ethic of laymen, originating
from a tension between God’s will and the conditions of the world. Tao-
ism did not have its own «ethos": magic, not conduct of life, was decisive
for man’s fate.
tional religion as in the case of Judaism, early Buddhist monachism or Russian
Old Believers.
31 A lack of inner consequence or an inner contradiction in religious systems (not on-
ly in Taoism, but also, for instance, in Jainism) has generally led, according to
Weber, to a reduction of intensity of innerworldly or otherworldly activity because
clear tracks for the conduct of life (as in Puritanism or Hinduism) in the pursuit of
interests were not provided.
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The toleration of magic within the Chinese conception of the world in
general and its positive cultivation by Taoism was particularly stressed by
Weber. Astrology, pharmacology, geomancy, etc. transformed the world
into a magic garden the fruits of which were enjoyed by the masses of the
people. There was no path leading from Taoism to a rational method of
life, be it inner – or other worldly, but Taoist magic necessarily became
one of the most serious obstacles to such a development.
Conclusion
The Confucian bureaucracy largely succeeded in confining sect formation
to occasional flare-ups, for the specific aspect of sectarianism that the val-
ue and worth of the personality are guaranteed and legitimated not by
blood ties or publicly authorized degree, but by being a member of and by
proving oneself in a circle of specifically qualified associates, was particu-
larly odious to the caesaro-papistic state. The formation of religious com-
munities for the laymen – a sociologically decisive fact – was lacking, and
for this reason magic has never been displaced by a great prophecy of sal-
vation.
It is of decisive importance that the patrimonial structure of state, and
the Confucian spirit which lived in it, were not opposed by strong and in-
dependent forces, that no divine or human authority entered into competi-
tion with them:
Not the power of a citizenry which has been of such a fundamental im-
portance in the Occident. The city in China lacked political autonomy:
it was not a polis in the sense of Antiquity, nor was it a «commune»
with political liberties of its own. Rather, it was the seat of a mandarin,
without privileges of self-government or a charter. A citizenry in the
Occidental sense could not develop here (RC: 13);
No estate of jurists and no formal jurisprudence, as it was developed in
Roman law, nor a doctrine of natural law, for this would have presup-
posed a tension between philosophical or religious postulates and the
«world» (RC: 148);
No ethical and asceticist religion which might have been able to shatter
the fetters of the sibs (RC: 237);
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No science in the Occidental sense, for the power of the logos, of
defining and reasoning, as well as a systematic and naturalist thought
failed to mature (RC: 150);32
No independent hierocracy which, as in the Occidental Middle Ages,
could have produced a tension between the sacerdotium (priesthood)
and the regnum (political authority) (RC: 142);
And finally no socially powerful prophecy and no salvation religion
conducive to an ethic of conviction and a methodical way of life and
being able to shatter the fetters of the sibs. (RC: 95).
Therefore, Weber believed, the «strong cage»33 of prebendary interests,
the cause of the ossification of the Chinese state, could only be shattered
by military conquest of the country or by a successful military or religious
revolution.
Such strong and independent forces did exist in the Occident and pro-
duced revolutions of major importance for the destiny of Western culture:
the development of independent cities in Italy in the 12th and 13th cen-
turies, the Netherland revolution in the 16th century, the «glorious revolu-
tion» and bill of rights in the 17th century, and finally the American and
French revolutions of the 18th century. They did not, however, exist in
32 N. Sivin («Chinesische Wissenschaft. Ein Vergleich der Ansätze von Max Weber
und Joseph Needham.» in: Wolfgang Schluchter (ed.) Max Webers Studie über
Konfuzianismus und Taoismus, Frankfurt a. M. 1983) wrote, with regard to the sci-
ences in China, that contrary to the picture that Weber drew of them the sciences
were sophisticated enough for us to be able to evaluate them at the same level as
their contemporary European counterparts until the seventeenth century (Sivin:
354). However, the level of scientific achievements and sophistication in China, to
which the monumental work of J. Needham draws attention, was not Weber’s ma-
jor concern when he wrote about Chinese sciences. He rather wanted to draw at-
tention to the fact that the Chinese sciences were not systematic and were not an
independent force which could compete with the bureaucratic attitude towards life
(RC: 151). And this interpretation seems to be accepted by Sivin when he writes
that the Chinese sciences were not integrated by anything corresponding to the sci-
entia of the West, that there was no science in China but only sciences. It should
be added that the continued existence of magic, although it was devalued by the
higher strata, may have had some influence on Chinese scientific development.
Magic does not include the awareness that its concepts or actions may be erro-
neous or falsified or submitted to critique as it is expected in the West. Vide: R.
Horton «African Traditional Thought and Western Science» in: Rationality, Ox-
ford: Blackwell 1979 pp. 131-171.
33 The use of the expression «strong cage of prebendary interests» (RC: 61) seems
like a weak echo of the «iron cage» (PE: 123) of modern Western civilization.
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China, and, therefore, no elements of the specifically modern rationalism
were standing in competition with the patrimonial bureaucracy.
The Result: Puritanism versus Confucianism
In a chapter entitled Result Weber compares the rationalism of Confucian-
ism with that of Protestantism. To judge the level of rationalization of a
religion, he says, there are two interrelated yardsticks. One is the degree to
which the religion has discarded magic, the other is the degree to which it
has systematized the relationship between God and the world and there-
with man’s ethical relationship to the world (theodicy or, in Asia, cosmo-
dicy).
China did not divest itself of magic for the Confucian ethic never pene-
trated the masses; it was in fact one of the basic tendencies of Confucian-
ism to preserve this magic garden, while, on the other hand, a complete
disenchantment of the world was carried through by Protestantism. With
regard to the systematization of religion, Weber mentioned that naïve
stand of Confucianism towards things of this world, as opposed to Protes-
tantism’s grandiose tension towards the world.
It is the fate of every religion which upholds ethical imperatives, to find
itself at some point in a state of tension with the irrationalities of the
world. At what points these tensions will set in, will depend on the respec-
tive salvational goals and on the paths or means of salvation, and the de-
gree of religious devaluation of the world is not identical with the degree
of its rejection in actual practice, for the world may be rejected as salva-
tional goal but at the same time accepted as means of salvation.
Confucianism reduced the religious devaluation of the world as well as
its practical rejection to an absolute minimum: all tensions between the
imperatives of a supra-mundane God and a creatural world were absent34.
34 Thomas Metzger in Escape from Predicament, Neo-Confucianism and China’s
Evolving Political Culture 1977 considered the denial of the existence of any tran-
scendental tension to be a major error in Weber’s interpretation of China. Particu-
larly the Neo-Confucian tradition which was not treated by Weber in any detail,
contained, as Metzger tried to show, the awareness of tension between the cosmic
ideal and the worldly reality (a tendency towards transcendence of the status quo),
as well as the realization that all attempts of the Confucian sage in his search for
perfection and to overcome that tension are inadequate. By having demonstrated
that there was «tension» in Neo-Confucianism, Metzger believed that he had also
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This ethic of unconditional affirmation of and adjustment to the world pre-
supposed the continued existence of magical religion while, at the same
time, every form of salvation religion and of congregational religion was
eliminated and every prophecy of a supra-mundane God who raises ethical
demands, was absent.
A true prophecy, says Weber, creates and systematically orients con-
duct toward one internal measure of value. Confucianism, however,
favoured adjustment to the conditions of the world, it did not require a
systematic unity of conduct which in the Westerner’s mind is associated
with the idea of personality (RC: 235), but rather a combination of useful
particular traits: not an inner- but an outer-directed personality.
The duties of a Confucian always stressed the piety toward concrete
people, never toward a sacred cause or an idea. They tied him to his sib
members, not to functional tasks or enterprises. In contrast, the ethical re-
ligions like Protestantism shattered the fetters of the sib and established
communities founded solely on their common ethical way of life.
As opposed to the adjustment to the world of Confucianism there is, ac-
cording to Weber, the rejection of the world of Puritanism, a rejection
which did not lead to a flight from the world but rather to rationalization
of the world. The world was rejected by the Puritans as a goal of salvation
but it was a means of proving one’s self in successful enterprise.
While, on the whole, China produced different kinds of capitalism (po-
litically oriented capitalism etc.), it did not develop modern capitalism out
of its own sources.35 Weber reminds us that neither acquisitiveness nor
shown that there has been continuity in China between tradition and modernity be-
cause tension belongs to modernity. Weber’s interpretation, on the other hand,
would imply that there has been a complete break with the Chinese tradition since
the Communist revolution. Metzger’s standpoint seems to imply a modified
Protestant ethic thesis: the researcher tries to find tension within a religion or cul-
ture and, if he succeeds, this indicates why that culture is or was able to modernize
(although not necessarily able to produce modern capitalism from within itself).
35 This does not mean, of course, that China or the Chinese would not be able to
adopt capitalism from the outside. Weber wrote one hundred years ago that the
Chinese “in all probability would be quite capable, probably more capable than the
Japanese, of assimilating capitalism” (RC: 248), for he distinguished clearly be-
tween invention and diffusion. Gordon Redding (1993) has described the «spirit»
in successful overseas Chinese family businesses as based on paternalism, net-
working and filial piety, not on individualism. The ideas of the key actors are
clearly linked to cultural (Confucian) sources while they live within a Western-in-
fluenced economic structure with legal, financial and commercial institutions. It
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high esteem for wealth nor utilitarian rationalism have any connection as
yet with modern capitalism. Rationalism was embodied in the Confucian
as well as in the Protestant «spirit». But while Confucian rationalism
meant rational adjustment to the world, Protestant rationalism meant ratio-
nal mastery of the world.
In comparison with the Occident, there were many conditions which
externally favoured the origin of capitalism in China. On the other hand,
many circumstances which hindered capitalism in China, similarly existed
in the Occident. Therefore, according to Weber, we have to conclude that
the mentality, i.e. the «Confucian spirit» had effects strongly counteractive
to capitalist development.
Intermediate Reflection: Religious Rejections of the World and their
Levels and Directions
Basic Literature
«Religious Rejections of the World and their Directions» in From Max Weber (trans-
lated and edited by H.H. Gerth & C.Wright Mills) Oxford & New York: Galaxy
1958, pp. 323-354
«Zwischenbetrachtung» in Max Weber Gesammelte Aufätze zur Religionssoziologie I,
Tübingen: Mohr (Siebeck) 1920 pp. 536-573
India which will be considered next, is, in contrast to China, the cradle of
the most world-denying forms of religious ethics. Before turning to her re-
ligions it must first be clarified in a schematic way which are the motives
from which world-denying religious ethics have originated and in which
directions they have developed.
The constructed schematic picture will indicate conflicting life-orders
in an ideal-typical way. The theoretically constructed types of life-orders
are prepared with a rational consistency which is rarely found in reality.
To this extent, the construction will be ideal-typical in order to facilitate a
clear general view and a precise terminology. But it is also true, as Weber
insists, that rationality, in the sense of logical or teleological «consisten-
cy» of an intellectual or ethical attitude, has some kind of power over
3.
may be asked whether the authoritarian capitalism of present-day China, lacking
an impartial bureaucracy which has no clear idea of acting sine ira et studio,
would increase its stability by revitalising the Confucian spirit.
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man36 (FMW: 324): religious interpretations of the world and ethics of re-
ligions created by intellectuals have been strongly exposed to the impera-
tive of consistency even if they integrated points of view which could not
be rationally deduced. Thus, the presentation of the otherwise multifarious
reality will be facilitated by the idealtypical construction of the internally
most consistent forms of ethical conduct that can be deduced from the giv-
en conditions.
Above all, these lines are intended as a contribution to a typology and
sociology of rationalism. The argument proceeds from the most rational
forms reality can assume, and then asks to what extent certain rational
conclusions, pertaining to the conduct of life, were drawn or why they
were not drawn.
Weber returns to the conception of a supra-mundane God (as in the In-
troduction) and notes that this conception, in spite of its affinity to emis-
sary prophecy, did not operate alone in the production of an ascetic reli-
gious ethic (in opposition to a contemplative and mystical quest), but that
this was possible only in conjunction with the nature of the religious
promises and the paths of salvation which they determined. In this context,
the polar concepts «asceticism» and «mysticism” need to be clarified.
Both asceticism (action in conformity with the demands of God; the ac-
tor considers himself as God’s tool) and mysticism (the individual consid-
ers himself not as a tool but as a «vessel»37 which is in contemplative pos-
session of the divine; action in the world appears as endangering the other-
worldly religious state) are forms of world rejection. Asceticism contrasts
radically with mysticism if asceticism operates within the world and tries
to master the world (inner-worldly asceticism) and if mysticism draws the
36 This is a theme which Weber alluded to on several occasions. In the Protestant
Ethic (PE: 56) Weber had already mentioned that in order to understand the spe-
cific importance and influence of religious ideas, one has to study their most
consistent and logical forms. In the replies to his critics (AC: 113) he wrote: the
style of life of the ascetic communities in confessionally mixed regions rubbed off
on the style of life of the other denominations; an assimilation to the most consist-
ent expressions of Protestant ascetism almost always took place.
Even in the field of legal doctrine one can, according to Weber (ES: 789), discover
the power of pure logic on legal practice.
37 The poet Rainer Maria Rilke whom Weber regarded highly and about whom he
commented in 1910 in a letter to his sister Lili, calling him a mystic (MWG II, 6:
615), wrote in 1899 in the collection of poems entitled Stundenbuch (Book of
Hours):
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full conclusion of fleeing from the world (world-fleeing mysticism). The
contrast is tempered, however, if the ascetic confines himself to overcom-
ing the creatural wickedness in his own nature and enhances his active re-
demptory accomplishments to the point of avoiding any action in the
world (world-fleeing asceticism) or if the contemplative mystic does not
draw the conclusion that he should flee from the world (inner-worldly
mysticism). But always, even when the mystic accommodates to the or-
ders of the world, he resists the temptation to take the ways of the world
seriously. Like Lao-tse, he proves himself against his action in the world
and not, like the inner-worldly ascetic, through his actions. Moreover, Ju-
daism and Islam with their transcendent god developed mysticism but
hardly any asceticism. Quite obviously, the concept of a transcendent god,
in spite of its affinity to active asceticism, did not operate alone but rather
in conjuction with other circumstances, particularly the religious promises
and the paths of salvation which they determined.
After these remarks on the polar concepts of asceticism and mysticism
Weber considers the tensions existing between religion and what he terms
the other orders of life. A methodical conduct of life which may form the
germ of either asceticism or mysticism, originally grows out of magical
preconditions. The magician has been the historical precursor of the
prophet. But while it is true that the prophets legitimized themselves
through the possession of a magical charisma, it was the substance of their
prophecy to direct their followers’ conduct of life to the pursuit of a salva-
tional good. This has been particularly so in the case of «salvation reli-
gions» that promised deliverance from suffering to their adherents. The
more inward, the more principled the essence of suffering was conceived,
the more it was important to attain a permanent state which would guaran-
tee salvation.
Such religions have lived in a permanent state of tension in relation to
the world and its orders. The tension has been the greater, the more ratio-
nal the ethic has been and the more the original ritualism was sublimated
towards a «religion of conviction». Equally, the further the rationalization
What will you do, God, if death takes me,
I am your vessel, if Time brakes me,
I am your drink, if curdling cakes me,
You 'll lose all meaning losing me.
Perhaps Weber found here the image of the mystic as a vessel or jug of God?
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and sublimation of the possession of «worldly» goods proceeded, the
stronger has the tension on the part of religion become, for this develop-
ment made conscious in the minds of the individuals the inner logic
(Eigengesetzlichkeit) of the religious and worldly spheres and the conse-
quences of these different inner logics. This is a typical result of the con-
scious endeavour towards rationality. Weber now considers a series of
these recurring tensions.
To begin with, there was the tension between salvation religion and the
traditional sib. For it was taken for granted in the prophetic religions of
salvation that brothers in the faith should, in the last analysis, be closer to
each other than to their relatives in the community into which they were
born. Shattering the magical ties and the exclusiveness of the sibs, they
created a new community characterized by a religious ethic of brotherli-
ness. The original distinction between in-group and out-group morality
was transferred to the religious community and the members were re-
quired to help the poor and the sick of the community; but, the more ratio-
nal the idea of salvation became and the more it was sublimated into an
ethic of conviction, the more the barriers of faith and even the existence of
hatred were conceived as the result of suffering and of the imperfections
of empirical reality. Therefore, the ethical demand has tended towards an
objectless acosmism38 of love, a universalist brotherliness which broke all
barriers of societal associations and often also the barriers of one’s own
religious community. The more consistently the demands of this religious
brotherliness have been carried through, the sharper they clashed with the
orders and values of the world. This clash became the wider the more the
values of the world have been rationalized according to their own inner
logic.
This became particularly obvious in the economic sphere. A rational
economy is a functional organization, depending on monetary calcula-
tions. Money is the most abstract and «impersonal» element in human life.
The modern rational capitalist economy, therefore, is not accessible to a
religious ethic of brotherliness, and the salvation religions have always
watched the impersonal economic activity with profound suspicion for, as
38 In philosophy the term «acosmistic» is used for a system of thought which denies
the existence of a cosmos outside of God or the devine. Weber uses the term to
designate mystical world rejection and generally any religiosity which rejects the
possibility to have an active and formative effect on the world and which, while
disregarding reality and social orders, obeys the rule of brotherly love.
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mentioned in Weber’s «Protestant Ethic», deo placere non potest (it can-
not please God).
The most radical rejection of individual economic property can be
found in the world-fleeing asceticism of monks. And yet, the paradox of
all rational asceticism which often creates the very wealth it rejects, has
made monks in all ages stumble: monasteries everywhere became the very
loci of rational economic activity.
There are, according to Weber, only two consistent avenues for escap-
ing the tension between salvation religion and the economic sphere in a
principled and inward manner: the Puritan vocational ethic which re-
nounces all universal love, serves God’s incomprehensible and positive
will and accepts the depersonalization of the economic cosmos as God-
willed. In truth, this standpoint of unbrotherliness was no longer a genuine
salvation religion. The other consistent avenue is the mystic acosmism of
love, the giving to anybody who accidentally comes one’s way, the object-
less devotion to anybody, not for the person’s sake but for devotion’s
sake.
Thirdly, there developed tension between the religious ethic of brother-
liness and the political sphere. While the religion turned to a God of love
and demanded an ethic of brotherliness, the bureaucratic state proceeded
without regard to the person, sine ira et studio (without either hatred or
love) and thus conflicted with the religious demands. Moreover, every
state’s absolute end is to safeguard itself, if necessary by the appeal to
naked force, – indeed, the state is an association that claims the monopoly
of the legitimate use of force –, and accepting the responsibility for any
possible injustice,39 contrary to the teaching of the Sermon on the Mount
not to resist evil.
And as force generally breeds more force, the «reasons of state» tend to
follow the tracks of their inner logic. The more matter-of-fact and the
more effective politics is, the less brotherly it will appear to a rationalized
ethic of brotherliness.
39 The translation of this passage in FMW: 334 is quite flawed. It suggests that there
might sometimes be injustice if the state does not intervene by force. Weber, on
the contrary, suggests that there might be injustice in any case, but that the politi-
cian, as he pursues an ethic of responsibility and not an ethic of conviction, has to
shoulder any possible injustice resulting from his actions. On the distinction be-
tween the ethic of responsibility and the ethic of conviction vide Weber’s «Politics
as a Vocation» in FMW: 77-128, particularly p. 120.
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There are only two solutions of the tension between religion and polit-
ics: 1. The Puritan belief that the commandments of God should be im-
posed by force on the creaturely world in the interest of God’s cause, and
2. the mystic’s radical acosmistic brotherliness which, with the maxim
«then turn the other cheek» of the Sermon on the Mount, withdraws from
the pragma of violence which no political action can escape. Some com-
promise solutions, however, may be of interest as types. Lutheranism, for
instance, has rejected the right to active resistance against any secular co-
ercion in matters of faith and has known only passive resistance in this
matter. It also accepted obedience to secular authority, even if it had given
the order for war – and it thus accepted its ethical autonomy. Luther’s reli-
giosity was, like all mystic search for salvation, apolitical or anti-political,
but he stopped short of drawing the full conclusion: he did not infer con-
sistently the radically diabolic character of the world.
The use of religious organizations for the political domestication of the
masses or for the religious consecration of the legitimacy of those in pow-
er were, of course, forms of the relativization of religious values and of
their inner logic. The most important type of these relative forms has been
the «organic” social ethic, whose conception of vocational work has been
the most important contrast to the idea of the calling, as found in inner-
worldly asceticism. The organic social ethic rejects the idea that salvation
should be accessible only to some and not to all and it attempts to synthe-
size the inequality of charismatic qualifications with the secular social
strata into a cosmos of God-ordained services. It thus comprehends the
world as an at least relatively rational cosmos, but it also represents, from
the point of view of the acosmistic ethic of brotherliness, an accommoda-
tion to the interests of the privileged strata and, on the other hand, from
the point of view of innerworldly asceticism, a lack of a rational-methodi-
cal conduct of life.
While the organic social ethic is eminently conservative, a virtuoso reli-
giosity may have revolutionary consequences. Inner-worldly asceticism,
whenever it opposes a divine «natural law» to a given political order, leads
to Puritan revolutions and to the obligation to crusade. In the case of the
mystic, on the other hand, when the possession of God turns into posses-
sion by God and when eschatological expectations of an acosmistic and
brotherly millennium appear, this may lead to chiliastic anomism.
Also every other rational action (apart from economic and political ac-
tion) carries within itself a profound tension. It results from the question
whether the value of an action lies in the action per se or whether it should
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be determined by its success. The attitude, resulting from an ethic of con-
viction, «to do right and to leave the success to God» will, because of the
inner logic of the world, prove irrational in its effects – as has been shown
theoretically in the Bhagavadgita, a part of an Indian epos.
Fourthly, there is tension between the ethic of religious brotherliness
and the spheres of esthetic and erotic life. Magical religiosity (with its
idols or ecstatic dances) stands in an intimate relation to the esthetic
sphere, but for the religious ethic of brotherliness art as a carrier of magi-
cal effects in suspect. Salvation religions have stressed meaning and have
devalued form, and they have completely rejected art, when it takes over
the value of this-worldly salvation. In religion’s eyes, such inner-worldly
salvation is no more than irresponsible indulgence and secret lovelessness.
Besides, in our intellectualistic age men tend to avoid moral judgements
or to transform them into judgements of taste («in poor taste» instead of
«reprehensible») – and this may very well be regarded by salvation reli-
gions as a very base form of unbrotherliness.
On the whole, universalist mass religions have always entered alliances
with art, but genuine virtuoso religions have clearly shown their reserva-
tions.
Also sexual love was very often part of magic orgiasticism, but most
prophetic religions have regulated it in favour of marriage and they thus
expressed the contrast between a rational conduct of life, on the one hand,
and magical orgiasticism and all sorts of irrational ecstasies, on the other.
But when, later, sexuality was sublimated into «eroticism», it appeared as
an escape from the mechanisms of rationalization, as equivalent to the
«having» of the mystic, and extramarital sexual life appeared as the only
tie which still linked man with the natural fountain of life.
A principled ethic of brotherliness is radically opposed to this kind of
innerworldly salvation. Inner-worldly and rational asceticism can accept
only the rationally regulated marriage, best demonstrated perhaps in the
Quaker ethic of William Penn40 which underscores the ethical responsibil-
40 Weber here mentions the letters of William Penn to his wife. It is perhaps note-
worthy that Weber more than once quoted letters of famous men to close female
friends: for instance the letters of the German poet Goethe to Frau v. Stein (Criti-
cal Studies in the Logic of the Cultural Sciences, CMW: 154 sqq); and the letters
of Abélard to Héloise (RC: 168). The three volumes of Weber’s Collected Essays
in the Sociology of Religion were dedicated to three women close to him: his wife
Marianne as well as Mina Tobler and Else Jaffé-Richthofen.
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ity for one another and which rejects all eroticism as idolatry of the worst
kind.
Finally, the tension is greatest and most principled where the religion of
salvation faces the sphere of intellectual knowledge. Wherever rational
empirical knowledge has disenchanted the world, it unavoidably meets the
claim of the ethical postulate that the world is a somehow meaningfully
organized cosmos. As the empirical as well as the mathematically oriented
view of the world rejects all questions which inquire about the «meaning”
of inner-worldly occurrences, they tend to push religion from the rational
into the irrational realm. Although religions again and again have tried to
justify and to rationalize their dogmas, the fundamental inner tension
which at some point demands the «sacrifice of the intellect”, proclaiming
credo non quod sed quia absurdum (I believe – not what is absurd but be-
cause it is absurd), could not be resolved. For salvation religion does not
claim to offer intellectual knowledge, it offers an ultimate stand towards
the world by virtue of a direct grasp of its «meaning».
The directions of world rejection and of the striving for salvation which
have been discussed so far, depended on the question which spheres of the
«world” had been rationalized or had been left to their inner logic (the
tribal, economic, political, aesthetic, erotic or intellectual sphere). Pro-
ceeding from the religious claim that the course of the world is somehow
meaningful, Weber now tries to construct a theory of the degrees of world
rejection. The claim emerged first in the context of the customary problem
of unjust suffering, but it then progressed to an ever-increasing devalua-
tion of the world. For not only unjust suffering, but the existence of suffer-
ing as such soon appeared to be irrational: the world itself was conceived
as imperfect. That an imperfect world may not be eternal, appeared rea-
sonable; but then this transitoriness devalued the highest inner-worldly
goods so that the whole empirical world was rejected. Even the most high-
ly cherished cultural values were indicted for they run counter, as has been
seen, to the demand for brotherliness, they are characterized by the un-
brotherly charisma of the mind and of taste and the impersonality of the
economic cosmos.
Furthermore, something will adhere to the possession of cultural values
which is bound to depreciate them with still greater finality: their mean-
inglessness. The inner-worldly perfection and cultivation of self is mean-
ingless because death is meaningless when viewed from the inner-worldly
standpoint. The man of culture cannot die «satiated with life” like the
peasant, for, just as his cultural values, his perfectibility in principle pro-
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gresses indefinitely; and the more differentiated the cultural values be-
come, the more it appears unlikely that he has achieved a meaningful se-
lection at the moment of his death. Thus culture or the striving for it can-
not have an inner-worldly meaning. Even all intellectual and mystical at-
tempts at salvation in the face of these tensions succumb in the end to the
reign of unbrotherliness, because their charisma is not accessible to every-
body and also, because under the social conditions of rational and voca-
tional work only the economically independent strata can afford to lead
the life of a Buddha or a Jesus.
The various ethics of salvation choose different points of departure for
their world-rejection on this purely rationally constructed scale. Besides
other circumstances, a rational element, the respective theodicy, does play
its part. Among the three consistent types of theodicy there is, to begin
with, Zoroastrian dualism which maintains the coexistence of the powers
of light and darkness. Its consistent form which involves renouncing the
omnipotence of a god, has been given up by most mass religions and has
been replaced by a less consistent form in which the god of light finally
triumphs over the god of darkness. While this conception restores God’s
sovereignty, it willy-nilly sacrifices some of the divine love because it ad-
mits a (subordinate) power of darkness, sin and hell’s punishments.
In that case, only renunciation of God’s love and benevolence, as in the
Puritan dogma of predestination, is consistent. Man’s acknowledged inca-
pacity to understand the ways of God means that he renounces any acces-
sibility to a meaning of the world. Outside of a circle of virtuosi the belief
in this consistent dogma has not been permanently endured.
The third form of consistent theodicy was peculiar to the religiosity of
Indian intellectuals and world renouncers. It stands out by virtue of its
combination of strict world-rejection with an organic social ethic, of con-
templation with an inner-worldly vocational ethic. It is to this Indian reli-
giosity that Weber now turns.
Hinduism and Buddhism
Basic Literature:
Max Weber, The Religion of India. The Sociology of Hinduism and Buddhism, New
York: The Free Press 1958
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Max Weber, Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Religionssoziologie II, Tübingen 1921
Wolfgang Schluchter, Rationalism, Religion, and Domination University of California
Press 1989 Chapter IV Hinduism and Buddhism: World Flight and Organic Rela-
tivism)
Wolfgang Schluchter (Hg.), Max Webers Studie über Hinduismus und Buddhismus,
Frankfurt a.M. 1984
The structure of Weber’s essay on «Hinduism and Buddhism» is quite
similar to that on «Confucianism and Taoism». After some introductory
comments regarding the fact that India has always been a land of trade,
that the princes pursued rational financial policies, that the political capi-
talism of tax farming and state contracting was well known and that Indi-
ans had cultivated rational science in some areas (including mathematics),
Weber nevertheless notes that modern capitalism did not develop indige-
nously but is an imported product. This raises the question as to whether
Indian religiosity, as one factor among many, may have been responsible
for the absence of modern capitalism. In order to answer this question,
Weber first analyzes the Indian social system and then the «spirit» which
lived in it.
The Hindu Social System
While in China the patrimonial bureaucracy was the dominating social
structure, the shell (Gehäuse) in which the Confucian spirit lived, in India
everything revolved around the caste system in which, in turn, there lived
the Indian spirit. But what is a caste? Weber approached the notion by
comparing it with other social forms. In contrast to a tribe, a caste is with-
out a fixed territory nor does it form a political body. Moreover, the ad-
missible kinds of occupation of caste members are strictly limited. This
leads to a comparison of the caste with merchant and craft guilds. Here it
must be stressed that membership in a caste is hereditary and that the
«spirit» of the caste system was totally different from that of the guilds.
The Occidental medieval city rested on the fraternization of the guilds and
of the citizenry. Since Paul’s letter to the Galatians (II, 12 sqq.) Christians
had shattered, according to Weber, the voluntary ghetto of the Jews, the
ritual barriers against commensality at the Holy Communion. This had
been the hour of conception for the Occidental citizenry. The Indian caste
order, on the other hand, excluded the possibility of commensality as well
as the connubium (marriage between members of different castes). There-
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fore, the possibility that town dwellers became citizens in the medieval
Western sense did not exist and the corporate character of the city was un-
known (ES: 1228). Nevertheless, castes are, according to Weber, status
groups, if status implies a quality of social honour or a lack of it, and ex-
presses itself through a specific conduct of life – even if the status differ-
ences of the castes are easily transposed into the magico-religious sphere.
And how were the castes combined into a caste system? Weber starts
from the classical brahmanical theory which divides the system into four
varnas (categories), the brahmins (representing the sacerdotal status), the
ksatriyas (representing the political power), the vaishyas (representing
commerce and trade) and the shudras (servile occupations), and thus es-
tablishes a hierarchical41 succession of ranks; but he leaves no doubt that
the relative ranks between concrete castes were always and everywhere
disputed. The concrete system was not established once and for all but was
continuously submitted to change in the various local and political situa-
tions. Considered over a longer time period, its importance seems to have
increased.
Kings naturally belonged to the ksatriyas. Their administratiion was
patrimonial-bureaucratic, the responsibilities of the administrators (often
the kings» relatives) were fluid. The kings often claimed monopolies in
trade, and tax farming arrangements evolved into prebends and not fiefs.
A prebendalization of the patrimonail state occurred (RI: 67-71).
Weber sees the origin of the caste system in the importance of the mag-
ical lineage charisma, reinforced by the existence of several races (RI:
126). This social situation favoured a division of labour based on the con-
cept of guest peoples – with an external resemblance to the helots of the
Spartan state in ancient Greece. The brahmins were in a position – without
any formal organization and although they depended on the political pow-
41 The meaning of «hierarchy» with regard to India has received a modified and
more nuanced interpretation by Louis Dumont in his Homo Hierarchicus. It does
not consist of units of successive orders or of a ladder of command as in a modern
army or in modern bureaucracy. Rather, it here implies a holistic and relational
view which gives everything its value and characteristics in relation to the englob-
ing whole. Thus, this view valorizes the social whole and subordinates the human
individual or the individual group. The opposition between brahmin and ksatriya,
for instance, is a hierarchical one in which the brahmin is superior to the ksatriya
although he depends on him materially, because the religious sphere is englobing
the political sphere, or, put differently: brahmins are superior because they are in-
ferior only at an inferior level.
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er of the kshatriyas – to occupy an eminent place in this system. Partially,
this may have been the result of the fact that the great Hinduistic patrimo-
nial empires found support of their legitimacy among the brahmins, par-
tially also because the patrimonial rules supported the caste system in or-
der to limit the power of the guilds, and finally because the Islamic con-
quest since the tenth century reduced the political power of the ksatriyas
and thus implicitly supported the position of the brahmins. For all these
reasons the caste system slowly became dominant.
The Hindu Spirit
The system had, according to Weber, a traditionalistic and anti-rational ef-
fect in the economic sphere – not because ritual caste antagonisms made
the development of large enterprises impossible or because of other relat-
ed difficulties, but because of the «spirit» which lived in the whole system
(RI: 112).
Hinduism is generally a very tolerant religion with regard to dogma and
teachings, but it stresses the ritual duties (dharma) of the castes. No Hindu
rejects the two central doctrines: samsara (the transmigration of souls) and
karma (the doctrine of compensation for one’s actions), according to
which the human fate and one’s position within the caste system is deter-
mined by the fulfillment of ritual and ethical duties in one’s previous life.
This karma doctrine was, according to Weber, the most consistent theodi-
cy ever produced in historical times. It promised the highest premium for
the fulfillment of one’s caste duties: rebirth in a higher caste, perhaps even
as a king or as a god.
This brilliant combination of ritual caste duties and caste legitimacy
with the karma doctrine was the product of rational ethical thought and not
of economic conditions (RI: 131); and only the wedding of this thought
product with the real social order by means of the promise of rebirth gave
this order the irresistible power over thought and hope of the people. The
devout Hindu, even if he was not conscious of this grandiose context, was
a captive in this intellectual and social cage (RI: 121). Action according
the the caste dharma had salvational significance. In the context of these
concepts, however, ideas of progress or revolution were inconceivable;
work was prescribed by tradition and the rationalization of economic life
an impossibility.
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Orthodox and Heterodox Salvation Teachings
If one wanrs to understand the brahmins, a comparison with the intellectu-
als of other cultures is unavoidable, in particular with the intellectuals of
the Greek polis and with the Confucian mandarins.
In contrast to the intellectuals of the polis, the brahmins were tied to rit-
ual and magic. On the other hand, both mandarins and brahmins were a
status group of genteel literati whose charisma rested on «knowledge»;
both rejected all types of orgiasticism and all irrational forms of salvation.
But in China we find a stratum of officials and candidates for office,
whereas careers in office were not typical for the brahmins who could be
princely chaplains, teachers, jurists, priests and sometimes even farmers.
The Chinese patrimonial bureaucracy did not recognize other autonomous
forces whereas the Indian brahmins stood independently beside the politi-
cal rulers.
The brahmins had their own duties (svadharma), different from those of
the political rulers; both followed the inner law (Eigengesetzlichkeit) of
their respective castes. There was no universally valid ethic, no natural
law, no natural equality of human beings, no concept of radical evil, no
concept of the state (RI: 144). Only the caste dharma existed, the inner law
of the respective castes. It was the dharma of the brahmin to perform sac-
rifices and other priestly activities and it was the dharma of the kshatriya
to conduct wars for the sake of pure power and, if necessary, by cunning
and fraud, which led to an astonishing Machiavellianism unheard of in the
Occident (RI: 146). The same can be said about other areas of life: in con-
trast to the rejection of specialization in Confucianism, Hinduism accepted
the special knowledge and inner laws of all spheres of life: the conduct of
war and administration became specialized fields of knowledge and there
existed a rational science in mathematics and grammar.
The seemingly so consistent and well-rounded picture of caste society
and karma theodicy in which the goal of salvation of each person is a bet-
ter rebirth and in which the means of salvation is action in conformity with
one’s caste dharma is, however, relativized by Weber by the observation
that the «wheel» of recurrent rebirths and deaths must appear meaningless
to the human being. The question arose how one can avoid or escape the
transitoriness of life.
Therefore, besides the conduct of life according to one’s caste dharma,
there was the alternative of the conduct of life of the sramana, the world
renouncer who, leaving the holistic social order by renouncing his existing
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rôle in society (as a member of a caste, family etc.) and sometimes living
alone in the wilderness, tried to achieve salvation from the wheel of re-
births as an outworldly individual. Ritual and virtuous actions within the
caste order might improve the rebirth chances, but true salvation could on-
ly be achieved by world fleeing asceticism or contemplation (RI: 152).
The sramana relativized the innerworldly goals of salvation by his radical
rejection of the world, the desire to be saved from the world itself – and
this not only because suffering devalues all creatures but because of an
aversion to the world’s meaningless turns and changes.
This state of affairs, full of inner consistency, was by no means univer-
sal, for the belief in fate or in an all-powerful god – both not logically
compatible with the karma theodicy – can also be found. But the juxtapo-
sition of caste dharma and the striving for otherworldly salvation produced
a tension, said Weber, which was the root of orthodox as well as hetero-
dox solutions.
One such solution can be foud in the Bhagavadgita, a religious poem
inserted in the Mahabharata epos and of almost canonical significance for
orthodox Hindus. The question is asked in what sense actions according to
the caste dharma can have salvational significance, and the originality of
the Bhagavadgita can be found in the answer that the man of knowledge
should keep an inner distance from his innerworldly duties, that he should
act in the world according to his dharma, but without ever seeking success
and the fruits of his actions. This indifferent attitude towards innerworldly
conduct represents, according to Weber, the crown of classical ethics of
Indian intellectuals (RI: 185), although he does not attribute to it a com-
plete inner consistency42 for there remained the question of the relative
significance of action in the world while disregarding the results. In this
inner-worldly mysticism (as opposed to world fleeing mysticism) both
paths of salvation, right knowledge and right action, seem to be of equal
rank. In any case, the fulfillment of the caste dharma was, according to the
Bhagavadgita, rigidly traditionalistic as an activity in the world but not of
the world (RI: 326).
Another response was Jainism which originated among intellectual
kshatriyas at the time of the development of cities. It rejected the ritualistic
42 According to Weber, there are only two consistent solutions to the tensions be-
tween salvation religion on the one hand and the political and economic sphere on
the other: the Puritan ethic and the acosmism of the mystic. All other solutions are
compromises and relativisations.
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commandments and teachings of Hinduism’s holy books, the Vedas, Just
like in orthodox Hinduism, knowledge was the supreme means of salva-
tion, but the path to salvation was asceticism to a much higher degree than
in other sects (RI: 195). Jainism produced the typical dualistic organiza-
tion of Hindu sects: a community of monks as the nucleus and the laity
under the religious domination of the monks. This laity had to take special
vows to fulfill obligatory duties and thus had the typical character of a sect
into which one is especially received.
At the top of all ascetic rules was ahimsa (prohibition of the killing of
living beings) which largely excluded the Jainas from many occupations,
particularly agriculture as ploughing endangers the the life of worms and
insects (RI: 199). This was followed by satya (to be free from falsehood)
and, even for the laity, by aparigraha (to be free from worldly attachments
or the limitation of possessions). While the acquisition of wealth was not
forbidden, the attachment to riches was frowned upon – in a way similar
to the Protestant ethic43 in the Occident (RI: 200). Furthermore, all decep-
tion and dishonest gain was prohibited. Only traders and bankers could
truly practice ahimsa. The compulsory saving, familiar from ascetic
Protestantism, worked also among the Jainas as they used accumulated
possessions for investment rather than consumption, but they remained
confined to commercial capitalism and banking and did not create indus-
43 It has been a recurring tendency to compare Jainism with Protestantism (already
G. Bühler in Deutsche Revue 1894, vol. 19. 4, p. 223 sqq. drew a parallel between
the Jainist organization and the Free Kirk of Scotland, later Glasenapp 1964: 331,
and fianally B. Nevashkar in Capitalists without Capitalism. The Jains of India
and the Quakers in the West. Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood 1991). In gener-
al, recent scholarship does confirm, while adding new aspects, Weber’s interpreta-
tion of Jainism. Jainas believe that existing karma needs to be destroyed by the ob-
servance of austerities, tapas, (vows of fasting, giving up any attachment to the
body etc.), and that they alone are expected to work out their salvation: no amount
of intercession by others or even higher beings is helpful. A lonely individualism,
similar to that of the Puritans, may be the result. But, on the other hand, there is
the distinction between monks (sadhu, swami) and lay people (the rules prescribed
to these two groups differing not in kind but in degree) which does not exist in the
Protestant sects; the caste system is not absent, there is idol worship among at least
some sub-sects, and the philosophical doctrine of syādvāda (the theory of the rela-
tivity of truths according to which contradictory statements may be true at the
same time) seems to relativize the requirement of truthfulness itself.
It might be mentioned in passing that, according to Weber, also the Parsis (of
Zoroastrian origin) are prosperous as businessmen because of their adherence to
the rigid injunction to be honest (ES:556).
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trial orgnizations – perhaps because of the barriers set up by the patrimo-
nial character of kingship.
Weber believed that the teaching of the Jainas contained an inner con-
tradiction, for their highest goal was an inner habitus of tranquillity – as
with all Indian soteriologies of intellectuals - (RI: 204), the path to its at-
tainment, however, was detachment from the world and self-denial
through mortification; but such asceticism does not easily lead to a feeling
of security and tranquillity. In spite of the separation of monks and lay ad-
herents, there was no separate goal of salvation for the lay community.
Magic was never completely cast off, and the anxious control of ritual cor-
rectness prevented an inner rationalization and a coherent method of con-
templative mysticism or active asceticism. After the Hindu Restauration
Jainism did not escape the fate of Hinduization and the caste order took
hold among them.
Ancient Buddhism
Early Buddhism, to which Weber then turned, is described systematically
with regard to the points important to him, and as a coherent system of
thought, even if at its beginning it may not have had such a rational con-
sistency (RI: 206). Just as Jainism, it originated during a time of urban de-
velopment and, as a soteriology of cultivated intellectuals, it was the prod-
uct of positively privileged status groups. Kshatriyas, brahmins and rich
citizens were its adherents, and the Buddha, himself a kshatriya, was in
Weber’s view, an exemplary prophet44 and not, like Mohammed or
Jeremia, an emissary or ethical prophet. Ancient Buddhism represents the
polar opposite of Confucianism and of Islam: it was an apolitical and even
anti-political religious theory of salvation of intellectually schooled men-
dicant monks.
The goal of salvation was, as with all Indian intellectual soteriologies,
internal peace; all means of salvation which were not directly related to
this goal were eradicated – as for instance the ascetic characteristics of
Jainism and all philosophical speculation. Buddhism did not doubt the
common Indian karma theodicy and the belief which followed from it that
44 India seems to be characterized by exemplary prophecy until the time of Mahatma
Gandhi. This kind of prophecy does not lead to any revolution (which would be
contrary to the caste spirit) but at the most to passive resistance ( ES: 447).
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salvation is the solely personal act of the single human being («be a lamp
unto yourself», as the Buddha said). But it rejected the belief that there is a
soul as a lasting unit. There is in Buddhist teaching no immortal soul and
no God who gives commandments. Buddhist precepts are recommenda-
tions. Human beings consist of many factors or elements which all are im-
permanent. What appears to be a personality is simply a bundle of differ-
ent factors which have combined into an apparent whole and which after
the individual’s death will combine into a new individual, just as if a light
might pass from one lamp to another: nothing substantial passes from the
former to the latter.45 What constitutes the individual is the will to exist,
the «thirst» for life and actions, pleasure and power, producing new kar-
ma, illness and death. «Thirst» and acting, even good deeds, are obstacles
to salvation, contemplation and inner enlightenment lead to bliss in the
here and now. The person who has achieved this goal, the arhat, is free
from fear and desire and has attained nirvana. There is no bridge between
the arhat ideal and the world of rational action (RI: 213). In later Buddhist
philosophy (Prajnaparamita) even samsara and nirvana are only concep-
tual constructions. There is a metaphor of crossing a river where Buddha’s
teachings are the raft which one does not need any more after the crossing
so that the distinction between samsara and nirvana becomes meaning-
less.46 Neither is a reasonable object of desire and the sensible Buddhist
will therefore desire nothing, said Vasubandhu (between 300 and 500
A.D.).
Salvation is thus an absolutely personal achievement and no one can
help; there is no grace and no prayer. There is a certain contradiction in
the fact that the Buddha who was quite aloof from forming a church or a
community gave life to an order of monks, although the organization of
this order was minimized intentionally and with great consistency. The
monastic rules (quite different from the Benedictine ora et labora, namely
pray and work) did not include work and they lacked what has been de-
veloped in Occidental monasticism: a rational conduct of life (except with
regard to a systematization of meditation and contemplation). A rational
economic ethic could hardly develop in this sort of religious order (RI:
216); there was only an ethic of non-action and of contemplation which
45 This metaphor is given in the Milinda Panha (Milinda's Questions 71.16), an old
Buddhist text, translated by I. B. Horner
46 Heinrich Zimmer Philosphies of India Princeton University Press 1951, p. 474
sqq.
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alone was thought to provide salvation. Salvation by work was considered
heretical.
Anyone who offered alms to the wandering monks could be considered
as a member of the laity. The Buddhist lay ethic, an insufficiency ethic of
the weak, as Weber called it, as they did not seek complete salvation, con-
tained the prohibition against the killing of living beings (ahimsa) and
promised innerworldly goods: riches and better rebirth chances. Any at-
tempt to form a methodical lay ethic was lacking for any sort of religious
premium for a specific economic behaviour was absent (RI: 219). Because
of the lack of any kind of planned influence on the conduct of the laity
there developed ritualism and hagiolatry. The acquisition of wealth was
not forbidden, for wealth did not imply wrong, but it was thought to lead
to the temptation to succumb to «thirst».
The Buddhist «acosmism of love», as Weber called it, was cool and
egocentric. Just as in Jainism and in Puritanism the own salvation (certitu-
do salutis) was at the center of all preoccupations, not that of one’s neigh-
bour or the love of one’s enemy. Buddhist altruism was not active brother-
liness but just a step to the final goal: the stoic equanimity of the one who
has achieved knowledge. If it is asked why ancient Buddhism became a
missionary religion, the motive can be found in the material interests of
the monks to increase the number of providers of food, of the lay popula-
tion.
Ancient Buddhism had been the most consistent of the soteriologies of
Indian intellectuals. Its inner consistency (and exterior weakness) had lain
in the fact that it reserved salvation to the monks and hardly bothered
about the laity. There was lacking what Jainism had produced, an organi-
zation of the laity. Soon after the expedition of Alexander, the patrimoni-
alism of «world-reigning» kings (cakravartin) replaced the ancient petty
kingdoms. Under the great king Ashoka the beginnings of Buddhist politi-
cal theory emerged, particularly the ideal of the welfare state, welfare be-
ing understood as the increase of the chances of salvation and of charities,
but not as rational economic welfare47. Moreover, the religious needs of
the literate officials and petty bourgeois who did not wish to attain nirvana
47 The translation in RI: 242 is plainly incorrect; vide the original German text in
GARS II, p.262 which states clearly that Ashoka’s policy was not meant to be ra-
tional economic welfare.
With regard to Buddhist political theory the Anguttara Nikaya 4. 70 of the Bud-
dhist Pali Canon states that if kings are without virtue, then officials will be with-
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needed to be satisfied, and the patrimonial ruler Ashoka saw in Buddhism
– originally a religion of intellectuals - an instrument to domesticate the
masses.48 As soon as Buddhism became a popular religion, it transformed
itself into a saviour religion with hopes for the world beyond guaranteed
by deeds of mercy and purely magical motives (ES: 628).
Buddhism elsewhere in Asia
Wherever Buddhism was diffused in the Orient, it considered the gods of
the respective cultures as subordinate to the Buddha and it generally un-
derwent some striking transformations. For emotional mass religiosity
there are generally but two possible soteriologies: magic or a saviour (RI:
237). The necessary adaptation process produced the Mahayana version of
Buddhism (as opposed to the earlier Hinayana). The idea of the Bodhisatt-
va who, instead of entering nirvana, becomes a helper in need for life here
and now, was developed. There also appeared, besides the world-fleeing
mysticism of early Buddhism an inner-worldly mysticism, the idea of a
world-indifferent life which proves itself within and against the world – a
Buddhist version of the ideas of the Bhagavadgita (RI: 253). But a rational
inner-worldly conduct of life was not to be established on the basis of the
Mahayana. Miraculous and magical interventions of the Bodhisattvas pre-
dominated, and the world remained a magic garden.
The Buddhism of Ceylon developed from the ancient Buddhist ortho-
doxy. Monastic landlordism was supported by kingship based upon a
magnificent irrigation system and the requisite bureaucracy. Buddhist lay
rules were not very demanding, belief in demons and magic art dominated
out virtue, and then also citizens and peasants will be without virtue. And then it
will not rain, seeds will grow poorly and humans will get ill.
48 In an interesting article, the indologist Heinz Bechert has given an evaluation of
Weber’s view of Buddhism. According to him, Weber’s assessment of primitive
Buddhism was surprisingly correct, and also still pertinent is Weber’s description
of the factors that caused the transformation of the old soteriology for intellectuals
into a religion of the masses. But Weber’s treatment of the later development of
Buddhism is India was unsatisfactory. Among Bechert’s critiques is Weber’s com-
parison between the Indian emperor Ashoka and the Byzantine rulers and Weber’s
overlooking of the graded character of the Buddhist ethic regarding monks and
laymen. (Heinz Bechert «Max Weber and the Sociology of Buddhism» in: Inter-
nationales Asienforum vol. 22 (1991) no.3-4, pp. 181-195).
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their life. In the outlying Indian territories of Burma and Siam the Hi-
nayana may well be co-responsible for the inferior technical and economic
development which it tolerated at best. The monasteries were not places of
rational work and the absence of castes in these territories had a negative
effect on the lay population, for, although they do not lead to modern ra-
tional development, castes do at least motivate a traditonal loyalty to one’s
vocation.
Mahayana Buddhism spread in China where it encountered the Confu-
cian stratum of literati. The policies of the Chinese government towards
Buddhism wavered between support, toleration, quota regulations, confis-
cation of temple treasures and violent persecutions. Buddhism here was of
a rather plebeian character, the monks belonged to the non-literary strata,
the monasteries were places of irrational ascetism, and meditation and
pagodas were apotropaic means to defend against demons. Any begin-
nings of a systematic ethical rationalization of conduct of the laity were
out of the question (RI: 268) 49
49 These affirmations are too short and sweeping, for Weber practically ignored the
rich Chinese Buddhist tradition,. While it is true that the Chinese nobility and liter-
ate families did not embrace the ways of the Indian renouncers and begging
monks, they were impressed by the reinterpretation of Buddhism by the life style
of Vimalakirti, a rich aristocrat who denied himself no luxury, «who wore the
white robe of the layman, but lived according to the rules of monks, who lived in a
house, but kept away from the world of desires» (E. Lamotte L'enseignement de
Vimalakirti, Louvain 1962 p. 127). It also appears that Buddhism brought a univer-
sal ethic to the prevailing familism and particularism of the indigenous traditions,
according to A. F. Wright in: Buddhism in Chinese History, Stanford University
Press 1959, p. 75. Li (order) was now interpreted as the transcendental absolute as
opposed to the empirical data of experience. Wang An-Shih, a minister of the
Sung dynasty who wrote Buddhist poems, tried to raise the condition of the farm-
ers and undertook various economic experiments. Contrary to the Confucian tradi-
tion, he believed that the literati should also have specialized knowledge in ancient
and modern laws and political economy. (Williamson, H. R. Wang An Shih, Lon-
don: Arthur Probsthain 1935, vol. 2, p. 331).
There have also been numerous rebellions and secret organizations of Buddhist in-
spiration, such as the White Lotus and the Maitreya Society who had millenarian
or chiliastic hopes and envisaged a new world order. Finally, there was the T’ai
P’ing rebellion in the nineteenth century which built on these millenarian hopes
but also borrowed from Protestant Christian ideas. Thus, Chinese Buddhism pro-
duced to a certain extent the «tension» in the form of millenarian and messianic
ideas and of ethical prophecies which Weber denied to Confucianism. Building on
these traditions modernization, at least in the form of socialism, could be intro-
duced into China.
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Excursus: Japan
From China, Buddhism was introduced to Japan and encountered a non-
Buddhist state cult (Shinto). Although Japan was a country of some inter-
est even in Weber’s time, he dealt with it only briefly, perhaps because he
thought that Buddhism (and Confucianism) did not have a serious influ-
ence on the important aspects of the «spirit» of the Japanese conduct of
life in the economic context, for the Japanese spirit, according to him, was
in its main outlines not produced by religious factors but by the feudal
character of the political and social structure (RI: 271).50 Japanese feudal-
ism did not represent a complete feudal system and ended in the quasi-pat-
rimonial regime of the Tokugawa: the granting of land to the daimyos re-
sulted in an administrative office for them rather than in a fief in the Occi-
dental sense (ES: 1075). Since the Tokugawa regime Buddhist monks be-
longed more and more to the non-literate strata. Only the Shin sect can be
compared to Protestantism in the Occident, but, for the same reasons as
Lutheranism, did not produce rational innerworldly asceticism.
The concept of the city as an autonomous seat of jurisdiction was ab-
sent in Japan – as it was in India and China (ES: 1227/8). The samurai,
entitled to bear arms and to hold fiefs or rather military prebends, were
personally free whereas merchants had no political rights. A people among
whom a stratum of professional warriors played a decisive rôle could not
attain a rational economic ethic on their own (RI: 275), but the feudal rela-
50 In an influential book Robert Bellah has tried to show that, on the contrary,
Japanese religions - several Buddhist sects - and bushido, the moral code of the
samurai, have furthered economic rationalisation by stressing diligence, frugality
and, in general, the work ethic (R. Bellah Tokugawa Religion New York
1957/1985). These were functional equivalents of the Protestant ethic. This view
has been questioned by a Japanese author (Maruyama Masao) on the basis that the
magical elements of religion (particularly in Shinto) prevent a complete rationali-
sation. Another Japanese author (Morishima Michio Why has Japan succeeded ?
Western Technology and the Japanese Ethos. Cambridge 1982) was interested in
the effects of Confucianism on East-Asian development, but he distinguished two
kinds of Confucianism: Chinese Confucianism which expects loyalty to family
and clan, and Japanese Confucianism, especially since the Meiji reforms, which
stresses kokutai, loyalty to the state and to the tenno (emperor).
It should not be forgotten, though, that the religious or «inner» factors of the de-
velpment of the capitalistic system, are, according ot Weber, insufficient for an ex-
planation ; they must be seen in connection with the «exterior» factors, in particu-
lar the legal and political system.
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tionships based on contractual legal obligations offerred a basis for the de-
velopment of an individualism in the Occidental sense.51 Therefore, as a
result of the Meiji reforms, the administration of «fiefs» could be replaced
by a bureaucratic administration, and Japan was easily able to take over
capitalism as an artifact from the outside, although it had been unable to
create it out of its own spirit.
Later Indian Developments
Turning back to India proper one notes that during the first millennium of
our era Buddhism was pressed back and was finally almost completely
eliminated. The princes strengthened their ties with the brahmanical intel-
lectual strata and the caste organization. Hindu sects with an organized
professional monkdom supported the slowly commencing restauration
which was based on the non-literary plebeian strata. The Vedanta com-
mentator Shankara initiated a monastic reform with the intention of fight-
ing the heterodox Buddhist and Jainist monastic orders. Each monk and
each lay person who belonged to a sect now had his guru (spiritual teach-
er). Thus, besides the caste order and its anchorage in the samsara and
karma doctrine which the sects did not question, the veneration of gurus,
almost living saviours, played and important rôle. Indian intellectuals up
to this time had ignored the orgiastic, ecstatic and magical parts of popular
religion, but now slowly an adaptation process took place: the cults of the
old fertility gods Shiva and Vishnu were transformed according to ortho-
dox ideas of vegetarianism and sexual abstinency.
Shivaism tried to free the old phallus (linga) cults of their sexual-or-
giastic character and to create a ritualistic and ascetic temple cult. But the
simple linga worshipper hardly knew Shiva and the meat and sexual orgies
continued. Therefore, the insertion of the non-classical linga cult into the
classical ritual was diffcult and the split between orgiastic and ascetic ori-
entation continued. These latent difficulties were particulary evident in the
Lingayat sect. The Lingayats rejected the caste order and had doubts with
51 According to Tu Wei-Ming, the Western concept of individualism (the lonely self)
does not exist in Confucianism ; rather, the self is a center of relationships («The
Confucian Dimension in the East Asian Deveopment Model» in: Josef Kreiner, ed.
The Impact of Traditional Thought in Present-Day Japan. Munich 1996, pp.
31-48).
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regard to the samsara dogma; they developed some rational and almost pu-
ritan characteristics, but they remained unbendingly ritualistic. The means
of salvation of the intellectuals was meditation about the linga, the popular
soteriology was magical and sacramental and obedience to a guru was
stressed. For these reasons the rational characteristics of the Lingayats
were unable to efface their traditional ritualism.
While Shivaism addressed itself to Brahmins as well as to peasants,
Vishnuism found followers among the middle strata. It tempered and re-
placed orgiasticism by a passionate devotion to a saviour. Not sacred
knowledge or ritual was at the forefront, but bhakti, the passionate god-
centred devotion or belief in a redeemer and his grace. It was an inactive
attitude of life, typical of pure belief-religiosity, including Lutheranism
(RI: 384, n.36).52 The Vallabhacarins in particular, were a merchant and
banker sect53 who did not seek salvation in the intellectual traditions of In-
dia, in asceticism or contemplation, but in refined sublimated orgies54 un-
der the strong influence of gurus. The means and goals of salvation were
graded and not ethically rational. It is evident in this sect, concludes We-
ber, that ascetic religiosity does not, as is often maintained, develop out of
the inner nature of bourgeois capitalism – quite the contrary. Sects which
considered innerworldly action as a path to salvation, nevertheless consid-
ered meditation as the higher path and disinterested action as superior.
52 Belief, according to Weber, is not an acknowledgement of facts or teachings, but
the religious reliance, the faithful obedience and the orientation of one’s whole life
to a God or saviour (RI: 187). Weber also mentions Augustine, according to whom
the assertion of intellectual propositions is the lowest level of faith (ES: 566). We-
ber thus uses the term in its older sense, as described by Wilfred Cantwell Smith in
Faith and Belief (1979): In old English the word believe meant to be loyal and
faithful. Shakespeare and Hobbes differentiated between belief and opinion. But
since the nineteenth century the word to believe simply meant «to have an opin-
ion» regardless whether the opinion was correct of false.
53 The term sect must be used with caution, as sects born from within the caste sys-
tem are quite different from the Western notion of sect which Weber opposed to
concept of church (vide Dumont, 1967, p. 349).
54 But vide: Jürgen Lütt «The Doctrine of the Vallabhacarya Sect and the Economic
Performance of its Followers» International Sociology 2 (3) 1987
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One of the Vishnuit sects, the Kabir Panthi55, was strongly pacifistic,
comparable to the Quakers, but their non-ascetic character and their obedi-
ence towards Gurus made an innerworldly autonomous conduct of life ot
he occidental kind impossible.
But the dogma of the unchangeability of the world order remained com-
mon to all orthodox and heterodox Hindu thinking and it is quite evident
that a community dominated by inner powers of this sort could not out of
its own arrive at the spirit of capitalism. It was even relatively difficult to
take over the economic and technically finished form as an artifact56 even
if the Indian worker may be highly diligent. It never occurred to a Hindu
to see in the success of his economic professional integrity a sign of his
state of grace or to undertake the rational reconstruction of the world as a
realization of God’s will (RI: 326). The masses of the contemporary Hin-
dus know nothing about salvation; they have this-worldly interests –
wealth and perhaps better rebirth chances. The religion of the intellectuals
may have some indirect effects on their conduct of life, but not in the
sense of innerworldly methodical rationality.
A Retrospective View on the Asian Cultural World
Asia was in principle the land of the free competition of religions and of
tolerance57. There were both orthodox and heterodox religious forms. In
55 Kabir (1440-1518) was a mystic poet who combined Hindu bhakti and Islamic Su-
fism. Weber did not mention Sikhism, founded by one of Kabir’s disciples, Guru
Nanak. As the term Sikh, derived from a Sanskrit term for disciple, already sug-
gests, the Sikhs had Gurus. They retained the Indian ideas of transmigration and
karma, but at the same time they were monotheistic and forbade the representation
of God in pictures. They practised commensality, at least «at the kitchen of the gu-
ru», and their caste structure was less rigid than among Hindus. At the beginning,
their syncretic tendencies were encouraged by the tolerant Moghul ruler Akbar,
but when persecutions set in under subsequent emperors, the brotherhood of Khal-
sa was founded: soldier-saints with a spartan code of conduct. It is this syncretism
of Indian and Islamic ideas which may well have made a consistent innerworldly
conduct of life difficult.
56 The English translation in RI: 325 regarding the take-over of capitalism in India is
incorrect and misleading. Vide the German original in GARS II, p. 359
57 Critics of Weber’s PE essay had pointed out that tolerance had a paramount rôle
for the economic development of the Occident. Weber’s mention of tolerance in
Asia (India & China) which had not in any way furthered a capitalistic develop-
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China, the upper social strata which rejected any kind of salvation religion
stood against the folk soteriology of the masses; and at the same time the
same relgion dispensed different forms of goods of salvation to different
social strata. Everywhere in Asia one finds a gulf between the literarily ed-
ucated and the non-literary masses. For the educated intellectuals of Asia
literary knowledge and mystical gnosis were the absolute path to the high-
est good whereas the masses tended toward a saviour religiosity and in-
deed a hagiolatry of living saviours or gurus (RI: 335). This charismatic
phenomenon was, beside the unbroken character of magic and the power
of the sib, the main characteristic of the Asian social order. The world re-
mained an «enchanted garden» (Zaubergarten), in which one revered or
coerced the spirits.
While it is true that the circles of literary strata attempted to sublimate
the orgiasticism and saviour belief of the masses – with limited success –
they only rarely succeeded in braking the grasp of magic. Not the rational
miracle but magic remained at the centre of mass religiosity.58 This most
highly anti-rational world of magic affected everyday economics, and
there was no way to a rational inner-worldly conduct of life. Where the in-
ner-worldly ethic was systematically specialized, as in the Indian caste
ethic, it was simultaneously traditional and ritually stereotyped.
The unrestricted lust for gain, the «acquisitive drive» of tradesmen and
artisans in Asia is probably unequalled in the rest of the world. Capitalism
existed among all Asian religions, but not modern capitalism and not the
capitalist spirit, for Asian religions were lacking in precisely that which
was decisive for the economics of the Occident: the temperance of this
lust for gain and its immersion into a system of a rational innerworldly
ethic as produced by Occidental Protestantism (RI: 337), thus creating the
religious motivation for seeking salvation through immersion in one’s
ment, is an implicit rejection of his critics. Tolerance, he wrote, may be able to
populate a country and to import foreign professionals, but Weber is rather inter-
ested in the question who might benefit from the tolerance. Only if Jews or ascetic
Christian denominations benefitted from it, the result was the spread of the spirit
of capitalism (AC: 66 & 100)
58 The «miracle» implies, according to Weber, a kind of belief in a rational guidance
of the world or in a divine gift of grace and is therefore more innerly motivated
than «magic» which is bereft of all meaning, is irrational and produced by pure
arbitrariness (RI: 335/6). The English translation regarding the distinction between
miracle and magic in RI: 335 is garbled and meaningless. Please see the German
original in GARS II: 370.
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worldly vocation. On the level of the privileged strata in Asia the patterns
of life showed feudal characteristics in Japan, were patrimonial-buraucrat-
ic in China, and were a mixture of knightly, patrimonial and intellectualis-
tic traits in India, whereas in the Occident the creation of a rational inner-
worldly ethic was bound up with the appearance if thinkers and prophets
who lived in a social context which was foreign to Asian culture: the polit-
ical burghers of the city without whom neither Judaism nor the develop-
ment of Christianity are conceivable (RI: 338). The inner order of the real
world remained concealed to the high-ranking intellectuals of Asia be-
cause it was of no interest to them. Their life was oriented to the imitation
of exemplary prophets. To the plebeian strata, on the other hand, no ethi-
cal prophecy appeared to rationally form their conduct of life.
Ancient Judaism
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Max Weber’s essays on the economic ethics of world religions may be
considered as analyses of an epoch of world history which the German
philosopher Karl Jaspers later called the axial time59. Approximately be-
tween the years 800 BC and 300 BC there lived in China Confucius and
Lao tse, in India the Buddha and in Persia Zoroaster, in Greece there lived
Socrates and Plato, and prophets like Jeremiah and Isaiah appeared in
Palastine. Weber’s essays may be read as the result of an effort to describe
the world images which were formed during the axial time and which de-
5.
59 Karl Jaspers, Vom Ursprung und Ziel der Geschichte München: Piper 1949.
Instead of using the concept of axial time, more recent scholars often talk of axial
civilizations and include Akhenaton (vide Jan Assmann, 1992, p. 290) and Mo-
hammed in the line of religious founders who initiated an axiological turn and sys-
tematised practical action to a conduct of life, thus producing a personality.
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termined the tracks along which the great cultural traditions were pushed
forward by the dynamic of interests. In this way Weber thought to be able
to seize the specificity of the Occidental evolution.
In this context Weber attributes a crucial position to ancient Judaism.
Because of its rational religious ethic of innerworldly action, free of mag-
ic, it was worlds apart from the paths of salvation offered by Asian reli-
gions; at the same time it was a crucial contributor of Western develop-
ment. Only hellenic intellectual culture, Roman law, the Catholic Church
resting on the Roman concept of office, and Protestantism equal ancient
Judaism, according to Weber (AJ: 5), in world-historical significance. But
Weber then asks why, in spite of all, Judaism nevertheless did not con-
tribute to the development of the modern capitalistic mentality.
Weber’s analysis comprises the time of the confederacy of peasants and
herdsmen before the year 1000 BC, the time of kingship of the city-based
culture until the conquest of Jerusalem by Nebuchadnezzar (597/587 BC),
the consequences of the Babylonian exile for the development of the reli-
gion, and some hints about the time of the hierocracy after the return from
Babylon. In general, Weber discovers a great independence of intellectual
culture in ancient Israel, and he observes that rarely entirely new religious
conceptions have originated in the respective centers of rational cultures,
not in Babylon, Rome, or London, but in Jerusalem, in the late Roman
province of Africa, in Geneva or in New England. For humans who are
distant from the great culture centers have not yet unlearned how to face
the course of the world with questions of their own (AJ: 206).
The Transcendent God, the berith, and the Prophets
Israel’s god was a god of heaven, just as originally in China. But while
China became a pacified world empire and its heavenly god an impersonal
and order-forming power, Israel remained a politically endangered small
state and Jahweh a transcendent personal creator and war god, conceived
as a partner of a covenant (berith) between himself and the Israelitic tribes,
a god of political events, a superhuman and yet comprehensible personal
master whom one must obey and whose positive commandments are to be
followed. The supporters of Yahweh opposed the sexual-orgiastic charac-
ter of the Baal-cults and the kind of religiosity influenced by them; they
also opposed any kind of magic as it was considerd impossible to coerce
Yahweh by magic. The representatives of this turn against orgiasticism
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and magic were mainly levitic priests, bearers of the knowledge of Yah-
weh’s commandments, to be found in the Thora, mainly in Exodus 20,
2-17 and Deuteronomium 5, 6-18.
Weber sees the difference between magic and religion tentatively in the
fact that magic contains bans in the form of tabus, but no duties and no
law, that it delivers oracles and concrete maxims of wisdom, but no ser-
mon and no rational law and coherent register of commandments like the
decalogue. While elsewhere one may find magic spells, in Israel one finds
miracles, for the miracle is, as opposed to magic spells, a more rational
construct, sprung from meaningful, understandable intentions of the god-
head. According to Weber, Israel was not an irrational magic garden like
India, but it was penetrated by the idea of a fundamentally understandable
god who directs the fate of his people, and by the idea of a rational provi-
dence (AJ: 223). And while for instance in Egypt there were magical sub-
stitutes for the fulfillment of the commandments (for the use of a
scarabaeus allowed the dead to hide their sins before the judge of the
dead), in Israel this kind of magic was absent and the ethical command-
ments had greater practical impact. Their relatively extensive rational sys-
tematization was the product of the work of the Levitic priests.
Moreover, all promises of Yahweh were tied to the good behaviour of
the people who as an association of free compatriots were jointly responsi-
ble for keeping the commandments of the god of the convenant; all had to
fear the vengeance of God if they tolerated a violation of God’s command-
ments in their midst.
In this constellation there appeared the phenomenon of prophecy, a
kind of demagogy to a certain extent, which would have been impossible
without the precarious situation of Israel in the world-political situation
between Egypt and Babylon. The question which these prophets/dema-
gogues asked was not as in Athens: how does one become a good citizen,
but rather: how does one fulfill Yahweh’s commandments. For the obedi-
ence to these commandments was the special duty of Israel because of the
berith. In the mind of the prophets Yahweh was the god of the political
union, an acting god, not the god of an eternal order. Moreover, since the
prophet Amos he was not only the originator of all possible good, but also
of doom.
Prophets never claimed the right to be worshipped in the manner of ha-
giolatry. And when they were «seized» by the spirit of Yahweh, this was
not the tranquil euphoria or mystic union of the god-possessed, as in India,
but a stormy demand. Their concept of God directed the interpretation
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which the Jewish prophets gave to their ecstatic experiences and deter-
mined the selection of such psychic states which might qualify as truly
prophetic (AJ: 313). Because of this a priori of the Jewish concept of god
the prophets could not be mystics. Their god was understandable by man
and he was a ruler of whom one desired to know how to obtain his grace.
The prophets never raised the question of the «meaning» of the world
and especially of life. Yahweh’s being and his decisions contained nothing
beyond understanding, and even world events were considered by the
prophets to be rational in character. There was much economy of psychic
resources in the fact that all rumination about the meaning of the cosmos
was precluded and that only conduct according to the commandments of
God behoved man (AJ:317). Essential for the prophets was the central re-
ligious mentality, the faith in Yahweh’s omnipotence. Obedience and hu-
mility were the ensuing virtues, an abject submission to God’s counsels
which would have been shocking to the Greek hero’s sense of dignity and
which, according to Weber, can develop only in the neighbourhood of
world monarchies.
Pariah People, Pariah Ethics, and Pariah Capitalism
Why did this mentality not lead to innerworldly action on the basis of an
ethic of conviction and to a modern bougeois conduct of life? Weber pro-
vides two connected reasons. The first reason can be found in the fact that
the Jews, living either in the neighbourhood of or within large monarchies,
became a pariah people 60, a guest people who were ritually separated, for-
mally or de facto, from their social surroundings (food restrictions and the
interdiction of the connubium with outsiders). This ritual separation of the
Jewish community had its beginnings during the Babylonian exile and was
60 A lively discussion has taken place about Weber’s thesis that the Jews lived in a
voluntary ghetto as a pariah people, a thesis which Weber derived from a compari-
son with India’s outcastes. Critics have advanced the argument that the Jews ex-
pected a complete upheaval of the social organization of the world – contrary to
the situation in India where the caste system was considered as permanent and un-
changing. Whatever one may think of the well-foundedness of this concept, it
serves Weber to describe a background against which he characterizes the Pauline
mission as liberating the Christians from the ritual segregation which was at the
root of the Jewish pariah position. Vide ES: 622 and also W. Schluchter, Hand-
lung, Ordnung und Kultur Tübingen: Mohr (Siebeck) 2005, p. 55
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further developed after the return from exile by the priestly hierocracy un-
der the Persian protectorate: prohibition against mixed marriages, com-
mensality, observance of the Sabbath. It was mostly self-imposed, but the
term pariah also seems to refer to the politically and legally precarious sit-
uation of the Jews as a guest people within their non-Jewish environment.
But why did an increasingly bourgeois community – for the observance
of the ritual was made extremely difficult for the peasants – voluntarily
adopt a pariah-situation? The answer can be found in the prediction of the
prophets, namely that the social order of the world will be turned upside
down by Yahweh and that a glorious future awaits those who patiently en-
dure in their pariah-situation. These were political predictions about the
future of this world. Deutero-Isaiah in particular (Isaiah 40-55) has pro-
duced, on the basis of the pariah situation in Babylon, the only serious
theodicy of ancient Judaism, an apotheosis of suffering, misery and humil-
iation and the patient enduring in it, a plebeian view according to which
only the wretched, the poor and the powerless are good.61 The situation of
the pariah people was here elevated to the highest station of religious
worth and honour before God. In this way the religious Jew proved him-
self; his piousness showed itself in the endurance of his pariah situation,
not in rational domination of the world, and not in rational economic ac-
tivity.
The second reason was found by Weber in what he called a pariah eth-
ic. With regard to the legends of the patriarchs (which, however, were
written down much later) Weber refers to this pariah ethic (AJ: 50), a cer-
tain pacifism and lack of heroism and a rather questionable commercial
ethic (a play to outwit each other goes on between Jacob and his father-in-
law); as well as the passing off of their beautiful wives as desirable sisters
and surrendering them to their prospective protectors - Gen. 12.13; Gen.
20.2; Gen. 26.7. Moreover and more in relation to economic activity, the
separation of economic in-group and out-group morality was decisive for
the religious evaluation of commercial activity. The dualism of the econo-
mic ethic precluded the possibility that, as in Puritanism, rational econo-
mic activity was ever seen in a positive religious light, for if a form of be-
haviour, e.g. interest taking, was strictly forbidden towards brothers in be-
lief, but was considered as an adiaphoron (neither good nor bad) in rela-
61 Weber was probably inspired by Nietzsche’s Antichrist, a critique of Christianity
in which Nietzsche described a mutation of all values in the sense of an overthrow
of aristocratic values and a religion based on the resentment of the masses.
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tion to outsiders, the possibility of proving oneself religiously through in-
nerworldly asceticism became unavailable.62 In contrast to this attitude the
Baptists and Quakers had pointed with pride to the fact that precisely in
economic relationships with the godless they had substituted legality, hon-
esty and fairness for falseness and unreliability. In the Jewish economic
ethic, however, there was no soteriological motive whatever for ethically
rationalizing out-group economic relations. Even the (traditionalistic) high
esteem for religiously pursuing one’s daily work by Jesus Sirach could not
alter this fact. Economic activity could not become, as in Puritanism, an
area of ethical and religious proof.
On the whole, as Weber wrote, the legally and factually precarious pos-
ition of the Jews hardly permitted continuous, sytematic and rationalized
industrial enterprise with fixed capital (ES: 614), and the pariah ethic im-
plied a non-rational economic attitude. No trace can be found of an appre-
ciation of economic activity as a virtue (AJ: 254); the area of proving
one’s piety lay in a quite different region from that of rationally mastering
the world or the economy. The pariah capitalism which resulted from this
situation consisted of state provisioning, trade, and money lending, but not
of industrial production or manufacturing. And although pious Jews did
not reject colonial capitalism, tax farming or political capitalism, as Weber
pointed out, the East European regions where Jews had been at home for a
long time, failed to develop specific traits of modern capitalism (AJ: 345).
Weber’s Judaism thesis contains an inner tension: on the one hand, the
Jewish conception of a transcendent and acting God conducted to inner-
worldly action, based on an ethic of conviction; on the other hand, the reli-
gious prophecies and the paths of salvation connected to them tended to
stress the obligation to endure in the given situation. In this can be seen
the Janus-like position which Weber attributes to Judaism within the histo-
ry of the Occident. The Jewish conduct of life was an important historical
precondition of the spirit of capitalism, but it did not contain the possibili-
62 With regard to the dual ethic, Freddy Raphel in «Max Weber and Ancient Ju-
daism» (Leo Baeck Institute Yearbook 18.1, 1973) has pointed out that at least
Joseph Caro’s code (sixteenth century), an authority on Jewish tradition, formally
forbid the exploitation of Gentiles by usury and that at least in some cases strict
legality was required towards outsiders while supplementary solidarity was ex-
pected towards one’s own people.
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ty to demonstrate one’s ethical merit by means of modern business activity
(ES: 616). 63
Supplement: The Pharisees
Since Maccabean times a significant change took place which left a defini-
tive imprint on Judaism. The motive for the rise of the movement of the
Hasidim and then mainly of the Pharisees was a reaction against Hel-
lenism. The Pharisees gave their movement the form of an order or of a
«brotherhood» whose members lived in the most rigid Levitical purity.
The charisma of the hereditary priests was devalued in favour of personal
religious qualifications based on conduct and education.
It was decisive that the Pharisees segregated themselves not only from
the Hellenes but also from the less ritually observant Jews, the «country-
people» with whom they avoided connubium and commensality. We are
faced here with an inter-local sect of like-minded persons. The rise of the
Jewish diaspora since Maccabean times and the unshakability of its com-
munities was the work of this brotherhood. The community of the
«chaber», and not any more the hereditary charisma of the priests now be-
came the bearer of the religion.
The Pharisees created the synagoge, the central institution of late Ju-
daism which for the Diaspora Jew replaced the priestly cult in the Temple
of Jerusalem, and they introduced instruction in the religious law which
became foundational for Judaism. Above all, one now consulted the teach-
63 As W. Schluchter (2005: 83) has suggested, this passage in the section on the soci-
ology of religion in ES was Weber’s response to W. Sombart’s thesis in Der Bour-
geois (1913) that Judaism equals Puritanism in its effect on the spirit of modern
capitalism. According to Weber, Judaism and Puritanism (and worldly wisdom
teachings of philosophers, economists and others) have different potentials of effi-
ciency. For pious Jews many economic transactions were at best permissible on
the basis of a lax interpretations of their religious code, or they might be ethically
indifferent so that success might be a sign that one had done nothing objectionable
or that one had acted appropriately in non-economic contexts. The pious Puritan,
however, could demonstrate his religious merit precisely in his economic activity,
based on absolutely reliable business practices (ibid.). «Not the doctrinal teachings
in general develop a life-changing force, but religious beliefs which are able to set
sanctions of a non-economic character on the fulfillment of a particular conduct of
life.» (PE: 145 – footnote).
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er learned in the law rather than the priest if one was in external or inner
difficulty or doubt.
Philosophical speculation was rejected as Hellenistic and practical ra-
tionalism or common sense, characteristic of petty bourgeois strata and
their economic interests, was favoured. There was also, for practical rea-
sons, some accommodation to the prevailing mass beliefs of plebeian stra-
ta, for instance to the messianic hope in the resurrection of the dead which
the high-ranking Sadducees (priestly sibs) absolutely repudiated.
The final dominance of the Pharisees began with the second fall of the
Temple: then all Judaism became Pharisaic. This was also the time of the
rise to dominance of the rabbis.
The rabbis were not at the begginning an exclusive organization: people
simply consulted those who legitimized themselves through charismatic
knowledge of the law. They were plebeian intellectuals who gave advice
and counsel while also holding down a secular occupation (vide the
Pauline «if any would not work, neither should he eat» ), for there was a
rigid prohibition against teaching the law for compensation. The rabbis
were no magicians 64 or mystagogues (as their Indian counterparts); their
activity and influence was based on teaching and writing only. With the
idea of charismatic prophecy 65 the learned rabbis lived in a state of ten-
sion, as is characteristic of any scripturally learned men who are ritualisti-
cally oriented to a law book. Finally, they were no bearers of an esoteric
salvation doctrine, a gnosis, for any gnostic pusuit of salvation devalues
the law and the ritualistically and ethically correct conduct. The Jewish
rabbi dispensed neither sacramental grace, nor was he a charismatic helper
in need. His special religious gift was knowledge. His personal authority
rested in serving as a model by leading an exemplary life. He taught the
law and he gave responsa in the manner of the Roman jurists.
There were expectations of a Messiah for the Jewish people and they
imparted a tremendous pathos to the piety of the Jews (the difference from
64 Magic had no place in post-prophetic Israel; the idea that one may coerce a tran-
scendent God through magic was completely eliminated. But, according to Weber,
magic continued to exist in two forms: exorcism and healing. In these particular
cases not the coercion of God but of demons was involved. In any case, these ac-
tivities did not belong to the normal activities of the rabbis.
65 The teaching of the closure of the prophetic age led to the assumption that the holy
spirit had vanished from the world and that all that remains is the spirit required
for the correct interpretation of the sacred law.
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all Indian cyclic saviour religions rests precisely in the presence of such
expectations of a last day), but for the individual Jew only the law and its
fulfillment came into consideration. But «world rejection» or world deval-
uation followed in no way.
Pharisaic Judaism was also far from rejecting wealth or from thinking
that its enjoyment endangers salvation although the unbrotherly exploita-
tion of economic power as shattering the old neighborhood ethic was con-
demned. Stipulations against usury and in favour of debtors and slaves
were casuistically elaborated. But any point of departure for an economi-
cally oriented methodic of innerworldly asceticism was lacking. The dom-
inant attitude of the Talmud thus differs greatly from the Ebionic66 hatred
of wealth in the Gospel of Luke (AJ: 403).
The Pharisees did not demand a separation from economic and inner-
worldly life, but this was not the case of Essenism, a Pharisaic sect. They
segregated themselves from the less pure not only by excluding connubi-
um and commensality but all contact (AJ: 406). The fear of ritualistic de-
filement was extremely intensified, secular enjoyments were considered
objectionable and copulation was restricted to Wednesdays. The com-
mandment not to steal was intensified to the effect that no economic gain
was permissible. They therefore shunned trade and the possession of mon-
ey. They preached to «love one’s enemy» and they lived by a disciplina
arcani 67. The motive for the way of life of the Essenes can probably be
found in their secret teaching, consisting apparently of an allegorical re-
interpretation of Jewish holy books. With regard to rituals, the rejection of
the animal sacrifice was characteristic.
The organization and religious conduct of the Essenes have often been
compared to original Christian practice: they knew the baptism, the love-
meal (agape), the support of the poor, they had a strongly pacifistic ethic
and they estimated the hopes for salvation of the poor higher than the
hopes for the rich.68
66 The Ebionites were a Jewish-Christian sect which stressed poverty and common
property.
67 The obligation to keep one’s doctrine secret from outsiders. Disciplina arcani was
also practiced by Shiite Muslim sects (e.g. the Druzes in case of danger) and some
Russian sects.
68 By centering on the Essenes rather than on the Sadducees, Weber seems interested
in the influence of rabbinic-talmudic Judaism on later Jewish developments in the
Middle Ages and on its closeness to ancient Christianity (vide: E. Otto in his «Ein-
leitung» to MWG I / 21-1, p. 140).
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The Pharisaic purity ritualism resulted in higher ritual barriers against
both outsiders and other Jews (AJ: 415). The Essenes segregated them-
selves by avoiding connubium and commensality and all contacts with
other Jews, the Pharisaic brotherhood segregated itself from the «country
people», those influenced by the Jerusalem priesthood segregated them-
selves from the Samaritans. Thus, there emerged a caste-like structure of
the old Yahweh believers whereas towards the outside world Jewry in-
creasingly assumed the type of a ritualistically segregated guest people, a
pariah situation which was voluntarily created and not one suffered under
the pressure of external rejection. While antisemitism did indeed exist, it
was the negative attitude of the Jews themselves – the refusal of the con-
nubium, of commensality and of any sort of fraternization even in busi-
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Max Weber never published an essay on Islam. But it is possible, by draw-
ing together his comments on it in his Economy and Society, particularly
in the chapters on the sociology of law, of domination and of religion, to
arrive at a relatively clear outline of what he might have written on the
economic ethics of Islam, at least with regard to early Islam. W.
Schluchter has tried this and this chapter has been inspired by his effort.
The structure of Weber’s analysis would certainly have been similar to
that which he employed in all other cases: it would have been divided into
two parts, the institutional factors (also called by him the exterior form)
and the motivational factors (the interior spirit). With regard to the Occi-
dent Weber made this distinction between institutional and motivational
factors when he said that there are political and legal as well as attitudinal
presuppositions for the development of modern capitalism, or, in his
words, «only the Occident knows the state in the modern sense …, only




and only in the Occident is found the concept of citizen, because only in
the Occident does the city exist in the specific sense of the word... Finally,
Western civilization is distinguished from every other by a rational ethos
for the conduct of life» (GEH: 313).
Islamic Patrimonial Domination
Islam was the latest product of Near Eastern monotheism after Judaism
and Christianity, the other two «religions of the book». At the very begin-
ning it may have developed in pietistic urban conventicles, but it then
rapidly transformed itself into a warrior religion with a strong status em-
phasis, a religion of masters, as Weber wrote (ES: 624).
As opposed to the Jewish prophets and to Jesus, Mohammed was a reli-
gious and a political leader, he was not just a proclaimer of Truth, but also
the rightful ruler. In Mecca and Medina he established the umma (the reli-
gious and political community) in place of the rule of Arabic families and
tribes. As in all cases of charismatic leadership, the question of succession
posed a problem, and the history of Islam was decisively influenced, as
Weber notes, by the fact that one branch, the Shia, recognized the heredi-
tary charisma of Ali’s (Mohammed’s cousin and son-in-law) family and
descendents, while the other branch, the Sunna, was based on tradition and
ijma (consensus). The astonishing thrust of the new Islamic movement
which within a few dozen years spread from the Arabian peninsula and
was able to conquer large parts of the Middle East and North Africa, and
later India and beyond, may be related to the connection of religion and
politics: there were ideal and material interests which resulted in the «ele-
vation of the believers through the subjugation of the unbelievers to their
political authority and economic domination» (ES: 474). But not only the
conversion of unbelievers was at stake, writes Weber; the primary purpose
was revenue or the payment of tribute by the members of other religions.
Non-believers not only were conquered, they also had to be adminis-
tered, and soon, under the Abassids (750 – 1258), the caliphate separated
from the sultanate, dividing spiritual and worldly tasks, but both subject to
the same religious law (sharia). A caesaro-papist solution was never at-
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tempted, but in Shiite Islam short-term theocratic solutions have some-
times appeared.69
Weber characterizes the kind of patrimonial domination in traditional
Islamic countries as sultanism and prebendal feudalism. Contrary to West-
ern medieval fief-based feudalism which was at least an approximation of
a rule based on law (ES: 1082) and in which the feudal relation resulted
from an exchange of a beneficium (fief) and a homagium (the promise of
loyalty, particularly in war) by way of a free contract, leading to a conduct
of life based on fealty and honour as opposed to filial piety, one finds in
Islamic states armies of purchased slaves (Janissaries) and military fiscal
prebendalism. This was so, with some modifications, not only during the
Abassid, but also during the Mamluk and Ottoman dynasties.
Weber writes that already the Abassids bought militarily trained Turk-
ish slaves who were totally tied to the ruler’s domination (ES: 1015). By
creating an elite troop of purchased slaves, the central power now had at
its disposal an instrument that freed it from dependency of the quarreling
Arab tribes. Prebendal fiscal feudalism then developed when slave gener-
als began to function as tax collectors and then as tax farmers in specific
areas. A consequence was the legal insecurity of the tax paying population
in face of the arbitrariness of the troops, and this, in turn, particularly since
the period of the Seljuks, paralyzed commerce (ES: 1016).
The two institutions, the military slave system and the military (tax
farming) prebends increased the possibility of arbitrary discretion and
lessened the calculability of the administrative/legal processes. One of the
consequences, according to Weber (ES 1096), was an artificial immobi-
lization of wealth by means of religious foundations (waqfs) in order to
evade its arbitrary seizure. In a more general way Weber claimed that the
patrimonial state lacks the political and procedural predictability and the
trustworthiness and objectivity of the legal order which is indispensible
for capitalist development as it is provided by modern bureaucratic admin-
istration (ES: 1095).
69 In the Shia tradition, as for instance in Persia, an entrusted imam (a qualified the-
ologian who replaced the hidden imam, a descendent of Ali) was to uphold Allah’s
command as the true interpreter of the Koran. In times of crisis there was the hope
that a Mahdi, a messianic deliverer, will fill the earth with justice and equity. We-
ber called such messianic or chiliastic hopes which scorn every thought of a ratio-
nal order in the world, irrational (ES: 550).
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The second point of comparison was that between the medieval North-
ern European city and the oriental city. Weber asked why the oriental city
tends to obstruct rather than favour the development of rational capitalism
although it also had merchant and artisan guilds with autonomous statutes.
Weber distinguished cities according to which stratum rules in them
(patrician or rentier city versus plebeian or producer city) and also with re-
gard to the question of whether they have political, administrative, mili-
tary and legal autonomy and autocephaly, legitimated only by the princi-
ple of the corporate urban commune. The city as an autonomous corporate
commune in which the fraternity of the burghers stood above the solidarity
of tribes and guilds existed only in the Occident while in the Islamic world
the prerogatives of patrimonial rule were never broken and the traditional
statusses of lord and subject were never replaced with membership status
in the city commune.
Mecca, for instance, was a kind of clan city (ES: 1231), with divisions
according to tribes and clans as the basis of military organization. Al-
though the city was a location of powerful economic interests, it was not a
communal organization. The umma, the religious community, was too
weak to cause a break with tribal and clan bonds because the legal institu-
tion which might have been able to do this, the concept of the corporation,
was lacking. The central organization of military prebendalism prevented
it.
As neither the city nor the church developed as independent corporate
bodies in the Orient, there were no counterforces to challenge Islamic pat-
rimonialism; the heterogeneity or structural pluralism of the West was
lacking and thus one of the prerequisites for the development of rational
industrial capitalism.
Finally Weber pointed out that in the Occident, in contrast to Islamic
countries, a technically and juristically schooled administration was avail-
able because of a clear dualism of sacred and secular law and because
these laws were able to develop according to their own inner logic (ES:
828). Why could trained specialists at a culturally dominant level only be
found in the West? Weber provided two reasons. On the one hand, the de-
velopment of secular law was able to take the Roman and Germanic legal
traditions as guides and was closely connected to the development of the
medieval occidental city and, on the other hand, the West had organs of
rational sacred law making in the Church Councils and the papal powers
of jurisdiction.
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Islamic law (sharia) is sacred law, the product of four major law
schools (ES: 820); it was developed by theological jurists (mufti) who
must be distinguished from judges (qadi) whose decisions were often
based on personal discretion. Since the so-called closing of the gates of
ijtihad (the accepted view – since the tenth century – that independent in-
terpretation of the law is no longer necessary nor advisable) it was stereo-
typed and opposed secularization (ES: 820). On the other hand, as reli-
gious rules were not comprehensive, there were certain administrative in-
stitutions governed by human profane law although this law was consid-
ered to be of an inferior kind.
Islamic sacred law also was an impediment to the establishment of a
unified legal system because its realm of validity was limited to Muslims
(ES: 821) while the particular laws of the subjugated people continued to
exist. Originally the Shiites, perhaps under Zoroastrian influence in Persia,
even tried to prohibit as unclean all economic intercourse with unbelievers
who followed different laws, but various legal fictions prevented this out-
come. The dominance of sacred law was, moreover, a decisive impedi-
ment to the establishment of a predictable legal procedure, for it did not
allow for a formal juridical systematization. Neither the spiritual nor the
the worldly jurisdiction developed an abstract logic in legal thinking, both
were oriented toward concrete and law-transcendent fairness and appropri-
ateness (ES: 823). The reason for this can be found in the fact that legal
interpretation of sacred law became stereotyped since the introduction of
the theory of the closing of the gates of ijtihad in the tenth century and that
profane law was dominated by sacred law and the gulf between sacred and
profane law could be overcome only by circumventing strategies and
doubtful casuistry, i.e. in an opportunistic manner (ES: 821/2). Therefore,
in typological terms, Islamic justice was for Weber a theocratic qadi-jus-
tice (ES: 1116) because of its spirit of material justice based on extra-legal
postulates which prevented a logical systematization of law in terms of
formal juridical concepts and procedures.
Patrimonial governments lack the political and procedural predictability
which is indispensible to capitalist development (ES: 1095), and it is
therefore not surprising that capitalistic industrialization was impeded by
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the religiously determined structure of the Islamic empires, their official-
dom and their particular kind of jurisprudence.70
The «Spirit» of Islam
Weber’s view of the «spirit» of Islam can best be approached if one starts
from the observation that there are a number of aspects in which Islam and
Calvinistic Protestantism are not different. In both of them there is one
transcendent God who is omnipotent and omniscient and the gulf between
this God and human beings is unbridgeable. Moeover, in both religions
the rôle of mediators between God and humans is significantly reduced:
Mohammed was simply an ethical prophet and the Jesus of the Calvinists
died only for those whom God had chosen. The idea of a church as an in-
stitution of grace and salvation is foreign to both religions.
But these are external aspects which did not prevent two very different
outcomes: the spirit of traditionalism in Islam and the spirit of rational
capitalism in the West. These diffenrent outcomes are largely related to
the idea of proof of being chosen by God in Calvinism and to the interpre-
tation of providence.
In Islam, original sin and the idea that human beings are incapable of
being good is absent. Moreover, while Calvinism demanded of its believ-
ers not single good works but a systematic conduct of work and life in or-
70 Interesting is the description of the Mughal goverment as patrimonial-bureaucrat-
ic, based on the A’īn-i Akbari (Regulations of Akbar by Abu al-Fazl) and the re-
markable congruence between these regulations and Max Weber’s ideal type of
patrimonial-bureaucratic domination. Vide: Stephen Blake «The Patrimonial-Bu-
reaucratic Empire of the Mughals» in: Journal of Asian Studies 39, no. 1 (1979),
pp 77-94. In these regulations the emperor Akbar (1542-1605) is depicted as a
«perfect man», a Sufi phrase which describes a person who enjoys a special and
intimate relationship with God (more on Sufism below), the emperor’s household
as the central element of government, members of the army as reporting directly to
the emperor, the administration as a loosely sructured group of men controlled by
the imperial household, and travel as a significant part of the emperor’s activities.
There were no clear-cut lines of authority, officials (who often received prebends)
were rotated from post to post and were not allowed to specialize in either civil or
military matters (the mansabdari system). The urban organization (capital cities,
provincial headquarters) revolved around the resources and requirements of impe-
rial and noble households which dominated not only political but also economic
activity as the central institutions of production, exchange, and consumption.
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der to prove that one is chosen by God, in Islam no one is considered inca-
pable of being good or of fulfilling Allah’s commandments, and the final
judgement functions according to the principles of bookkeeping. The ful-
fillment of one’s duty is the real foundation of salvation (the five pillars:
repetition of the creed, prayer, almsgiving, the fast during Ramadan, and
pilgrimage) and not, as in Calvinism, a mere indication of grace. Allah
guides those who show themselves open to his revelations and follow his
positive commands. Therefore, the ethical concept of salvation is really
alien to Islam so that Islam cannot be considered as a religion of salvation
(ES: 625). The original bearers of the religion, people of knightly status,
had no sense for concepts such as sin, humility and redemption (ES: 472).
This leads to Weber’s comments on the concept of providence in Islam.
It knew nothing of Calvin’s «double decree» and did not attribute to Allah
the predestination of some people to hell and of others to everlasting life
(ES: 574). Not original sin and saving grace for those who are chosen, but
offence and just punishment are the focus of thought. One’s fate in the be-
yond is secured by observing the five pillars of Islamic faith, and Allah
guides the faithful who are in distress; it is not linked to the idea of proof.
Rather, in Islam providence is related to one’s fate not in the world be-
yond, but in this world; it is predetermination, as Weber writes (PE 227, n.
36) rather than predestination. The Islamic doctrine of providence is thus
not developed as consistently and coherently as its Calvinistic counterpart,
for it simply juxtaposes two lines of thought: the absolute power of Allah
and the self-determination and responsibility of man.
Therefore, the most important thing in Calvinism, the search of the be-
liever for proof of his election, played no part in Islam. Only the fearless-
ness of the warrior could result because the time of his death was predeter-
mined and needed not worry him, but not any rationalization of life as
there was no religious reward for it. The Islamic doctrine thus leads to
fearlessness in battle and war (ES: 574/5), but daily life remained unsys-
tematic, utilitarian and and even fatalistic (kismet); in extraordinary situa-




The economic ethic was feudal71, and the most pious enriched them-
selves by military booty. The rôle played by wealth was diametrically op-
posed to that played in Puritanism. Muslims took pleasure in luxury (luxu-
rious raiments, perfume etc.). Weber quotes the traditional saying that
when God blesses a man with property, he likes to see the signs thereof
visible upon him (ES: 624). The Koran rejects every kind of monasticism,
though not all ascetism (e.g. fasting). Avoidance of certain unclean foods,
of wine, and of gambling is required – which had consequences for specu-
lative business.
Sufism and Conclusion
Since the 12th century, Sufism with its orders of dervishes, originally from
Persian and Indian sources, penetrated the petty-bourgeois strata almost
71 Bryan Turner (Weber and Islam, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul 1974) wrote
that Islam was an urban religion of merchants and state officials, and that many of
its key concepts reflect the urban life of a mercantile society in opposition to the
values of the desert and of the warrior. When Weber attempted to show that Islam
was a religion of warriors and produced an ethic which is incompatible with the
spirit of capitalism, he was, according to Turner, hopelessly incorrect (ibid. p. 2).
Islam may well have experienced a permanent division between the ruling institu-
tions (sultanate, military, legal experts), the merchants, and the tribal desert
dwellers, each group with its own ethic ; Ibn Khaldun may then have been correct
when he described how beduin tribesmen with their tribal loyalty (asabiyya) from
time to time plundered and took control of the cities where such asabiyya did not
exist, and how they then acquired the culture of the cities and watered down their
loyalty and group feeling.
But Turner’s reference to an article by Goitein in the Journal of World History
(«The Rise of the Near-Eastern Bourgeoisie in Early Islamic Times», vol 3,
(1957), pp. 583-604), with comments on Muhammad Shaibani’s On Earning hard-
ly supports Turner’s argument. Shaibani (died 804) tried to show that striving for a
decent living and even for luxuries was not opposed by Islam but regarded as per-
missible, lawful, and even desirable. But the arguments advanced are ambivalent.
There are sayings extolling poverty and sentences in canonical collections urging
man to strive for a prosperous living. There seem to have been no social prejudices
against business, although it was natural, according to Goitein, that the honoured
and more lucrative posts in the administration and army attracted the more enter-
prising brains. In any case, the striving for and showing of luxuries was not part of
the Protestant ethic, nor can the permission or the advice to acquire wealth in any
way be compared with the psychological sanctions which Protestantism set on
diligent work.
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everywhere72, from Tunisia to Indonesia, but it was even further from de-
veloping innerworldly ascetism as it followed orgiastic, pneumatic and
mystical paths and was essentially irrational and otherworldly (FMW: 269
& ES: 626). The Sufis conceded the legitimacy of the sharia and of kalam
(rational theology), but they also claimed intuitive insight which can be
expressed for instance in poetry (e.g. Rumi). Although the principles of Is-
lam do not recognize an intermediary between Allah and the individual
believer, the Sufi orders expected absolute devotion to their respective pir
(leader). They also required poverty, although often in a metaphorical
sense, namely poverty as non-attachment. Both irrational Sufism and the
official traditionalistic ethic directed the conduct of life of Muslims into
paths whose effect was opposite to the methodical control of life found
among Puritans in the Occident (ES: 626). There were also diversions
from any methodical control of life by the advent of cults of local saints
and by magic, tolerated by the consensus of the community.
On the whole, Islam did provide the motivation of a status group of
warriors for world conquest and for innerworldly action, but its economic
mentality, particularly to the extent that merchant strata later moved to the
forefront, was traditional and world-adjusted. As a warrior religion it was
tied to the concept of holy war (jihad) and to the division of the world into
the house of Islam and the house of war (dar al-Islam, dar al-Harb), but
Islam lacked, according to Weber, all promises of a messianic realm (ES:
626)73, at least to the extent in which they were linked with meticulous fi-
delity to the law, as in Judaism. More importantly, Islam did not provide a
force to transform the conduct of life from within because it lacked the
Calvinistic idea of proof. The ideal personality type of this religion was
not the literatus (as in China), nor the ritualistic priest (as in Hinduism),
nor the wandering monk (as in Buddhism), but the world conquering war-
rior.
72 An exception may have been the Mevlevi order which penetrated the higher strata
of the Osmanic empire, as Annemarie Schimmel (Sufismus, Müncher: Beck 2000)
writes.
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The Roman Monarchic-Bureaucratic Empire
Max Weber characterized the Roman economy during the time of the prin-
cipate as coastal, urban, and based on slave labour. There were no facories
in the modern sense (no industrial enterprises which deserve this name be-
cause of their size, their continuous existence and their division of labour),
although there existed the so-called ergasteria (work shops), an undiffer-
entiated accumulation of slave workers.
Weber asked whether a capitalist economy existed in Antiquity to any
culturally relevant degree (SAC: 48). In order to answer this question, he
had to define the term «capitalist». If we want to talk of capitalism, he
said, the enterprise needs a market-oriented basis in a double sense: the
products must be sole in the market place, and the means of production
must have been bought in the market place for the purpose of economic
profit. From this point of view, an enterprise consisting of purchased
slaves is a capitalist enterprise, for the slaves were normal market objects
which could be bought and sold.. But, of course, it was not a modern capi-
talist enterprise based on free labour.
Capitalism in Antiquity was not modern rational capitalism, not only
because of the use of slaves, but also because capital was used in a differ-
ent way from today: not in modern factories or enterprises, but by means
of tax farming, mining, plantations and ergasteria. Capitalistically used
slave property had certain peculiarities. The use of slaves increased the
amount of invested capital (as compared to free labour), implied greater
risks and largely prevented specialiation and the division of labour. Most
importantly, though, it depended on regular new supplies to the slave mar-
ket by means of military conquests.
7.
a.
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During the time of the polis (the city as an institution in republican
Rome, but also in ancient Greece) which had been based on the synoik-
ismos (confraternization and commensality of the urban clans), and when
free arms bearing citizens who equipped themselves constituted the mili-
tary power, capitalism had seen its strongest development. At that time,
militarism affected all aspects of social life, in fact, the polis was essen-
tially founded for military purposes (SAC: 346) so that ancient capitalism
was based on the exploitation for private profit of the political conquests
(SAC: 364). But during the time of the principate and later, the monarchy
in Rome slowly plugged all sources of profit because it became more and
more bureaucratized74 and relied more and more on liturgical services
(supplying its needs by holding specified groups responsible for public
tasks). The most important obstacles to capitalism in the Roman empire
were therefore political and organizational. Only in passing does Weber
consider the possibility that the peoples’ mentality may have played a rôle
as an obstacle to capitalism as he mentions the contempt of trade and
tradesmen by the leisured upper classes and the fact that businessmen
were not sustained by any ethical motivation of working in business
(SAC: 67).
As soon as Rome declined and the wars of conquest ceased, the regular
supply to the slave market dried up. This and the suffocating presence of
the bureaucracy which tended to make subjects out of citizens, led to the
gradual disappearance of economic trade, the rejection of urban coastal
communities in favour of large interior estates, and a barter economy. Civ-
ilization became rural until much later during the Middle Ages the city
with new characteristics came to life again.
The Spirit of Ancient Christianity
As in the case of Islam, Max Weber had completed all the preparatory
work for an essay on Christianity 75 when his death intervened. Neverthe-
74 Weber also writes that in the liturgy state created by Diocletian, capitalism found
no anchorage (SAC: 364). The regulation of the tax system curbed the arbitrary
power of the tax farmers ; the tax collecting system was «nationalized» and tax
farmers were transformed into state officials.
75 This is mentioned by his wife Marianne Weber in her foreword to vol. III if his
Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Religionssoziologie (GARS) Tübingen 1920
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less, there are at least some indications in his published work which can
lead to a short outline of his views on ancient, Eastern–Orthodox and Oc-
cidental Christianity. This outline has again been partially inspired by
Schluchter’s work.
Weber believed that the earliest communities of ancient Christianity
were strongly urban, to the extent that the word for countryman, paganus,
acquired the meaning of heathen. Weber also thought, although the evi-
dence is not strong, that ancient Christianity was characteristically a reli-
gion of artisans and wandering journeymen, both slave and free (ES: 481).
In fact, Christianity did not originally reject slavery as is confirmed in
Paul’s letter to Timothy 1.6. 76 This was a world-rejecting religion and, al-
though the acquisition of money was not forbidden, and Jesus nowhere ex-
plicitly stated that preoccupation with wealth leads to unbrotherliness, this
notion was at the heart of the matter: the attachment to Mammon consti-
tuted one of the most difficult impediments to salvation (ES: 632).
It appears that Weber would have wanted to trace the development of
the Jesus movement from within Judaism, particularly in its Pharisaic ver-
sion, into a distinct and independent religion. He saw the first step in this
direction in a sublimation of the Jewish law, i.e. in a revolution of ideas
which stressed inner conviction and integrity or the fulfillment of the inner
sense of the commandments rather than outwardly correct behaviour and
the rational study of sacred law, and which combined this inner conviction
with a non-rational attitude of unlimited trust in God (ES: 567). According
to Weber, only those who were willing to sacrifice even their own intellect
for this relationship of trust were considered to be true disciples of Jesus.
In fact, an inner anti-intellectualism belonged, according to Weber, to
the constitutive conditions of ancient Christianity, taking stands against
the legalistic scholarship of Judaism as well as against ancient philosophy
(ES: 512) and affirming that the «poor in spirit» rather than philosophers
and scholars are exemplary Christians. Weber also points in this regard to
the formula credo quia absurdum («I believe because it is absurd», a for-
mula often attributed to Tertullian) which may refer to a belief in truth
which is superior to reason but perhaps also antagonistic to reason. Even
76 Slavery was justified by natural law theory in its relative form: slavery and politi-
cal subordination had to be accepted after the Fall as remedies for man’s wicked-
ness. Slaves were not even accepted as members of monastic congregations, just
as in ancient Buddhist times they were not accepted in the sangha (the order of
monks).
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the position of Athanasius (Jesus as being of the same substance as God
the Father – an absurd view from a rational point of view, according to
Weber) against Arius was for Weber (FMW: 351) an attempt to protect
the faith against the intellect or a sacrifice of the intellect.77 The virtuosi of
the law in Judaism are replaced by the virtuosi of belief, and Christianity’s
fundamental quality as a religion of belief (pistis) is opposed by Weber to
the religiosity of (gnostic) knowledge of Asian salvation religions and to
intellectualism in all its forms (ES: 512).78
A second step came with Paul who, as Weber conceived him, methodi-
cally undertook missions with the goal of organizing congregations on a
permanent basis. He went beyond Judaism not only on the level of ideas,
but also institutionally. One event, related in his letter to the Galatians II,
12/13, was, according to Weber, of epochal importance (RI: 37): Paul re-
proaches Peter for having eaten in Antioch with the gentiles and for hav-
ing withdrawn and separated himself from them afterwards under the in-
fluence of the Jerusalemites. As this reproach of dissimulation was not ef-
faced, it points to the shattering by Paul of the ritual barriers against com-
mensalism which the Jews had imposed, the destruction of their voluntary
ghetto; and it points to the universalism of Paul’s mission which cut across
nations, ethnic and status groups so that Christians of Jewish and gentile
origins could participate together in the Eucharist. This event of Antioch
was also, Weber believed, the hour of conception of the Occidental city
even though it only began to flourish more than a thousand years later.
Already the Judaism of the Pharisees was a congregational religion,
centered around the synagogues and based on legal and ritualistic princi-
ples, but the new Christian congregations since Paul can rather be under-
stood as pneumatic and charismatic congregations. They were tied togeth-
er, as Weber stated, by the overwhelming importance of the charismatic
gifts of the «spirit» and by the expectation of the Second Coming (ES:
77 The idea that Athanasius tried to open a chasm between Greek philosophy and
Christian belief (by proposing the doctrine of homousia) in order to avoid the
complete Hellenization and secularization of religion and to limit rational thought
had already been proposed by A. Harnack in 1889 (Dogmengeschichte, Tübingen
1991, p.178/9).
78 Weber could also have quoted Celsus, an educated Roman, who criticized the
Christians for believing without reason (αλόγως πιστεύουσιν) and for inventing
dogmas without being able to justify them. Vide Wilhelm Nestle «Die
Haupteinwände des antiken Denkens gegen das Christentum» in Archiv für Reli-
gionswissenschaften 37 (1941) p. 72
7. Christianity
113
634). The character of their life was otherworldly and there appeared to
exist a total indifference among early Christians to social, political and
economic problems, combined, however, with an attitude of caritas to-
wards all and sometimes even with an objectless «acosmism of benevo-
lence and love» (FMW: 330). Weber even talks of the radical rejection of
the world in ancient Christianity as opposed to ancient Judaism which he
describes as world-adjusted (ES: 633).
But these charismatic-pneumatic congregations which had overcome
ethnic and national boundaries and in which the Jewish ritualism and le-
galism had become sublimated into an ethic of conviction, were not a
church, yet.
Four features characterize the emergence of a church, according to We-
ber (ES: 1164): 1. The rise of a professional priesthood; 2. claims of uni-
versal (not just ethnic or national) domination; 3. dogma and rites must
have been rationalized and recorded in holy scriptures; and, most impor-
tantly, 4. all these features must be realized in such a way that the charis-
ma is separated from person or persons and becomes linked to the institu-
tion and particularly to the office. The last feature does not just describe
routinization which is the fate of all charismatic domination everywhere,
but depersonalization of charisma, i.e. the transfer of charismatic qualities
of the original person or persons to social institutions. Office charisma, the
belief in the specific state of grace of a social institution, was Weber’s ex-
ample of this phenomenon (ES: 1139), and this is what was developed af-
ter the period of the Jesus movement and Pauline Christianity in ancient
Christianity.
At its final point of development in the Middle Ages the Christian
Church was the first rational bureaucracy in world history, based on ratio-
nal Roman law and the practical rationalism of the Roman aristocracy
which rejected all forms of ecstasy. In order to arrive there, the Church not
only followed the path of routinization, but it also received its inner stabil-
ity from the depersonalization of the original Christian charisma: the ordi-
nation combined with the office and its character indelibilis and not any
more the personal charismatic qualifications and life style of the priest de-
termined the effectiveness of his distribution of divine grace and of the
sacraments; the office was separated from the personal worthiness of the
office holder although some, e.g. the Donatists, the first specific sect,
strongly objected to this development (ES: 560).
The power of miracles that had emanated from Jesus had become insti-
tutionalized. It was realized every time a lay person was dispensed a sacra-
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ment by a priest: Weber saw the Church as a kind of trust fund of eternal
goods of salvation (ES: 1164).
Weber judged, as he had mentioned in his essay on China, the level of
rationalization of religions by two yardsticks: 1. The degree to which reli-
gion has discarded magic and 2. the degree to which it systematizes man’s
relationship to the world. While there may have been in ancient Christiani-
ty an increase of rationalization in regard to the interpretation of God’s
commandments, compared to the legal casuistry of ancient Judaism, there
was a setback with regard to the disenchantment of the world. Ancient
Christianity did not maintain the anti-magical stance of Judaism, for We-
ber saw in the Christian sacraments an at least partially magical quality.
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Weber’s essays about the other world religions were written for the pur-
pose of understanding aspects of Western civilization. His interest in East-
ern Orthodox Christianity and particularly in its Russian expression, how-
ever, was also guided by his desire to find solutions and alternatives to the
historical and political situation of his day. He studied the Russian lan-
guage, wrote articles about the Russian revolution of 1905, and planned to
write a book about Leo Tolstoy. He believed that in the characters of Rus-
sian fiction, e.g. Dostoyevsky’s Brothers Karamazov or Tostoy’s War and
Peace, one finds represented antique Christian ideas which seem to have
been lost in the Occident. Weber even started to look at Western civiliza-
tion through the eyes of the Russian Slavophiles (Khomyakov, Kireevsky)
who had pointed to and criticized the West’s lonely individuals in an at-
omized society, its Roman heritage, the rationalism of its jurisprudence,




of the Western state as well as of the Occidental Church was the work of
jurists, - a view, which Weber accepted.79 His views of Russian-Orthodox
Christianity will be summarized here.
The Patrimonial State
Russia has been an inland area of strongly agricultural character where the
yield was comparatively poor, but it also had a network of navigable wa-
terways which facilitated trade. Since the Normans invaded Russia and
made Kiev their headquarters in their trade with Constantinople around
the tenth century, traders have sailed on the Russian rivers, and the city of
Novgorod in the North-West was in close contact with the Hanseatic
league.
But the rulers of Moscow who slowly expanded their power considered
their country with the eyes of landlords as their property (votchina). The
administration of the developing state evolved out of the patriarchal ad-
ministration of the rulers’ private domain into a patrimonial administration
(ES: 1013). After the collaps of the Byzantine empire in 1453, the Mus-
covite princes increasingly thought of themselves as the defenders of Or-
thodox Christianity and began to adopt the title of tsar (Caesar); at the
same time, though, they continued to consider themselves as the owners of
the state and all the land, and the political administration as their private
affair. The slowly growing patrimonial bureaucracy operated in purely
personal submission to the ruler so that it served only him and not imper-
sonal purposes. Russian feudalism did not develop a tradition of contractu-
al agreement between the boyars (nobles) and the patrimonial ruler, and
therefore had no vassals in the Occidental sense.
The population was easily divided into four groups: the nobility, the
monastic and clerical estate, the peasantry and the urban population. They
all were treated differently in regard to taxes, legal matters and military
service. The old nobility, the boyars, slowly saw their freedoms reduced
by the princes of Moscow so that their properties became tied to services
to the ruler. Moreover, a service nobility (dvorianstvo) was created and re-
ceived service fiefs (pomest'e) which could not be sold or bequeathed. In
79 Andreas Buss The Russian-Orthodox Tradition and Modernity Leiden: Brill
2003 p. 122
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fact, the concept of the sacredness of private property (allodial property)
did hardly exist; property was generally tied to services, at least until 1785
(Catherine II). The system of mestnichestvo which determined social rank-
ing forced the nobility to enter the patrimonial bureaucracy for the sake of
preserving social status and career chances. The chin (rank) within the pat-
rimonial bureaucracy later became the official basis of social prestige, and
all opportunities for economic advancement depended upon office hold-
ing. Because the officials were often moved between the various branches
of the administration (military, judiciary, diplomacy), modern specialized
knowledge was generally lacking. Weber underlined (ES: 1068) that one
fundamental feature of medieval Western nobility could not develop in
Russia: an internalised conduct of life and a common social honour as it
was created by the occidental knighthood. Economic interests and the de-
sire of advancement propelled the nobles in Russia, not an inner standard
of self-assertion based on fealty and a contractual relationship between a
vassal and his king. This was a prebendal feudalism as it tends to develop
under patrimonial domination.
Cities in the occidental sense with liberties and autonomous status have
not existed in Russia or, as in the case of Novgorod, were soon subjected
to the tsar. There were no guilds in Russia before they were created by the
government in the eighteenth century according to the level of income of
merchants and traders. But even the richest merchants made every effort
to be raised into the nobility and into the public service rather than to in-
vest and to expand their business, for every financial loss could result in
the descent into a lower guild. Thus, there was no status solidarity among
the citizens. Well into the middle of the nineteenth century there was vir-
tually no commercial credit or banking nor a rational concept of corpora-
tion as it was produced in Western commercial law. The situation of the
merchants was often precarious and they had to fear the nobles and even
the Tsar who sometimes seized hold of their commodities.
During the Middle Ages the Russian peasants were free, but since the
sixteenth century the bonds of serfdom gradually deprived them of their
freedom of movement and tied them to the land, to the jurisdiction of the
dvorianstvo (office nobility), and to their mir (village community). Rus-
sian law, as Max Weber has noted (ES: 725), recognized liturgical collec-
tive liability and the corresponding collective rights of the compulsory or-
ganizations, e.g. the village communities. Peasants as well as the merchant
guilds owed the state a variety of obligations in money or labour, and they
were jointly (as village community or as a guild) accountable for the ser-
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vices imposed on their group. The system of liturgies, as Weber called this
system of the satisfaction of state needs (ES: 1097), was applied compre-
hensively by many patrimonial-bureaucratic empires of Antiquity, and ev-
erywhere it reduced private capital formation80 as it discouraged the most
successful and entrepreneurial of the respective group who were expected
to contribute more. The retention of the mir after the emancipation of the
serfs inhibited the emergence of a vigorous farming class, because the en-
terprising members of the mir had to share the financial burdens with the
incapable and unwilling ones.
On the whole, it may be said that the patrimonial state blocked the de-
velopment of commercial capitalism (but not of political capitalism) be-
cause of the lack of a rationally calculable functioning of administration
and jurisdiction, and because of the lack of a clear separation between
them.
The Orthodox Church
When in 988 Prince Vladimir of Kiev was converted to the Christian faith
of Byzantium, the classical conception of the emperor as rex-sacerdos
(king and priest), a caesaro-papistic ruler, continued to survive. In Con-
stantinople a strong state and an old civilization englobed the Church.
Russian rulers since the beginning, and later the tsars, adopted the caesaro-
papistic conception of the ruler, totally different from what was to develop
in the Western Christian tradition since the dictatus papae of Pope Grego-
ry VII who claimed that the state was simply the political branch of the
Church.
Moreover, a deadly conflict had developed between two kinds of
monasticism in Russia: on the one hand the so-called hermitage monasti-
cism which turned away from politics and church hierarchy and pursued
missionary activities in northern Russia and Siberia, and, on the other
hand, the cenobitic monasticism which was friendly towards the state and
upheld the principle of monastic land-holding. The cenobitic Josephite
monks prevailed with the help of the Moscovite princes (ES: 513) and this
led to the petrifaction of religious life and to the idea that the Russian tsars
80 The notion of liturgy is derived from a Greek verb (leiturgeo) which means that
someone administers a public office and defrays the costs connected to it out of his
own pocket.
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(after the fall of Constantinople in 1453 to the Turks) should rule all Or-
thodox people as well as the Orthodox Church which became totally de-
pendent on the state. The resulting caesaro-papism eliminated all possibili-
ty that Eastern canon law would develop further by means of conciliar leg-
islation and would influence economic and political life. Later, under Pe-
ter the Great, even the patriarchate of the Church was abolished and be-
came a branch of the patrimonial bureaucracy (ES: 830/1). Weber wrote
that «magic- ritual forces were controlled most thoroughly in the ancient
polis, rather well by the feudal powers in Japan and the patrimonial ones
in China, and reasonably well by the bureaucratic state in Byzantium and
Russia» (ES: 1161).
While in the West the dualism of emperorship and papacy during the
Middle Ages developed as a form of status plurality and also strengthened
other status positions (nobility, cities), any tension between state and
church was lacking in Russia and no autonomous nobility or independent
bourgeoisie could develop either.
Monasticism in the Eastern-Orthodox tradition was connected with the
official church in a particular way. While in the West monasticism was
subdivided into functionally different monastic orders which were active
as the «auxiliary troops» of the Church in missionary work, hospital work,
education, or even as orders of knights, and while in this way, as Weber
said (ES: 1167), the monks left the monastic cell and tried to dominate the
world, the Eastern Church in principle facilitated the complete separation
of the monk from the «world» and his complete abandonment to prayer
and contemplation. But a compromise was achieved already by a decision
of the Trullan Council in 691 that only monks can become bishops (while
the ordinary priests of the Orthodox Church had to be married). This rela-
tionship between Church and monasticism was, according to Weber, in-
consistent (because of the mechanical combination of personal charisma
and office charisma) and could be explained only because the develop-
ment of an independent hierocracy had been deflected by caesaro-papism.
The «Spirit» of the Orthodox Church
The «spirit» which lived within this patrimonially governed church was
composed of magical, ritual and mystical aspects. In reference to magical
ideas, Weber mentioned the veneration of icons and that the fear of giving
serious affront to two dozen saints by omitting in one year the days sacred
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to them has hindered the reception of the Gregorian calendar until the be-
ginning of the twentieth century (ES: 405). In general, Weber believed,
peasants much more than urban artisans try to coerce their gods by magi-
cal means. But there also existed, among the religious elites, a kind of an-
tique mysticism which considered the rites of the Church as guides and di-
rection to mystical experience and which revealed itself in the fact that the
highest authority which decides who belongs to the Church and which re-
ligious teachings are dogmatically correct is the church as a communal
group united in love, the consensus ecclesiae (ASS: 466), – and not the
Pope as in the Catholic Church, nor the Scriptures, as in the Lutheran
Church.81 The mystical vision of God, moreover, was not a heterodox
movement, but it was central.
Mysticism, in Weber’s terminology, is set in opposition to asceticism.
He connected asceticism with activity proving one’s religious merit in the
world; in mysticism he saw passive contemplation and quiet repose in
God.82. The ascetic affirms rational activity within the world as God’s in-
strument, the mystic regards action within the world as a temptation
against which he must maintain his state of grace as God’s vessel. Activi-
ties of the mystic within the world are minimized and are characterized by
a distinctive «brokenness», because success in the world has no signifi-
cance with respect to salvation (ES: 549) and because of an inner convic-
tion of the senselessness of this politically, socially and artistically formed
life. The consequence is a relative indifference towards the world.
Eastern Christianity did not adopt the Western idea of a legal relation-
ship between God and the human being (which was developed since
Anselm of Canterburry and also appears in the doctrine of justification by
81 According to A. Khomyakov’s epistemology, the possession of truth is not a func-
tion of individual consciousness ; truth is inaccessible to individual thinkers who
have only partial knowledge or rationality. Only sobornost' (togetherness of peo-
ple united in faith) makes true understanding possible (vide: Buss 2003: 122).
Khomyakov was a leading figure among the Slavophiles.
82 Mysticism and asceticism have also been linked by Weber to the concept of the
divine – be it the concept of a transcendent and omnipotent god in Western reli-
gious traditions, be it that of an impersonal immanent order as in the great reli-
gions of Asia. The concept of a transcendent god leads to asceticism and to seeing
oneself as an instrument of God while mystics see themselves as passive vessels of
immanent divinity. But there is no necessary correlation as can be seen in the Rus-
sian-Orthodox tradition which, in spite of its mystical tendencies conceived God
as transcendent and is in this respect internally «broken» (ES: 551).
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faith in parts of Protestant theology). Orthodox Christians are convinced
that sinful actions imply only a diminution of their goodness and not a vi-
olation of their legal relationship with God; they are convinced that they
themselves can become similar to God and attain theosis.
An economic ethic in the narrow sense of the term which might have
settled the question of the «just price» and of the justification of interest
taking was not developed because of the Orthodox indifference towards
the world. The highest psychological premia were not placed on vocation-
al activity within the world but on contemplation and on the anchoretic
life style of monasticism which was considered to be the perfection of hu-
man life. There was no religious motivation for a rational and methodical
reorganization of the world or for capitalistic gain in the pursuit of a voca-
tion. No inner motivation led out of the spiritual conditions of the Ortho-
dox Church to a reorganization of political and economic life. The proof
of one’s own value was produced against the «world» and worldly activi-
ties, not in and by them.
No Renaissance, no Humanism, no Protestantism have opposed the
«spirit» of Orthodoxy. Even a development of science out of its own roots
did not take place, partially because the rational form of a systematic the-
ology (the Summae of Thomas Aquinas) was not developed; and a formal-
ly rational law did not appear because Orthodox canon law remained sti-
fled under the caesaro-papistic government. There were no strong and in-
dependent institutional or spiritual powers, no city bourgeoisie, no inde-
pendent nobility or hierarchy and no ethical prophecy which could brake
open the strong cage of the patrimonial state.
Russian Old Believers
In the seventeenth century, when the Patriarch Nikon, supported by Tsar
Alexis, had introduced several liturgical reforms, a schism (raskol) split
the Russian Church in two. It appeared about seemingly trivial questions,
but, in the opinion of the Old Believers, as they were called, a religious
ceremony, incorrectly performed, has no effect and no value before God.
This insistence on correct ritual implied a fundamental difference from
Western Protestantism which had little interest in what it considered to be
mere exterior forms.
About the same time there was in Russia an eschatological mood, the
expectation of the arrival of the Antichrist whose significance for the
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raskol should not be underestimated. The Old Believers who broke with
the official Church and with the state – for the official Church was closely
tied to the state and to the ruler, the tsar, considerd by them as the An-
tichrist – now faced many further decisions concerning not only the ritual
but also their conduct of life. A Church Council excommunicated them,
their leader Avvakum was burned at the stake, many of them fled into the
uninhabited woods, they were excluded from elective offices and there
were waves of mass suicide. Nevertheless, the number of Old Believers
increased in the subsequent centuries and in general they became also
more prosperous than the members of the official church. There was a
preference for hiring Old Believers as industrial laboureres because of
their honesty and their temperance, and they also enjoyed the reputation of
being the most honest businessmen. But, although they were considered to
be honest, frugal, industrious and thrifty, it can in no way be said that the
connection which Max Weber saw between ascetic Calvinism and the de-
velopment of modern capitalism can also be observed in the case of the
Old Believers.
A practical problem of the Old Believers resulted from the fact that no
bishop had joined the schism and that therefore no new priests could be
ordained. One part of the Old Believers, the priestists (popovtsy), decided
to accept priests ordained by the official church, the others, the so-called
priestless (bezpopovtsy), arrived at the view that some sacraments ( the
sacrament of marriage in particular) were not accessible any more and that
they had to remain unmarried. Here is an example of the fact that religious
positions can have other sources than the social conditions of the strata
which support them, namely the inner consistency of logic which, against
the requirements of interests and tradition, leads to certain consequences.
To the extent that the influence of the priests diminished, the Old Be-
lievers developed the character of a congregational religion, i.e. a religion
which was influenced to a large extent by the laity. Weber talks of congre-
gational religion when the laity has been organized permanently in such a
manner that they can actively participate and make their influence felt – as
opposed to a parish which is a mere administrative unit and delimits the
jurisdiction of priests (ES: 455). 83 This refers not only to the bezpopovtsy
but also to the popovtsy, for they subjected the priests who deserted from
83 Rational ethical congregational religions have combined frequently in the past and
in a striking manner, according to Weber, with capital rationally employed in a
productive enterprise for the acquisition of profit (ES: 479).
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the official church and came to them to a humiliating procedure and treat-
ed them more as employees than as religious shepherds. Therefore, there
was more self-responsibility and their conduct of life became more me-
thodical and systematic. Nevertheless, the Old Believers, in contrast to as-
cetic Protestantism, kept the magical and ritualistic aspects of Orthodox
Christianity and the world remained for them a magic garden.
The Vyg monastery near the White Sea, founded by a group of priest-
less Old Believers, where the severe northern climate often destroyed en-
tire crops of grain, became a religious and cultural center. It followed
strict norms of congregational discipline, the general assembly decided on
questions of dogma and of ritual and about political questions. They put an
emphasis on the benefits of hard work and on basic education, indispensi-
ble to read the Scriptures. The more or less passive resistance of the Vyg
inhabitants towards the tsarist government can be characterized as pariah-
ethical. Their attitude towards the world was not world-domination, nor
world-indifference, but rather an attitude of world-endurance, combined
with passive resistance.
The situation of the Old Believers was relieved under Catherine II who
repealed many discriminating laws. Now, Old Believers took charge of
most of the economic activities in the areas of the middle and lower Volga
and of the state-owned iron foundries in the Urals. The Theodosians, an
ascetic branch of the priestless Old Believers, founded during a plague
epidemic in Moscow a cemetary combined with a home for the aged and a
hospital; soon, some chapels and shops were added and the activities ex-
tended into the commercial field. But the Theodosians remained hostile to
private property, sex and marriage and kept away from everything con-
nected with the state as belonging to the Antichrist. While according to
Weber the Puritans had a world-dominating attitude, it was the tendency
of the Theodosians to strenthen the personality ideal of the world-renounc-
ing monk.
In the nineteenth century, there were Old Believers among the richest
merchants in Moscow, but Weber’s opinion about them was full of nu-
ances. The inner-worldly asceticism which can be noticed in the life-style
of most Old Believers, was broken by traditionalism, ritualism and magi-
cal influences in the search for salvation. Thriftiness in the patriarchal
household and insistence on hard work amounts to worldly wisdom and to
literary theory (as for instance in the old Domostroi), in any case not to be
compared with the religious motives of the ascetic Protestants who sought
the proof of their own value in their inner-worldly calling. Nevertheless,
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the increase of personal responsiblility, produced by the development of
congregational religion, moreover their solidary mutual help contributed
to the economic success of the Old Believers. It goes without saying, that
the persecutions by the government and the official Church as well as the
exclusion from public life furthered individualism and commercial abili-
ties as in the case of many other minorities (Jews, Parsis, Copts).
The Russian Sects
Russian sects, in contrast to the Orthodox Church and the Old Believers,
had little interest in ritual and magical means of salvation.
The Khlysty, who are usually considerd to be the root of Russian sec-
tarianism, believed in the repeated reincarnation of Christ in living human
beings. Salvation for them consisted in the liberation of the soul from the
body, and this was possible, according to them, at least temporarily, by ec-
static contemplation of the Spirit of God, the so-called radenie, during a
religious-ecstatic dance. In order to prepare for the radenie the ascetic
suppression of all physical urges and desires was required, including fast-
ing and the avoidance of sexual relations even with one’s own wife.
This was perhaps an attempt to turn monastic asceticism into the re-
quired life-style of everyone and thus a parallel to Western Protestantism,
but Western Protestantism was inner-wordly and resulted in the attitude of
world domination while the attitude of the Khlysty was world-fleeing, or
at least world indifferent. For religious reasons, but also because of the
persecutions by the tsarist government they upheld a strict disciplina ar-
cani (they kept their beliefs and practices secret; officially they continued
to belong to the Orthodox Church, but they disdained its practices and met
in private locations). Their congregational discipline may help to explain
their honesty and industriousness, but their world-fleeing asceticism and
their ecstatic dances as means of salvation could not produce a rational
conduct of life in the world, although their thrifty life-style produced rela-
tively well-ordered economic conditions.
Occasionally, some Khlysty may have had sexual relations after their
exstatic dances. The foundation of the Skoptsy sect by K. Selivanov re-
flected the desire to eliminate such possibilities (ES: 602). Selivanov cas-
trated himself and considered castration as the only means of salvation.
His followers, the Skoptsy (castrated), were an essentially ascetic sect in
which castration was the highest means of salvation (ES: 540) and which
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in any case did not allow sexual relations, the consumption of meat, alco-
hol, gaiety and aimless strolls. Like the Khlysty, they followed the disci-
plina arcani in the belief that religious achievements lose their value if
they are made known to other people. At the same time, their secrecy pro-
tected them from prosecutions. Theirs was an icy individualism which fol-
lowed from the separation of the castrated from all societal life and pro-
duced an impersonal conduct of life similar to ascetic Protestantism, even
in the political and economic field. They did not worship icons and they
had only contempt for the sacraments of the Orthodox Church.
In their emphasis on asceticism, in contrast to the mysticism of the Or-
thodox Church, the Skoptsy were less inclined to consider themselves as
vessels of the divine Spirit, but rather as tools in the plan of the world in
which Christ and Selivanov had a central position: they considerd it to be
their task to increase and complete the number of Skoptsy so that the Mil-
lennium of the Skoptsy may be created.
They lived mainly in urban centers and were active in commerce, in-
dustry and banking. Their striving for wealth was motivated in part by the
financial possibility to bribe the officials in order to deflect the sometimes
intense persecutions. But there were also inner motives: a cold individual-
ism and an unbrotherly calculating attitude in human relations; further the
rejection of all sacramental means of salvation and the ascetic life-style
connected with it – and all this reinforced by their strict congregational
discipline. Max Weber writes that the rational-ascetic Russian sects (not
all sects) had economic features similar to those of ascetic Protestantism
and that the Skoptsy produced the most extreme combination of business
qualification with ethical world rejection (PE: 2: 154 & 321).
In the Ukraine there appeared in the eighteenth century the so-called
«Spiritual Christianity», mainly composed of the sects of the Dukhobors
and the Molokans. They rejected the traditional forms of the Orhtodox rit-
ual as well as fasting, icons and priesthood. Decisive for them was the
gnostic opposition between spirit and matter. Only the inner spirit really
exists, they said, and the body is but a temporary prison. The goal of sal-
vation is to restore God’s image in man and to break the material bonds.
They rejected all government authority, refused military service and lived
on the basis of common property.
The communities of the Dukhobors achieved considerable economic
prosperity, and their religion must be mentioned among the reasons for
this: the rejection of icons and of ritual as magical means of salvation as
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well as the control of their life produced by their congregational disci-
pline.
The Molokans who split off from the Dukhobors were the most numer-
ous sect in the nineteenth century and were considered by the government
as particularly harmful. They taught that the sacrament of baptism is per-
formed whenever someone leads a Christian life without sins. Thus bap-
tism, instead of being a single ritual act, was for them a continuous con-
duct of life, expressed in sobriety, honesty and industriousness. They also
taught that worldly authority and human laws are only meant for the «chil-
dren of the world», but not for «Spiritual Christians»; they therefore re-
jected serfdom, military service and the taking of oaths. Russian anthori-
ties have written that they were richer, in spite of the persecutions, than
the Orthodox population and even the Dukhobors.
The Stundists, also mentioned by Weber, - the movement seems to have
originated among German colonists - had particularly strong anti-ritualis-
tic tendencies, rejected fasting, icons and priesthood, and were industrious
and thrifty. They upheld private property but often opposed commerce and
the use of money.
Result
The Orthodox religion offered several different forms of salvation accord-
ing to the different social strata. The peasant masses with their magical
world-views contrasted with the personality ideal of the monk with his
mystical world view. The Old Believers and sects were unable to free
themselves from the caesaro-papistic patrimonial state and this led to pas-
sive apolitism and sometimes to pariah-ethics. Weber also mentioned the
specific character of the Russian natural law which is based on the concept
of community and not of society (ASS: 467). The religion of both Old Be-
lievers and sectarians was generally congregational and lay people played
an important rôle as intellectuals and administrators. The ecclesiastical
discipline was, however, hampered, in the case of the Old Believers, by
traditionalism and ritualism. The rejection of religious rites, icons and
sacraments by many sects, i.e. the rejection of magical positions, led to the
necessity for the sect members to attain the certitudo salutis by their own
efforts without a mediator, it led to a more rational conduct of life, possi-
ble also in the economic sphere. This was the case particularly among the
Skoptsy and among the Molokans. Russian sectarians also abolished the
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distinction between monastic ethics and lay ethics, but without the conse-
quence of the Protestant Ethic in the Western sense.
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Finally, Weber had the intention to set his Protestant ethic studies in the
general framework of Occidental Christianity as a whole and to answer the
question as to what constitutes the distinctive economic, social, and legal
characteristics of the singularity of the development of the Occident. Of
course, as he had done in his essays on India and China, he would have
considered the institutional and legal characteristics and transformations
as well as the motivational characteristics and finally their interconnec-
tions (the degree of affinity between the institutions and the inner motiva-
tional forces).
The Institutional and Legal Transformations
The institutional and legal transformations which interested Weber, as
they produced the external historical preconditions of modern capitalism,
took place from the eleventh to the thirteenth century: the so-called Papal
Revolution (Weber did not use this more recent term) with the Investiture
Struggle and the development of canon law, Western feudalism, and the
rise of the Occidental city.
The reasons for the transformation of the outworldly situation of an-
cient Christianity to a more inworldly situation of later occidental Chris-




Louis Dumont will complete the view.84 While in early Christianity the in-
dividual as a value was conceived as outworldly, as apart from the given
social and political organization (and similar to the religious renouncers or
samnyasins in India), the conversion of Constantine and then of the Ro-
man Empire to Christianity forced upon the Church a closer relation to the
State. The first clear but still traditional result was Pope Gelasius’ formula
(around the year 500) about the relationship between the pope’s auctoritas
(authority) and the king’s or emperor’s potestas (power). But a dramatic
change occurred in the eighth century when a Frankish king was given the
rôle of protector of the Roman Church by a pope and when Charlemagne
was crowned as emperor in Rome by another pope in the year 800. The
popes thus broke their ties with Constantinople and claimed superior polit-
ical power in the western part of the Roman Empire, not only auctoritas
but also potestas.
This claim was then based on the forged so-called Donation of Con-
stantine (the Donatio Constantini, on the basis of which the popes also
claimed sovereign political authority in a part of Italy), and later justified
in the theory of the two swords. A significant ideological change occurred
here, for the sacerdotium (the spiritual function) claimed to rule in worldly
matters. The Church now became «inworldly», according to Dumont, and
the difference between spiritual and temporal power became one of degree
and not of kind. Conversely, the previously outworldly individual became
more inworldly, for since the Church pretended to rule the world this
meant that the Christian individual was now committed to the world and
this was going to lead to the the formation of the modern individualist ide-
ology (the ideology which makes us believe that we are autonomous indi-
viduals). The unified culture (Einheitskultur) of the Middle Age, as
Troeltsch has characterized it, started to break up. Weber did not deny the
existence of a unified culture based on the teachings of the Church, but he
was more interested in the organizational diversity which was developing
under the unifying canopy. The final stage will later be found in Calvin
who suggested that the task of the individual is to work for God’s glory in
the world rather than taking refuge from it, and with whom the Church be-
comes a society of inworldly individuals and a mere instrument of disci-
pline.
84 Louis Dumont «A Modified View of Our Origins. The Christian Beginnings of
Modern Individualism» in: Religion (1982) 12, pp. 1-27
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While previously, just as in Eastern-Orthodox countries, there had been
a tradition of caesaro-papistic domination, the Papal Revolution in the
West – soon after the schism between Rome and Constantinople or be-
tween Eastern and Western Christianity – put an end to it and even at-
tempted to impose a theocracy (Gregory VII in his Dictatus Papae of
1075, and then Innocent III), the pope claiming not only religious but also
political superiority over the emperor in secular matters, including the au-
thority to depose and to excommunicate emperor or king. Ultimately
though, the Investiture Struggle resulted in a tension-filled dualism be-
tween the religious and the political domain in the Concordat of Worms of
1122, a pact with the force of international law between the ecclesiastical
and the secular authority.
The result was a clear dualism of jurisdictions, a separation of ecclesi-
astical and secular authority, and the systematization of canon law which
became the first modern Western legal system and also, as Weber men-
tioned, one of the guides of secular law on its road to rationality. The Oc-
cidental Christian Church created for itself organs of rational law-making
in the Councils, in its bureaucracy, and in the papal powers of jurisdiction
which no other of the great religions did ever possess (ES: 792). The term
«corporation» may be used in this context: in Roman law, the state was
considered to be a corporation, and so were municipalities, with the right
to own property and to conclude contracts; guilds of craftsmen and
traders, churches and monasteries were also corporations and could act as
juristic persons to the extent that these privileges were granted by imperial
authority. But the canon law added a completely new idea: the whole
Church, the Church Universal, became a corporation, independent of em-
perors and kings and able to create new positive written law for its mem-
bers by rational enactments of church councils and synods.
Weber considered the medieval Catholic Church as the first rational bu-
reaucracy in world history and he added that it took the form of a compul-
sory institution 85, an Anstalt. Its canon law was a coherent ecclesiastical
85 Weber distinguished between corporation and institution/compulsory organization
(Anstalt). In both cases there is a legal distinction between the whole and its mem-
bers, but while the corporation is simply a fixed group of persons who can be re-
placed in prescribed ways, an Anstalt imposes, within a specifiable sphere of oper-
ations, its order (with relative success) on all action conforming with certain crite-
ria (ES: 52); it has mainly administrative organs, rationally established rules and
generally obligatory membership, although the members have no influence on the
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law which, although quite independent, markedly influenced the develop-
ment of the secular corporation in the Middle Ages (ES: 714/5). Although
the legal concept of the institution (Anstalt) was not fully developed be-
fore the modern period, as Weber admitted, he thought that it was bound
to arise in some manner when the original charisma of the early Church
leaders disappeared and the new official bureaucracy of the bishops need-
ed technical legitimation for the exercise of ecclesiastical rights of proper-
ty – for in Antiquity religious properties like temple assets or church
buildings belonged to the polis (ES: 714).
Weber also considered the Gregorian reforms as a decisive step in the
development of the Western Church as an institution of sacramental grace
(ES: 560) in which the ultimate religious value is pure obedience to the
Church which can provide absolution, and not the fulfillment of concrete
ethical duties, not even the supererogatory duties of the monks. The
Church was a hierocratic organization, an organization which claimed the
monopoly of enforcing its order through psychic coercion by distributing
or denying religious goods (ES: 54) – as opposed to the State which en-
forces its order by exercising the monopoly of physical coercion.
In fact, Gregory’s reforms also addressed themselves to the monastic
orders and introduced important reforms for them. Asceticism and monas-
ticism no longer were ends in themselves, to be lived outside the «world»,
but they became means which served the general aims of the Church.
Monks became the «auxiliary troops» of the Pope with well-defined roles;
they were integrated into the bureaucratic ecclesiastical organization, sub-
ject to a specific discipline, living according to the consilia evangelica and
removed from everyday life by the vows of poverty, chastity and obedi-
ence (ES: 1168). But even the mendiant monks, in contrast to Buddhist
monks or even the monks of early Chistianity, were forced into the service
of the Church and compelled to serve rational purposes (preaching, sys-
tematic charity, education etc.). Anchorites were not even mentioned in
the canon law of the Catholic Church. The principle was: extra ecclesiam
nulla salus (outside of the Church there is no salvation).
Moreover, for Weber the monastic communities of the Occident were
the first rationally administered manorial organizations and the occidental
administration (ES: 707). Weber considered the Church to be an Anstalt, although
he admitted that the transition between corporation and Anstalt is gradual and flu-
id. It should be noted that in Economy and Society the term is variously translated
as institution or as compulsory organization.
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monk the first vocational man (ES: 1169). While in other religious tradi-
tions the monk is a mendicant or itinerant and represents the proptotype of
an anti-economic seeker of salvation, in Occidental monasticism labour as
an ascetic means of salvation and as an economic instrument – the Bene-
dictine formula ora et labora (pray and work) may serve an an example –
was developed far more consistently (ES: 1170). The Cistercians with
their rational organization of agriculture and their well-known achieve-
ments in colonization, can be said to have organized some of the first ra-
tional enterprises (ES: 1182). Only ascetic Protestantism made the addi-
tional step of transferring rational ascetism into the world. But while the
monks were able to develop an ethically systematized method of life, ac-
cording to Weber, they were still dependent on the institutional sacramen-
tal grace of the Church and thus somehow midway between Catholic laity
and the future ascetic Protestants.
The state in the modern sense did not exist yet, but there were emerging
secular legal systems in England under Henry II, and on the Continent Ro-
man law started to take hold under the emperor Frederick Barbarossa. And
there were secular legal subsystems. One aspect of the socio-political
structure which Weber would certainly have considered was the rise of
Occidental feudalism, based on fiefs and not, as for instance in the Islamic
tradition, on prebends.86 This feudalism was not only a marginal case of
patrimonialism, it was at the same time a routinized charismatic relation-
ship, related to its military origins and to an education which favoured the
individual heroic battle between warriors and a mentality based on honour.
Rather contradictory elements were merged: strictly personal fealty be-
tween lord and vassal, contractual stipulations of rights and duties and fi-
nally a depersonalization of the personal relationship by virtue of a rent-
providing fief (ES 1074). This Occidental feudalism led, according to We-
ber, to a unified code of conduct, based on an ethic of honour, clearly dif-
ferent from a religious ethic based on salvation. This conduct of life im-
plied the complete opposite of a rational economic mentality and was, ac-
86 The prebend (benefice) is a lifelong remuneration for services within a patrimonial
regime, the prebend-holder a rentier or usufructuary with official duties. In con-
trast, the free vassal who has a fief stands outside any patrimonial subordination
and is subject to a code of duties and of honour. As opposed to dignity which per-
tains to the individual regardless of his position in society, honour implies that
identity is essentially linked to institutional roles and dishonour implies a loss of
face in the community (vide also Peter Berger 1973).
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cording to Weber, the source of a certain «nonchalance» in business af-
fairs, but it was an innerworldly conduct of life nevertheless.
Apart from this conduct of life based on honour, feudalism also pro-
duced, because of the fief-holder’s position through a bilateral contract
with his lord, the idea of the contractual character of political power
which, in comparison to pure patrimonial domination, introduced an ap-
proximation of a state ruled by law (Rechtsstaat; ES: 1082), of property
rights and individual rights. In England this led to the Magna Carta
(1215). The idea of a social contract, an idea which led to modern consti-
tutionalism, is here anticipated in a primitive fashion.
And finally, there was the rise of the Occidental city which, according
to Weber, had, in universal-historical terms, a special position if compared
to Asian cities or the cities of Antiquity. While the hereditary caste struc-
ture in India, with its ritual separation of the occupations, precluded the
emergence of the confraternization of the burghers into a city corporation,
and while in fact in all Asian cities the kin group associations ruled out the
existence of a city «commune», the Occidental medieval city was not only
a seat of trade and crafts and their respective guilds, but it was also a
sworn confraternity with its own charter (ES: 1248). Its citizens were sub-
ject to a special autonomous law, and they could be considered as a dis-
tinct «estate» with its own privileges and with the legal status of citizen-
ship. The city was an autonomous, autocephalous and anti-feudal corpora-
tion. It imposed its own statutes, levied taxes and launched economic pol-
icies of its own, but it did not apply ecclesiastical law or perform sacred
rites; its task was to maintain peace and justice, for the bearers of private
enterprise, the citizens, needed peace for their affairs, whereas the citizens
of the antique polis needed wars for their political capitalism. The city was
economically oriented, the citizen was a homo economicus, whereas in
Antiquity the citizen of the polis (city) was a homo politicus (ES: 1354).
Weber reminds his readers of the Christian preconditions of the fraterniza-
tion of the city burghers: the events in Antioch and the elimination of all
ritual and kinship barriers, as described in Paul’s letter to the Ephesans.87
In the cities, particularly in Italy, there also developed new legal princi-
ples in mercantile law which allowed the legal separation and the separa-
tion for accounting purposes of private and business spheres, of the house-
87 Described in more detail in the section on ancient Christianity above.
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hold and of the «firm», as Weber had noted 88: the commenda, a kind of
joint stock company for a single venture, and a varation of it, the societas
maris. Unlimited partnerships and the domestic system (GEH: 153) de-
veloped early, but more and more, continuous capitalist acquisition was
performed in a separate enterprise. The identity of household and office
fell apart, business assets and private property were separated. The advan-
tage of these arrangements was that the liability of the partners was limi-
ted to the amount of their initial investment and it implied limited joint lia-
bility. The partnerships were corporations and therefore juristic persons.
Bonds, stock certificates, bills of exchange, and the beginnings of
bankruptcy law followed. This fundamentally important development was
a characteristic feature of the Occident; it characterizes the qualitative
uniqueness of the development of modern capitalism (ES: 379). Certainly,
the medieval city was a historical interlude, but, though not the only sig-
nificant antecedent developmental stage, it can be linked as one of the cru-
cial factors with the rise of modern capitalism and the modern state (ES:
1323).
The «Spirit» of Traditionalism and the Puritan Sects
The economic ethics of the Middle Ages and even of the Renaissance
were largely based on the «spirit» of traditionalism so that an inner affini-
ty between commercial activity and the innermost core of the personality
was lacking (AC: 117). The devout Catholic, as he went about his
econonomic affairs, found himself continually behaving in a manner that
transgressed papal injunctions. His economic behaviour could be permissi-
ble only on the basis of a lax probabilistic morality (ES: 615). Homo mer-
cator deo placere vix potest (merchants can hardly please God) was a for-
mula of the Corpus Iuris Canonici (canon law). Economic activity was not
considered as immoral, but as morally neutral or indifferent. The Latin
formula implied, in fact, a high degree of concession on the part of the
Catholic doctrine to the financial powers in the Italian cities: they were al-
lowed to make a profit, but this did not provide any hope of salvation.
88 In: Geschichte der Handelsgesellschaften im Mittelalter 1889, now translated as
The History of Commercial Partnerships in the Middle Ages (2003). The theory of
corporations which developed slowly distinguishes between the property, liabili-
ties and assets of the corporation and those of individual members.
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The history of the prohibition of interest taking is rather complicated.
The Christian Church, including the popes, took interest without any scru-
ples in the early Middle Ages, but as in all salvation religions, there was
hostility towards the power of capital which is impersonal and not
amenable to ethical control, as Weber explained. However, there was also
accommodation to practical needs as can be seen in the canonical distinc-
tion between interest and usury (shameful profit). Persecution of usurious
lending arose as a concomitant of the incipient development of actual cap-
italist instruments; it was the result of a struggle in principle of ethical ra-
tionalization and the rationalization in the domain of economics (ES: 584).
In any case, officially the prohibition of interest was not abolished until
the nineteenth century (PE: 151, n. 29). The accommodation was possible
because the Catholic Church remained a sacramental institution of grace.
«Quite realistically the Church recognized that man was not a clearly de-
fined unity to be judged one way or the other, but that his moral life was
normally subject to conflicting motives and his action contradictory. Of
course it required as an ideal a fundamental change of life. But the Church
weakened this requirement for the average person by one of its most im-
portant means of power and education, the sacrament of absolution, the
function of which was connected with the deepest roots of Catholic reli-
giosity» (PE: 70). Institutional grace was provided by purely magical
sacraments because the institution was deemed to control the accumula-
tion of grace producing supererogatory achievements of its officials or of
monks (ES: 560).
In general, Catholic traditionalism implied a non-methodological se-
quence of single actions. The Catholic knew that he could obtain absolu-
tion from his sins in the confession, for the Church gave grace to the just
and the unjust. The veneration of the saints, according to Weber, led prac-
tically to polytheism, and even the Holy Communion contained magical
aspects. Only the monks surpassed the lay ethics with supererogatory
works and achieved a methodical (though outworldly) way of life.
But if economic traditionalism was to be broken, the toleration of eco-
nomic acquisition was not enough, nor was worldly or economic wisdom
sufficient. Only Protestantism in the sixteenth century eliminated all sacra-
mental and institutional grace and insisted on the proof of one’s salvation
by innerworldly asceticism which led to a deep moralization of life, or to a
life-transforming power from within. The Protestants did not think that
any priest or church could help them to acquire the certitudo salutis (the
psychological certainty to be saved); not simple good works or institution-
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al grace with regard to sins committed did suffice any more, but one was
required to conduct one’s whole life in a systematic and methodical way.
A revolution in mentality took place, as the Protestants took a stance
against the enjoyment of life. Not economic but religious premia (the
prospect of salvation) were expected by an ascetic life style and the ratio-
nal tempering of the greed for gain in one’s profession. Moeover, the or-
ganizational structure of the sects which augmented social control and
compelled the members to prove themselves among their peers added to
the inner motivation a further pressure from the outside.
The systematization of canon law, the new ideas in mercantile law, the
feudal contract and the rise of the ideal of the citizen all added to the legal-
ization of life 89, and Weber did indeed write that the rationalization of
law and the increasing calculability of the functioning of the legal process
constituted one of the most important conditions for the existence of the
capitalistic enterprise (ES: 883) – but by no means the only one. Only
when in the sixteenth century the social form of the sect became dominant
in parts of Western Europe and North America90 and when the Protestant
ethic was added to the above-mentioned legal developments so that one
can talk of a bourgeois conduct of life, different from the seigneurial-feu-
dal conduct of life or the modes of conduct of peasants or the Faustian life
of full and beautiful humanity, only then a development of «unbroken
consistency» could set in which could take advantage of the legal ideas
and institutions discussed earlier and would lead to modern capitalism.
Thus, Weber could say that «in the last resort the factors which produced
(modern) capitalism were the rational permanent enterprise, rational ac-
89 Even the relationship of man to God became a sort of legally definable relation-
ship so that salvation could be settled by a legal process – a theory later developed
by Anselm of Canterbury (ES: 553).
90 According to Troeltsch (1911), Christianity has created three social forms: the
church, an organization administering the means of salvation ; the voluntary sect
of committed believers ; and mysticism which denies the validity of any social or-
der or formation of the world. Weber accepted this classification of the three types
of religious forms (ASS: 462 sqq). The existence of these three social forms was
the consequence of the influence of Stoicism on early Christian thought, distin-
guishing the idea of a perfect natural law (the ideal of mankind ruled by reason,
which led to the formation of sects) from relative natural law (which recognizes
the diversity of status and the existence of irrational passion, as in the church),
while mysticism denies any natural order on principle because of the meaningless-
ness of political and social life (predominant in Orthodox regions).
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counting, rational technology and rational law, but again not these alone.
Necessary complementary factors were the rational spirit, the rationaliza-
tion of the conduct of life in general, and a rationalistic economic ethic»
(GEH: 354).
Of course, when Weber wrote at the beginning of the twentieth century,
he thought that the spirit of religious asceticism had escaped from the
«iron cage», and he saw only mechanized petrifaction and the «last men»
in a godless and prophetless age.
The Characteristics of Modern Western Capitalism
The resulting modern Western capitalism can be characterized by three
complexes of criteria:
1. The modern capitalist enterprise, based on
a) formally free and specialized labour, based on machine production
b) the legal separation from the household (including separate ac-
counting procedures)
c) a disconnection of the capital of the enterprise from the wealth of
the individual owners (possibility of joint stock companies)
d) freedom of contract
2. A capitalist economic order, including
a) the openness of the markets for labour, capital and land
b) a formally rational and predictable legal system and public adminis-
tration
c) the modern state (Anstaltsstaat)
d) rational technology
Weber considered these two complexes of critera as the conditions for ob-
taining a maximum of formal rationality of capital accounting (ES: 161/2).
To this, however, must be added
3. The spirit of capitalism – a rationally moderated pursuit of profit for
the purpose of proving oneself in one’s vocation.
The causal connexion between religious ethics and capitalism will be fur-
ther analysed in Chapter IV and the connexions between different kinds of
legal systems and capitalism in Chapter V.
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THE WORLD RELIGIONS IN CONTROL
TESTS
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Weber, Max (2012) «Critical Studies in the Logic of the Cultural Sciences» part II in:
Collected Methodological Writings London: Routledge pp 169-184
Kries, J. v. (1888) Über den Begriff der objektiven Möglichkeit Leipzig: Fues’s
Elective Affinity and Causal Adequacy
When Max Weber wrote his essays on the «Economic Ethics of World
Religions» and when he planned additional essays on Islam, early Chris-
tianity and Orthodox Christianity, he thought that capitalism in a general
sense has existed in most advanced cultures. Certainly, when he talked of
capitalism Weber did not mean the uncontrolled impulse to acquisition,
the simple pursuit of gain or of money, for this pursuit has been common
at all times and in most countries among coachmen, dishonest officials,
crusaders and waiters, and, as Weber said, this naïve idea of capitalism
should be given up once and for all. By capitalism in a general sense We-
ber meant the pursuit of profit by means of continuous rational enterprise
and by formally peaceful exchange ( PE: XXXII)91 which can exist among
traders and moneylenders and can also take the form of political capital-
ism, for instance in colonial capitalism or tax-farming.
While being well aware of these different manifestations of capitalism
in Western history as well as elsewhere, Weber was mainly interested in
the particular kind of capitalism which developed in Western society in
the last several centuries: modern Western capitalism. He described it as
rational-capitalistic organization of formally free labour, based on free
market exchange and on the separation of business from the household,
for the satisfaction of the needs of the masses ( PE: XXXV). Within this
system may be found - at least at the time of its early development - the
CHAPTER IV
1.
91 A more complete definition would distinguish between the capitalistic enterprise
and the capitalistic system which can only develop under the rule of law and when
the administration of the monetary system has been monopolized by the State.
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«spirit of capitalism», identified with the rational tempering of the irra-
tional impulse of gain, based on calculations in terms of capital and result-
ing from the religious doctrine of proof (Bewährung). In his Protestant
Ethic (PE) Weber mainly, although not exclusively, tried to understand
(verstehen) this «spirit» of capitalism, a certain style and conduct of life
which a century or two after the Reformation appeared to have a close
elective affinity with the religiously oriented ethical rationalism of the
Protestants.
Most present-day scholars of Weber’s PE see the relationship between
the Protestant ethic and the spirit of capitalism as one of elective affinity
or of homologic structures and not of causality92. The theorem of elective
affinity (Wahlverwandtschaft) originated in the natural sciences: The
Swede Torbern Bergmann wrote Disquisitio de attractionibus electivis in
1782, referring to the fact that in anorganic chemistry elements may form
combinations which can later be dissolved in favour of others. The Ger-
man poet J. W. Goethe, who had his own view of the natural sciences, in-
terpreted these phenomena of natural law described by Bergmann as re-
sulting from inclination, affection or attraction, and he transferred these
ideas and the German term which described them (Wahlverwandtschaft) to
the realm of interhuman relationships.93 Goethe’s figurative use of the
term was later adopted by Weber in two different contexts and he attached
to it two different meanings. On the one hand, Weber used the term to in-
dicate meaningful adequacy (Sinnadäquanz) or affinity of meaning of reli-
gious concepts and motives in relation to each other and in relation to the
total construct of meaning to which they belong. For instance, ethical
(emissary) prophecy had, according to him, a profound elective affinity to
the conception of a transcendent personal God ( FMW:285), the dogma of
predestination combined with the doctrine of proof had an elective affinity
with a systematic conduct of life as opposed to single good deeds, and the
Protestant feeling of being a tool and not a vessel of God fitted well into
the whole monotheistic world view although no causal relationships are
implied here. Similarly, the devout Hindu was accursed to remain within
the structure (Gehäuse) of the karma doctrine ( RI:121) which formed a
92 E. Fischoff (1968) «The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism: The History
of a Controversy» in:S. N. Eisenstadt (ed.) The Protestant Ethic and Moderniza-
tion New York: Basic Books 1968, p. 81
93 See Benno von Wiese’s Editorial Note on Goethe’s novel «Die Wahlver-
wandtschaften» in GoethesWerke, Hamburger Ausgabe, Vol VI, 1989, p. 675
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meaningful whole resulting from the non-causal elective affinities of its
parts. Elective affinity here points to an inner consistency of thought con-
figurations as they develop in the theologies of major world religions, re-
sulting from the fact often observed in the history of ideas that what is ra-
tional or logically consistent has some degree of «power» over humans
and thereby tends to favor a coherent thought structure.
On the other hand, Weber wished to place his methodology beyond the
one-sided alternatives of materialism and idealism so that when he spoke,
for instance, of an elective affinity between the spirit and the form or sys-
tem of capitalism ( AC: 75) or between Calvinism and capitalism (ibid.:
107), he wanted to reject any type of reductionism and generalization
about causality between religion and economy and he also wished to im-
ply that any assertion about the manner and the general direction of causal
relationships, while not excluding reciprocal influences, must be the result
of further historical research, not just a methodological one. At the same
time, Weber suggested that the elective affinity of the spirit of capitalism
with its social structure, or form, can produce a mutually favorable rela-
tionship or even a reciprocal intensification (Steigerung) and a develop-
ment of unbroken uniformity. In this case, spirit and form do not stand in
each other’s way, as would be the case if capitalism were imposed on a
social environment which contains a different spirit.
It is in this second sense which does not exclude causal relationships if
they can be established by historical research that Weber used the term
Wahlverwandtschaft in the PE. He knew that for the historian the method
of verstehen provides no guarantee of empirical truth, if it is not comple-
mented by a method which can establish causal relationships.
It may be useful here to refer briefly to Weber’s methodology which
has as a starting point the logical distinction between natural science and
cultural science. As a cultural scientist Weber was concerned with the in-
terpretative understanding (verstehen) of social phenomena. Religions, he
thought, provide human actors with categories and with an intelligible
context of meaning which can be ideal-typically reconstructed (as Weber
did with regard to the meaning contexts provided by the world religions).
Scholars are then able to understand social actions which are related to
such ideal-typical meaning contexts and which are in this sense rational
and adequate on the level of meaning. In fact, such rationally interpretable
meaningful behaviour often constitutes the most appropriate ideal-type for
sociological analysis, for it permits to become aware of irrational or emo-
tional influences. Such understanding is, according to Weber’s interpreter
1. Elective Affinity and Causal Adequacy
139
Henrich 94, the result of the anthropological characteristic of human beings
to take position in relation to meaning contexts.
But understanding on the level of meaning is never sufficient, it must
be verified by causal adequacy. Weber stressed the complementarity of
verstehen (understanding) and causal explanation (CMW: 273/4), the ne-
cessity to control any interpretation by the methods of causal imputation if
it wants to be more than a plausible hypothesis; in fact, sociology is con-
cerned with the understanding of social action and thereby with a causal
explanation of its course and consequences (ES: 4), as subjective meaning,
understandable by the observer, is often but one element in the causal pro-
cess.
The essays on «The Economic Ethics of World Religions» (EEWR)
were used by Weber as control tests to establish the causal adequacy of
religion and thus of the validity of his PE thesis, and they could possibly
also have been used to establish the validity of the projected thesis of his
planned essay on Occidental Christianity. While Weber’s wife Marianne95
wrote that the essays on the EEWR contribute to the characterization of
Western man and his culture, and while it may also be true that before the
publication of his essays on India and China there lay Weber’s discovery,
as Schluchter96 puts it, that the whole of Western culture - not only its eco-
nomic aspects, but also its law, its organizational aspects and even its mu-
sic - is permeated by a specific mode of rationalism which needed to be
characterized further by contrasting it with the different modes of rational-
ism in non-Western cultures, it should nevertheless not be forgotten that
these essays also constituted an attempt to verify and to validate the PE-
thesis within the context of a universal history of capitalism. In fact, it was
one of Weber’s main historical and sociological interests, particularly in
his studies on the «Economic Ethics of World Religions», to establish the
cause or the causes of those particular aspects of modern Western capital-
ism which distinguish it from all other forms and manifestations of capi-
talism.
As Weber talked of the causal imputation of the «spirit» of modern
Western capitalism to the religious ethic of Protestantism, or more gener-
ally of the attribution of a concrete effect to a concrete cause, it may not
94 D. Henrich 1952: 50
95 Marianne Weber 1975, Max Weber. A Biography. New York: John Wiley, p. 333
96 Wolfgang Schluchter 1989 Rationalism, Religion and Domination. University of
California Press p. 45
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be superfluous to ask ourselves how he thought to achieve this causal im-
putation and what he meant by the terms cause or causation in a socio-his-
torical context. For an answer, we shall go back to the work of the «out-
standing physiologist» v. Kries 97 on which Weber heavily relied98 and
then to the essays on «The Economic Ethics of World Religions» which
can serve to apply v. Kries’ theory.
Adequate Causation according to v. Kries
It is an axiom, said v. Kries, that every event which actually occurs, was
necessarily produced by the totality of all previously existing circum-
stances many of which are often unknown to us. But if this is so, what do
we mean when we attribute a concrete event to a single cause? In order to
show this, we must first clarify the notion of objective possibility.
If we say that an event is objectively possible, we mean that we are un-
certain about its occurrence or non-occurrence because we do not know all
its conditions and all the surrounding circumstances, for under clearly de-
fined conditions the notion of objective possibility cannot be applied. But
the same notion imposes itself when the conditions and circumstances of
an event are only partially or generally known and when we wish to con-
sider the relationship of an effect to these general or partial conditions. For
instance, it is indeed objectively possible that, while playing at dice, the
six comes up ten times in a row, for there is nothing in the general condi-
tions and circumstances of playing at dice which might necessarily pre-
vent this particular outcome. But it is also objectively possible that the six
never comes up.99
We also say occasionally that a certain person could have done or
known this or that. In such cases we abstract from the given particular
thoughts and preoccupations which existed at the time of the event in
question, as well as from the psychological make-up of the person under
consideration, and refer only to that part of the circumstances which is of
particular interest to us, namely the physical or intellectual capacities or
the social position of that person. We thus assert the compatibility of a
2.
97 J. von Kries 1888 Über den Begriff der objektiven Möglichkeit. Leipzig : Fues ’s
98 Max Weber «Critical Studies in the Logic of the Cultural Sciences» in : CMW, p.
171
99 von Kries 1888 : p. 5
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certain action with a part of the total conditions involved. It might be ar-
gued, for instance, that Chamberlain could have stopped Hitler by not ac-
cepting the Munich agreement, if one abstracts from the political situation
in Europe at the time and from his personal characteristics and refers only
to his position as prime minister of Britain. On the whole, therefore, we
may talk of the objective possibility of an event under generally or partial-
ly defined conditions, if such determinations of the conditions are conceiv-
able which would, according to our experience and nomological knowl-
edge, produce the event.
This notion of objective possibility will now be used in the context of
causal relationships. Without any doubt, only the total complex of all con-
ditions which produced a result may be called its cause in the strict sense
of the term. But sometimes another sense of the terms cause and causation
plays an important role, and this was particularly so in German legal
thought which in Weber’s time was much concerned with the problem of
causality. We might say, for instance, that certain generally defined condi-
tions or circumstances represent a larger or smaller possibility of bringing
about a given result (e.g.: driving under the influence of alcohol increases
the possibility of an accident). The question is, then, how such general
statements about causal relationships might influence the evaluation of
concrete cases.100
Before we return to this question, some preliminary remarks are neces-
sary. According to v. Kries, the question regarding the causality of a cer-
tain circumstance or factor is equivalent to the question of what would
have happened in a particular case if from the total context of conditions
this circumstance or factor had been absent while all others had remained
unchanged. Therefore, we shall say that a circumstance may be considered
to have caused an effect if it can be shown that the same effect would
probably not have occurred without it. But what do we mean when we talk
about the same effect?
To be sure, we deny the causality of any factor not only if without it the
effect would have occurred in the same way, but also if its absence would
have produced only an unimportant modification of the effect. It is clear,
therefore, that we are not interested in the effect with all its concrete de-
tails, but rather in a generalized idea of it. For instance, if we ask whether
a certain medication has caused somebody’s death, we want to know
100 Ibid. p. 20
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whether he would also have died without taking this medication but not
whether he would have died in exactly the same position or in the same
corner of his room.
Finally, the following distinction needs to be made: if a given factor has
caused an effect, the causal nexus may be either general or a peculiarity of
the given case. The following example taken from v. Kries will clarify
this.
If a coachman who is driving a passenger is drunk or falls asleep and
thus misses his way, and if then the passenger is killed by lightning, it may
be said that the sleep (or drunkenness) of the coachman has caused the
death of the passenger. For if the coach had been on the right way, it
would without a doubt have been at a different location at the time of the
thunderstorm and the passenger would probably not have been hurt. But
one can perhaps say that there is here no general connection between the
above-mentioned cause and the effect in all cases of drunkenness, al-
though a causal connection is undeniable in this particular case. Moreover,
in general, a traveller can also be hit by lightning, if the coachman is
awake.101
Matters are quite different if, in the same example, instead of being hit
by lightning, the coach had been overturned and the traveller had in this
way been hurt or killed. In this case one would have to assume not only an
individual but a general causal relationship between the sleeping of the
coachman and the accident; one might say that in our experience the
sleeping of a coachman, although it does not necessarily always cause an
accident, generally does increase the possibility and probability of an acci-
dent.102
The purpose of these reflections will become clear with the help of the
notion of objective possibility as it permits a general or abstract considera-
tion of a causal relationship between a single factor and an effect. A theo-
ry which knows of no other causal relationship than that B always is the
effect of A and which thus asserts the regularity of an effect without any
exception, often appears to be fruitless, for the relationship between a sin-
gle factor and an effect often is not of such nature. But, as opposed to a
causal theory which assumes an absolute regularity of the causal relation-
ship, it is often possible to say that a causal element augments the objec-
101 Ibid.: p. 25/26
102 Ibid. :p. 26
2. Adequate Causation according to v. Kries
143
tive possibility of an effect or that the presence of a causal element pro-
duces a certain effect in a much larger variety of circumstances.
In order to have short terms to designate the two variations in the exam-
ple of the sleeping coachman, v. Kries talks of adequate and of «chance»
causation. A is called the adequate cause of B, and B the adequate effect
of A, if generally (in the large majority of possible circumstances) A may
be seen to favour B; in the opposite case he talks of «chance» causation. In
the above example the drunkenness of the coachman was the «chance»
cause of the effect that the traveller was killed by lightning; it would, how-
ever, have to be considered as the adequate cause in the modified example
where the overturn of the coach resulted in the death of the traveller.103
It is perhaps useful to point to a frequently occurring confusion which
tends to result from the misunderstanding of the fact that there is a basic
difference between an event which is considered to be the «chance» cause
of an effect and an insignificant event. Weber (CMW: 179) used the ex-
ample of the two shots fired in Berlin in March 1848 which were, accord-
ing to him, causally insignificant. One would speak of «chance» causation
and impute the March Revolution to those two shots only if it could be ar-
gued convincingly that without them the social and political circumstances
would not have produced a revolution. In fact, though, it is only conceiv-
able that the two shots have had an influence on the precise moment of the
outbreak.
It must be stressed that the distinction between an adequate cause and a
«chance» cause does not refer to the manner in which in a concrete case a
causal factor produces an effect, but that it has an abstract meaning. It is
assumed that the causal factor is a behaviour or an event which can be
added in the scientist’s mind to a manifold variety of circumstances.
Equally, the effect which may or may not have been favoured by the
cause, remains generally defined and not described in all its details. The
distinction between adequate and «chance» causation is always based on a
generalized consideration of a particular case, the result of mental manipu-
lations and comparisons, by which the degree of objective possibility is in-
tended to be grasped, not, however, on the objective causality of the
events.104
103 Ibid. : p. 27
104 Ibid. : p. 27
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It should also be noted that in v. Kries’ theory of causality, which, as
has been seen, is based on the notion of objective possibility, a clear divid-
ing line between adequate and «chance» causality cannot be drawn. The
steady transition follows from the fact that the general causal conditions
for any effect may take any value between 0 and 1. If, for instance, a train
accident forces a traveller to spend a few hours at an unexpected location
where he catches an infectious disease and dies, we might say that the
train accident was a chance cause of his death. We would, however, be in-
clined to consider the death to be slightly more adequately caused, if the
accident had happened in an area which is known to be disease-ridden. In
fact, in this particular case the increase in the risk may be great though the
resultant probability is still small. It should perhaps be mentioned in pass-
ing here that, as Hart & Honoré have noted105, there is a standing danger
of confusion, if adequacy theory is misunderstood, between the notion of a
substantial increase of a risk and that of increasing the risk to a substantial
one.
If one wanted to characterize the theory of adequate causation, one
would have to view it at some distance from many modern scientific out-
looks. Platonic thinking is nowadays rather rare, and yet one misunder-
stands the term «adequate causation» if one thinks of it in any but a Pla-
tonic sense – i.e. that «true» adequate causation is an ideal to which real
life situations approximate more or less. Weber (CMW:180) said that it
admits gradations but that one cannot arrive at numerical estimates. When
Turner & Factor106 who have tried to fit adequate causation theory into the
Procrustean bed of modern probability theory criticize the concept by sug-
gesting that its only requirement for a claim of causal connection was a
plausible claim of a relationship of conditionality and a dependent proba-
bility of greater than zero – and that it is difficult to see what «proof»
means here, they think in the more modern terms of true/false which apply
to propositions, rather than in the terms of less true/more true which apply
to types or ideal types of reality itself.
The distinction between an adequate cause and a «chance» cause can,
according to v. Kries, easily be used in criminal law where it has to be de-
cided whether someone is responsible for a criminal act. Our sense of jus-
105 Hart, H. L. A. and Honoré, T. 1985 Causation in the Law Oxford : Clarendon p.
493
106 Turner, S. and Factor, R. 1981 «Objective Possibility and Adequate Causation in
Weber’s Methodological Writings» Sociological Review 29 (1) p. 25
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tice seems to suggest that a person is responsible only for the adequate
consequences of his actions. If, for instance, someone who in a street fight
was slightly injured by a knife later died of tetanus, one would normally
say that the fight was the «chance» cause and not the adequate cause of his
death, because in general experience superficial knife wounds do not re-
sult in death. In a legal system which accepts the notion of adequate cau-
sation, the opponent would then not be held responsible for the death.
Weber’s Use of the Concept of Adequate Causation
Max Weber had been trained as a lawyer and was quite familiar with legal
theory. Having seen the fruitfulness of v. Kries’ work in German legal the-
ory, especially in the work of Gustav Radbruch, he applied it to the histor-
ical and cultural sciences. Like v. Kries, Weber thought that reality is a
«heterogeneous continuum», a stream of immeasurable events which, be-
cause of the interdependence of all events, is infinitely complex. But sci-
entific investigation can only grasp a finite and ever changing portion of
this infinite reality and of the causal connections within it by concentrating
on those aspects which acquire meaning and cultural significance for us or
for the historian, i.e., which become «historical individuals». Weber went
beyond v. Kries in concentrating on those aspects of «the infinite web of
reality» which acquire meaning and cultural significance for us, i.e., which
become «historical individuals», and then in perceiving these historical in-
dividuals as genetic ideal types which the scientist constructs in order to
clarify reality and in the expectation of a possible causal relationship, and
which he then uses as hypotheses for causal imputations.
It seemed to Max Weber that - apart from the question of subjective
guilt - the legal expert and the historian or social scientist ask exactly the
same question: under what circumstances and in what sense can it be as-
serted that an event or a person has caused a certain effect - and therefore
that the ideas developed by v. Kries can and should be applied to the study
of universal history. Both the judge and the historian do not explain
causally the total course of events as that would be impossible and mean-
ingless. While the judge’s deliberations take into account those compo-
nents of the events which are pertinent for the subsumption under the legal
norms, the historian is exclusively concerned with the causal explanation
of those elements of the events in question which are of «general signifi-
cance» and hence of historical interest (CMW: 173).
3.
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The battle of Marathon serves as an example. By the end of the nine-
teenth century, the Greek victory in the battle of Marathon of 490 BC be-
tween the Athenian army under Miltiades and the Persian army of King
Darios the Great was considered to have been of such importance for the
subsequent development not only of Greek culture but of Western culture
in general that the Baron de Coubertin did not hesitate to add the
Marathon run of approximately 42 km to the list of Olympic competitions,
in memory of the Athenian soldier who had run the same distance from
Marathon to Athens in order to announce the victory – and had then died
of exhaustion. If the Persians had been victorious – so it was thought –
they would probably have imposed a theocratic regime in Greece as they
had done in Israel and Egypt a few decades earlier; the providers of ora-
cles and mystery cults would have dominated the polis, and Greek culture
with its philosophy, tragedy, sculpture, etc., the seedbed of Western civi-
lization, would never have blossomed. In Weber’s formulation we attempt
to grasp the real causal interconnection by constructing unreal ones.
(CMW: 182)
In Weber’s words, the battle «decided» between the independence of
Greek culture and a Persian-dominated theocracy which, in the case of a
Persian victory, would have been objectively possible (although we cannot
state the degree, between 0 and 1, of this objective possibility), for, ac-
cording to our general knowledge of the Persians, the course of events
would have been different in its general outlines and in those features –
the cultural values which depended on the Athenian victory – which are
significant for Western man. (It should be added in passing that this is the
reason why Western man, according to Weber, rates Marathon higher than
a battle between two African tribes). Weber concludes that it is not the
case that a Persian victory must have led to a quite different development
of Hellenic culture – but a different development would have been the ad-
equate effect of a Persian victory.
Adequate Causation and «The Economic Ethics of World Religions»
The notions of objective possibility and of adequate and «chance» causa-
tion are equally useful in the interpretation of Weber’s investigation of the
causes of the spirit of modern capitalism. The thesis of the causal rele-
vance of the Protestant ethic meant for him that modern capitalism, with
4.
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its unchanged general characteristics, and quite apart from all its concrete
details, probably would not have appeared without this causal element.
This thesis, namely that the Protestant ethic is an adequate cause – and
not simply a cause and definitely not the only cause and probably not even
the only adequate cause and perhaps not the most important adequate
cause – of the modern capitalist spirit, is at the centre of Weber’s compar-
ative sociology of religions. Within the field of the cultural sciences, ac-
cording to Weber, we can only have knowledge of adequate causes, and to
say that an event was necessarily caused by previous conditions, would be
a pure a priori. A thesis about adequate causation presupposes, as has
been shown, a judgement of objective possibility; in Weber’s case it pre-
supposes a judgement on what we can imagine to be the effect, according
to the rules of experience, if in the total complex of the historical condi-
tions of modern capitalism we assume the Protestant ethic to be either ab-
sent or modified. A judgement about what might have happened under dif-
ferent circumstances would at first sight perhaps be called irrational, but
Weber does not simply rely on the imagination of what might have hap-
pened.
In order to be able to arrive at a reasoned judgement, Weber turns to-
wards historical analogies of the most different time periods and cultural
areas. Ideally he would like to find a historical course of events which co-
incides with the development towards modern capitalism in all economi-
cally relevant respects except for the Protestant ethic. Weber does not find
this logical ideal but he can show that, in spite of conditions in India and
especially China which were at times and as a rule favourable for the de-
velopment of capitalism (high esteem for wealth, significant technological
knowledge, wars between competing states, etc.), capitalism of the mod-
ern occidental kind was not born there (although political capitalism did
exist), while in the occidental cultural area, wherever the Protestant ethic
took root, modern capitalism developed, even sometimes under the most
unfavourable and miserable conditions, for example among the Puritans of
New England. Weber, therefore, draws the conclusion that the objective
possibility of the independent emergence of modern capitalism, when the
Protestant ethic is absent, must be considered as small, for, in the absence
of this causal factor, the other existing conditions and circumstances lead
us to expect a high degree of possibility of another development.
It is possible to go one step beyond this argument. Weber was not only
able to show, by means of intercultural comparison that, when the Protes-
tant ethic was absent, modern capitalism as a rule did not arise (although,
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obviously, it could be imported from outside), but he also indicated that
similar rational-ethical influences among certain other sects in other cul-
tural areas (e.g. some Russian Old-Believers and sects or the Jains and
Vallabhacarins of India), although they did not produce capitalism of the
modern Western kind, nevertheless resulted in economic rationalization
and success (PE:145 fn 12;) compared with the surrounding population of
the same cultural area. This seems to indicate an adequate causal relation-
ship between the ethics of certain kinds of sects and a generalized concept
of capitalism. It is the paradox of all rational-ethical asceticism – as can be
seen in the history of many monasteries – that it itself produces the wealth
which it rejects. Not only ascetic Protestantism but also certain other reli-
gious communities characterized by a religiously oriented asceticism and
rationalism of the conduct of life have had a revolutionizing effect on eco-
nomic activity and pushed it in the same direction – and the realization of
this fact in turn strengthens the Protestant ethic thesis, if one wishes to in-
terpret it not only as a thesis about elective affinity of meaning, as most
scholars who know only the PE and not the EEWR do, but also as a thesis
about adequate causation. It is true, though, that the religious communities
in question (some ascetic sects before the Reformation, some monastic or-
ders, some Russian and Indian sects) have not been closely studied by We-
ber – with the partial exception perhaps of the Jains, about whom he wrote
a few pages in his essay on India. The apparent positive relationship be-
tween religion and economic success in the case of the Vallabhacarins in
India and of some Russian sects and Old Believers has been studied more
recently.107
Some other possible explanations of the development of modern capi-
talism were rejected by Weber. Technical advances, for instance, can cer-
tainly favour capitalist growth, but historical experience teaches that they
alone are not generally able to overcome traditionalism and to contribute
to the formation of a new economic structure. In ancient Rome the capital-
istic development was highest when the technological development had
ended and the technical knowledge of the Chinese remained without prac-
tical applications ( ASS: 451 and RC:243). Similarly, the increase of the
reserves of precious metals can accelerate an already existing economic
107 Jürgen Lütt, «The Doctrine of the Vallabhacarya Sect and the Economic Perfor-
mance of its Followers» International Sociology 2 (3) 1987; Andreas Buss «The
Economic Ethics of Russian-Orthodox Christianity», Part 1 & 2 in : International
Sociology 4 (3 and 4) 1989
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development, but historical experience (for instance in Ptolemaic Egypt)
shows that precious metals alone do not create a new economic structure.
It should also be remembered that after the discovery of America, the flow
of gold and silver to Spain produced a recession and not an increase of
capitalistic development (GEH:353). And, finally, the existence of rational
law cannot generally, out of itself, change the prevailing circumstances in
the direction of more modern capitalism. In Rome, for instance, the high-
est degree of rationality in the legal system was attained only after the
conclusion of the capitalistic development.108
Technical advances, precious metal-resources and rational law, there-
fore, although not irrelevant, cannot alone be held to be adequate causes of
modern capitalism. Other possible causes mentioned by Weber, e.g. popu-
lation increase, the development of autonomous cities or commercial
routes, etc., would perhaps merit some consideration but have not been
studied comparatively as causes of capitalism by Weber.
The low degree of the objective possibility of the independent develop-
ment of modern capitalism without the Protestant ethic, the development
of modern capitalism even under otherwise unfavourable circumstances
where the Protestant ethic predominated, further the high degree of objec-
tive possibility of rational economic activity within the sphere of influence
of rational-ethical sects in non-western cultural areas, and finally his rejec-
tion of other, though less investigated, possible causes of modern capital-
ism have led Weber to the conclusion that the causal influence of the
Protestant ethic was very high (Weber AC:120), that it was the adequate
cause of modern capitalism, although, obviously, it is never possible, in
the historical imputation of an effect to a cause, to arrive at a numerical
ratio.
It has thus perhaps been shown that «The Economic Ethics of World
Religions» must not only be interpreted in relation to Weber’s discovery
of a specific mode of rationalism in Western culture, but also as the
methodologically necessary consequence of his discovery in the PE that
there is an elective affinity between certain aspects of Protestantism and
the spirit of capitalism. In the EEWR Weber proceeded to establish a rela-
tionship of adequate causation – assuming the precise understanding of
this delicate notion as formulated by v. Kries – between certain idealtypi-
108 Schelting, Alexander v., 1934, Max Webers Wissenschaftslehre Tübingen: Mohr
(Siebeck) 1934, p 113
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cally refined phenomena, while in the PE he had, to a large extent, only
established elective affinity. Weber had perhaps referred to a yet unde-
fined plan of this kind in the sibylline remark, made in 1908 in response to
one of his critics, that the Gegenprobe of his PE, although promised, was
still lacking.109
The interpretation of the term Gegenprobe, apparently used by Weber
only once, is not without difficulties, but it probably refers to what in the
older anglosaxon literature on Weber is termed «control-test» and what
the French interpreters call, much more clearly, «validation causale indi-
recte»110 or «l’expérimentation causale par comparaison historique» (Ray-
mond Aron111).
This leads to a final point. When H. Tyrell112 sums up the premises and
intentions of the PE-essay and then declares that Weber never plausibly or
systematically explicated the power and efficacy of religion which he
rather took, in the wake of Nietzsche, to be self-evident, he simply ignores
all the Gegenproben of the EEWR which Weber had undertaken in his lat-
er years. By revealing relationships of adequate causation, Weber indeed
also established the efficacy of religion, at least the «adequate» efficacy.
109 Max Weber Kritiken und Antikritiken. Die protestantische Ethik II (edited by J.
Winckelmann) Gütersloh: Mohn 1978 p. 54. The term Gegenprobe is found in a
footnote and refers to Weber’s statement that he had promised further studies as
supplements, interpretations and further testing of his PE thesis (AC : 45). Recent
translations as «converse causal relationship» (AC : 49) or simply as «counterar-
gument» ( The Protestant Ethic and the «Spirit» of Capitalism and Other Writ-
ings, P. Baehr & G. Wells ed. and transl.) London : Penguin 2002, p. 240 ) do not
seem quite adequate.
110 Philippe Besnard Protestantisme et Capitalisme Paris: Armand Colin 1970, p. 19
111 Raymond Aron 1967, p. 543
112 H. Tyrell, 1990, «Worum geht es in der ‹Protestantischen Ethik›?» Saeculum, vol
41, no. 2, 130 sqq.
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THE WORLD RELIGIONS AND THE LAW
SECTION 1: MAX WEBER’S SOCIOLOGY OF LAW
Basic Literature:
Weber, Max (2012) «R. Stammler’s ‹overcoming› the materialist conception of histo-
ry» in: Collected Methodological Writings London: Routledge pp 185-226
Weber, Max (1968) Economy and Society Chapter VIII (pp 635-900) New York: Bed-
minster
As Max Weber had not been given the time to complete his tour of the
world religions and then to address the characterization of Western Chris-
tianity and culture in a final and concluding essay, our understanding of
this characterization is limited to the dispersed remarks in Economy and
Society and, of course, to The Protestant Ethic. It can be asked, though,
what he might have written, and there are good reasons to suggest that he
would probably have given particular attention to the singular develop-
ment of Western law in comparison with the laws of other religious and
cultural traditions. This development was the result of the separation of
law and religion since the so-called Papal revolution.
Max Weber’s sociology of law belongs to the least accessible and the
least known parts of his oeuvre, particularly in the English speaking
world. But, although he is today considered as one of the fathers of classi-
cal sociology, as a student he studied law and he wrote his two doctoral
theses on questions of commercial law in the Middle Ages (1889)113 and
on the relationship between the law and the agrarian situation towards the
end of the Roman Empire (1892)114. Besides these texts, there are also the
two texts in Weber’s Economy and Society: The chapter on the «Sociology
of Law» in volume 2, and the text in volume 1 under the title «The Econo-
CHAPTER V
113 The History of Commercial Partnerships in the Middle Ages (transl. by L. Kael-
ber) 2003
114 The revised and enlarged version of 1909 was translated as The Agrarian Sociol-
ogy of Ancient Civilization London, New Left Books 1976. It is the first major
comparative work of Weber, treating Mesopotamia. Egypt, Israel, Greece, Hel-
lenism and Rome.
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my and the Social Norms». Both these texts were originally translated into
English and published together by Max Rheinstein under the title Max We-
ber on Law in Economy and Society (Harvard U. Press 1954) and then lat-
er as parts of Economy and Society. It should be noted, however, that the
text which both in the German version and in the English translation was
previously called «Sociology of Law» has now (in MWG I /22-3) acquired
the title «The developmental conditions of the law» (Die Entwicklungsbe-
dingungen des Rechts), pointing to the possibility that it may perhaps not
be interpreted as a sociological text at all, but rather as a universal history
of law. Moreover, there are many comments and remarks on the law in
other cultures or civilizations in Weber’s essays on the various world reli-
gions and in his General Economic History (which, however, is merely a
reproduction of course notes of Weber’s students). Finally, there is the
long article on «Stammler’s «Overcoming» of the Materialist Conception
of History» which will be considered shortly. Weber’s study on Stammler
will serve as the point of departure, for it is here that Weber tried to clarify
his distinction between the law as a system of norms (the object of ju-
risprudence) and the law as an empirical order (the point of view of the
sociology of law) - a distinction which is perhaps easier to make in the
context of the European civil law tradition than with regard to the com-
mon law of England or North America.
Jurisprudence and the Sociology of Law
Legal rules may be studied from several different points of view. They
may for instance be considered as norms or as facts. Max Weber uses the
following example115: If I say that my digestion is regular, I may be stat-
ing the simple fact of nature that my digestion follows a certain temporal
pattern. In this case, the norm is an abstraction of the regular natural pro-
cess. But I can also come to feel the need to «regulate» my digestion by
eliminating some disturbances, and then the norm becomes an ideal which
one desires nature to conform to. The observed reality and the desired ide-
al may sometimes coincide, but conceptually they are different.
115 “R. Stammler’s «overcoming» of the materialist conception of history” in: Max
Weber: Collected Methodological Writings. (ed. H. H. Bruun & S. Whimster,
London: Routedge 2012) p. 207
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Before entering the sphere of law Weber tried to clarify the distinction
between jurisprudence and the empirical or sociological analysis of law by
an analysis of «the rules of the game». While he took as an example a
game relatively little know outside Germany, the skat (ibid., p. 212 sqq.),
it may be useful here to analyse a better know game, the football, in We-
berian terms.
The rules of football are valid in the same way for the players as the
rules of law are valid for the citizens of a state. The players accept these
rules which determine how one should play correctly and who should be
considered as a winner. If one wants, one can propose changes to these
rules by addressing oneself to the International Football Association, per-
haps in order to discuss the disastrous effect of the offside rule on teams
which prefer an aggressive game, or in order to question the rule that the
referee always has the last word. These are questions related to the politics
of football. But as long as the rules are considered valid and in force, there
are only questions of jurisprudence and questions of the interpretation of
the rules, e.g., whether a given rule should be applied in the situation x or
y or how the referee should decide if he wants to decide correctly. These
are dogmatic questions.
The situation is completely different if one wants to explain a concrete
football game. The rules of football are certainly a precondition of every
game, although not the rules as interpreted by the jurists of football, but
rather as conceptions or ideas which the players have of their content and
of their importance. Weber calls these the maxims of the players. More-
over, the ideas which the players have of the rules are only one factor
among others which influence their action. Other factors could be: their
physical and psychological condition, their motivation, their level of intel-
ligence and their fair play.
Finally, the rules of football are a precondition of what one might call
the empirical knowledge of football, providing to those who are not famil-
iar with the game the capacity to distinguish it from a game of rugby or
field hockey. For those who are unfamiliar with football see only a bunch
of adult men running here and there, pushing and shoving, and efforts to
kick a ball in all directions. But if the observer has the impression that
there is a certain probability or a chance that the actions of most players
are influenced – at least to a certain degree and most of the time - by the
rules of football, he will think that he actually sees a football game.
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Thus, one can distinguish three levels of analysis:
1. The ideal norm, analysed by the jurists of football;
2. The maxims of the players which contribute, together with other fac-
tors, to the empirical event;
3. The rules as a means of knowledge which serve to analyse the empiri-
cal facts; this analysis may be intended for classification, causal analy-
sis or other purposes.
If the rules are considered as facts – the level of sociological analysis –,
then Weber maintains that one cannot pass from these facts to values or
norms; if, however, the rules are considered as norms, jurisprudence can-
not demonstrate the necessity of the existence of these norms, it can only
ascertain their validity according to the patterns of juridical thought pro-
cesses. Passing from the analysis of the rules of football to an analysis of
society, it may be said that any sociological analysis, for instance a study
about the relationship between economy and law, cannot be concerned
with the ideal normative order but only with its empirical validity or the
extent of the probability that certain maxims contribute to certain legally
acceptable actions.
Incidentally, the distinction between the sociological analysis and the
doctrinal analysis reappears in Weber’s essay on the Protestant Ethic. A
superficial reading of it might lead to the belief that he attributed this ethic
to the dogma of predestination as formulated by Calvin. But this is not the
case, for the logical consequence of the dogma that God has predestined
us to hell or paradise would be fatalism, as Weber admitted himself (PE:
192). The social result, however, was just the opposite because of the in-
troduction of the idea of proof by Protestant ministers. The maxims of the
Protestants and their comportment were formed under the influence of the
psychological sanctions which the religious context as a whole (sermons,
social pressure, and mainly the possibility of proving to oneself one’s sta-
tus of grace) placed on them.
The Rationalisation of the Societal Spheres
As already mentioned, Rheinstein’s translation of Weber’s sociology of
law introduced it into the English-speaking world. In his introduction,
Rheinstein informed his readers that Weber’s main problem is the rela-
tionship between modern legal thought and modern capitalism, although
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he admitted that Weber never said so expressly.116 In the subsequent Eng-
lish literature on the subject, this opinion has been repeated like a
mantra.117
The present analysis will disregard the idea that the relationship be-
tween law and economics constitutes Weber’s main interest. It rather starts
from the equally well-established position that Weber’s research after the
early publication of the Protestant Ethic centered on his idea that Western
culture as a whole may be characterized by a process of rationalisation and
that Weber wanted to retrace this particular process also in the field of
law. It will be seen that this process of rationalisation had no necessary
connection with other social spheres, for instance the economy, but that it
followed, at least at the level of the ideal legal norms, its inner logic.
Hubert Treiber118 has suggested that Max Weber has described the pro-
cess of the rationalisation of religion and of law in the Occident in very
similar ways, although the rationalisation of religion has been described in
more detailed fashion. Following Treiber’s suggestion, the rationalisation
of religion will here be used as a background for the analysis of the ratio-
nalisation of law.
The rationalisation of religion is defined by Weber by two related phe-
nomena: systematisation and disenchantment. He wrote:
«For the level of rationalisation a religion represents we use two primary
yardsticks which are in many ways interrelated. One is the degree to which
the religion has divested itself of magic, the other is the degree to which it has
systematically unified the relations between God and the world and therewith
its own ethical relationship to the world.» (RC: 226)
In conformity with this definition Weber explored several ideal-typical
levels of religious rationalisation. The world of magic was for him an «en-
chanted garden» with spirits and beliefs in animism. Demons could be
pacified and even dominated by magical acts. But there was no separation
between this world and the «other world». The cosmos was monistic. Up-
on the arrival of cults of salvation the division between human beings and
116 Max Rheinstein 1954, p. L
117 Kronman 1983; vide also Trubek (1972: 746) who advanced the opinion that ac-
cording to Weber a greater rationalisation of law produces a greater calculability
of economic action - but who then believed to discover that this hypothesis en-
counters a problem in the case of England.
118 Hubert Treiber «Elective Affinities Between Max Weber’s Sociology of Religion
and Sociology of Law» (1985) 14 Theory and Society, p. 809 sqq.
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that which was considered divine became more intense and the concept of
god became more systematized. The gods became specialised and humans
turned to them by means of sacrifices and prayers. The profession of priest
came into existence, and these priests offered advice and became the spe-
cialists of the ceremonies of sacrifices and of prayers. They also received a
specialised training. Ritual magic of the previous level was replaced by
ethical commandments, pronounced by prophets. This led to a more me-
thodical conduct of life. In opposing all casuistry, ethical prophecy led to
practical rationality, for it systematised the norms and the style of life. The
world was seen more and more as material which should be fashioned ac-
cording to coherent interior norms. (RC: 235)
Finally, there were salvation religions with a now dualistic view of the
world, assuming an abyss between this world and the world beyond. These
religions completely systematised the concept of divinity and they com-
pletely eliminated all magic. In the Occident, this systematisation has been
achieved by transcendental monotheism, while in the Orient one rather en-
counters cosmocentric concepts with an impersonal divinity.
The mention of different concepts of God or of the Divine leads to an-
other way to conceive the rationalisation of religion. It is not about the
level of rationalisation any more (from magic to salvation religions), but
about different directions or orientations of rationalisation. One may en-
counter - in India or in Buddhism - a rationalisation of religious thought
which produces an attitude of world rejection, or it might lead, as in Con-
fucianism or Protestantism, to an attitude of world acceptance or even
world domination. Moreover, to the different conceptions of the divine
correspond different kinds of prophecies: exemplary prophecy which
shows the path to salvation by personal example (Buddha or Gandhi), and
emissary prophecy which requires obedience to ethical commandments
(ancient Jewish prophets). In the Orient, the rationalisation of religious
concepts leads humans to consider themselves as vessels filled by the di-
vine presence, while in the Occident humans may see themselves as in-
struments used by a transcendent God to change the world. In the second
case, the fundamental attitude is not contemplation but rather an ascetic
life style, working within the orders of the world. A methodical conduct of
life can thus result from different orientations of religious rationalisation.
Be it world rejection as in Buddhism, world acceptance as in Confucian-
ism, or world domination as in Calvinism, such an ethos is always the re-
sult of a set of ideas constructed as a rational and coherent whole.
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The different orientations of religious rationalisation are closely related
to the problem of theodicy. In the Occident, this problem is: If there is a
transcendent God who has absolute power, how can his existence be rec-
onciled with the imperfection and the suffering in the world? Elsewhere,
where there is no transcendent all-powerful God, the problem is different,
but in any case Weber believed that, to the extent that the disenchantment
of the world increases, it becomes more difficult to find a rational and co-
herent solution to the problem of theodicy and that humans are confronted
by irruptions of the irrational (FMW: 281). Weber saw three rational solu-
tions to the problem of theodicy: the karman doctrine of India, Zoroastrian
dualism and the Protestant predestination - whereas all other solutions
were considered by him as compromises.
Weber attached also great importance to the study of the carriers of reli-
gion: priests and prophets. While magicians, shamans or sorcerers re-
ceived a mostly empirical and applied formation so that their thinking was
stereotyped, priests underwent a more rational formation and could devel-
op a more coherent system of ideas. In order for this to happen, the clergy
needed to be organised in a way which was independent of political influ-
ence. This was not the case in Antiquity or in China, but Indian brahmins,
belonging to a separate category of castes, were relatively independent. In-
dependence of the Church and of the clergy also developed in the Occi-
dent since the Investiture Struggle.
Rational thought, developed by the clergy of an independent church,
generally does not find its support among peasants who everywhere have
to adapt to the force of nature and prefer to find support in magic, but
rather among craftsmen in the cities who depend on rational planification
of their work and also among the bourgeoisie and rational bureaucracies.
Calvinism corresponded well to the expectations of citizens involved in
trade and commerce. It provided a rational solution to the problem of
theodicy by making God inaccessible to human understanding. The doc-
trine of predestination eliminated the usefulness of good works for salva-
tion and made salvation by magic, sacrifices or sacraments impossible. No
human aid to achieve salvation was possible, and a cold individualism de-
scended on a society which rejected the traditional religious ideal of broth-
erliness. The only option which remained for the individual who wanted to
make certain that he was among the elected, was a methodical and ascetic
- and in this sense rational - conduct of life within society. This methodi-
cal ethic which wanted to transform the world for the glory of God had,
according ot Weber, an elective affinity with the spirit of capitalism. An
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elective affinity, however, is different from a causal relationship. Weber
did not say that the kind of rationalisation which was produced by Calvin-
ism was the direct cause of capitalism.
«Not ideas, but material and ideal interests, directly govern men’s conduct.
Yet very frequently the «world images» that have been created by ideas have,
like switchmen, determined the tracks along which action has been pushed by
the dynamics of interests» (FMW: 280)
Religion is an independent sphere having its own dynamics and following
its own process of rationalization. The more it is rationalized, the more it
enters into a conflict with other spheres of social life. The tension between
the religious sphere and the economic sphere may serve as an example.
The most primitive forms of magic manipulation of spirits or gods were
aimed at health problems or related to the wish of descendents or wealth.
A tension between economics and religion did not exist. This was the case
in the old (Vedic) Indian, Chinese and Jewish religions. But, to the extent
that religions proceeded on the path of rationalisation, their relationship
with economic considerations became more strained. According to Weber,
rational economic activity is impersonal and oriented towards profit on a
market.. Without estimating a price in monetary terms, a calculation of
profit is not possible. If the capitalistic activity follows its own inner laws,
the relationship with religion which is oriented towards brotherliness and
against the holding on to money and the taking of interest, becomes diffi-
cult.
Thus, there are two autonomous spheres, regulated by their own inter-
nal rationalisation, and a deep conflict develops between them. There are
only two rational solutions to this tension: the Calvinist ethic which re-
nounces brotherliness, and mysticism which escapes from the world. Ten-
sions also develop between the religious and the political sphere. On the
level of the magical world view this problem did not exist, but with the
arrival of salvation religions and a god of love, an abyss opened up be-
tween these religions and the bureaucratic state which fulfills its functions
objectively sine ira et studio (without hate or enthusiasm), which follows
its own inner laws and can only appear as a caricature of ethics.
Excursus on Eigengesetzlichkeit
In the analysis of the tensions between the religious and the economic and
political spheres, the terms «own laws» and «inner laws» have been used
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when reference was made to the evolution of these social spheres. The
terms are approximate translations of a German term which may have
been formulated by Weber himself119 and which has been translated into
English (and other languages) in the most diverse and incoherent ways. A
well-known collection of some of Weber’s essays, for instance, uses the
following translations: «internal and lawful autonomy (FMW: 328), «in-
herent logic» (FMW: 341), «own immanent laws» (FMW: 331) and «pe-
culiarity of its technique» (FMW: 147). The reader does not easily realise
that he is referred to a term of terminological precision and significance.
As Conrad has shown, Eigengesetzlichkeit does not mean autonomy in
the sense of the freedom or right to establish or change one’s own laws. It
rather refers to the necessity and/or obligation to follow the logically de-
ductible internal laws of a social sphere, be it religious, political or econo-
mic, or the subjection of a social sphere to its inner logic. Machiavelli has
demonstrated it with regard to the political sphere, rational capitalism does
it in the economic sphere. Everywhere, according to Weber, rational
thought in the sense of a need of inner logical coherence has power over
man. The various systems of thought confiscate the empirical experience
and mould it in their own way. Rational coherence is an independent mo-
tive of human thought and activity, and Weber sometimes referred to it in
order to overcome monocausal sociological explanations. The notion of
Eigengesetzlichkeit which Weber had developed in the context of his soci-
ology of religion then seeped into his sociology of law.
The Rationalisation of the Law
The term Eigengesetzlichkeit can indeed be found in the German version
of Weber’s sociology of law, but the English reader cannot easily recog-
nize it for it is translated by «a high degree of independence» (ES: 650)
and by «intrinsic necessity» (ES: 885)120. One needs to read the German
119 Dieter Conrad «Max Weber’s Conception of Hindu Dharma as a Paradigm» in:
D. Kantowsky (ed.) Recent Research on Max Weber’s Studies of Hinduism. Lon-
don: Weltforum 1986. Conrad suggested that Eigengesetzlichkeit may be a trans-
lation of the Indian term svadharma (the dharma of particular castes or a disci-
pline imposed on one’s group). Weber only used it after the completion of his re-
search on India.
120 The corresponding German passages can be found in WG: 392 & 506.
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text in order to realize that Weber’s concept has been obscured by the
translation, a concept which Weber also hinted at when he wrote of «the
intellectual needs of the legal theorists» (ES: 855) and of «the force of the
purely logical legal doctrines» (ES: 789). In order to arrive at the stage
where Eigengesetzlichkeit can develop, it was necessary that the law sepa-
rated from religion and passed through several levels of progressive ratio-
nalisation. Just as in the case of religion, the rationalization of law can be
characterized by disenchantment, generalization and systematization or, as
Weber wrote, a body of law can be «rational» in several different senses:
generalization (which often leads to casuistry), synthetic construction of
«legal relations» and, in later stages, systematization (ES: 655).
Early law was irrational. There were trials by ordeal, magical concepts,
oracles, and there was patriarchal authority within sibs and clans. A crimi-
nal act was a violation of a magical norm, i.e., a tabu, and the original pro-
cedure of mediation was determined by magical beliefs. Witnesses did not
affirm that a «fact» was true, but confirmed the rightness of the party
whom they assisted by exposing themselves to the divine wrath (ES: 811).
Trials took place as forms of arbitration or conciliation between different
groups or clans whereas within the clan the patriarch pronounced his deci-
sion according to customary law. The first rationalisation of customary
law was the result of the delimitation of the powers of the patriarch by re-
ligious norms or by a political power above the clans. Where the clans re-
mained strong, as in China, a rational law could not develop. At this level,
there were no general norms but rather evaluations of each particular case,
often related to the status of the person being judged as this determined the
decision. In these cases Weber spoke of an irrational law from a substan-
tive point of view and of qadi-justice. Surviving characteristics of this
kind of law can be found even today, according to Weber, in «peoples’ tri-
bunals» as well as in the existence of lynching and of juries.
A certain formalisation has then been introduced by charismatic per-
sons, for instance the Druids among the Gauls or the rachimburgi, charis-
matic «declarers» of the law, in German areas. Also, Roman law consul-
tants offered advice (responsa) to judges, formulated as oracles. These law
consultants were probably among the first legal professionals. The judges
then formulated their sentence on the basis of a revelation or an oracle.
This law was formal in the particular sense of an exterior formalism. In
order to acquire something, for instance, one needed to touch it with one’s
hand (mancipatio). Weber wrote of an irrational law from a formal point
of view when one applies in law making and law finding means which
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cannot be controlled by the intellect (ES: 656). Today, the oath is a rem-
nant of this kind of law.
But the historical movement advanced from traditional law and charis-
matic law formulations to the creation of rational law. While in earlier
times the law was revolutionized from time to time by prophets — the
Decalogue or Koranic law come to mind —, law became more formalized
since the arrival of salvation religion and particularly of Christianity, and
the revolutionary powers then lay in the tension between the different ori-
entations which this formalized law adopted. What contributed to the for-
malization of (Occidental) law was, on the one hand, the refusal of the
Church to have any relations with the State, and, on the other hand, its
great religious and intellectual influence which tended to eliminate magic
and the power of the clans and had created a systematized belief system.
Roman law had distinguished between fas (religious law) and ius (legal
obligations), a distinction which facilitated the creation of a secular ratio-
nal law by the law specialists in Byzantium and Italy. Only later did the
Church, in a compromise with the secular powers, accept and adopt the
natural law of the Stoics, «the sum total of all those norms which are valid
independently of, and superior to, any positive law... and provide legitima-
tion for the binding force of positive law» (ES: 867).
In order to eliminate the revolutionary tendencies which are immanent
in all natural law, the Church adopted the Roman interpretation of natural
law which distinguished between absolute and relative natural law, thus
considering political subordination and even slavery as facts of life which
one can soften but not eliminate. The adoption of natural law led also to to
the reception of Roman law which in turn served as a basis of canon law.
Canon law did not combine, as the sacred law of other cultures, secular
elements with sacred law. In any case, the separation of secular law and
the law of the Church, affirmed since Pope Gregory VII, strengthened the
development of canon law and the development of the rational bureaucra-
cy of the Church which, in order to impose discipline, needed rational le-
gal procedures; it eliminated the ordeals and, during the Inquisition, even
developed a certain concept of proof. By analysing this development We-
ber showed that the formal side of modern law in Europe had its origin in
Roman law while its concepts are largely inventions of the Middle Ages
or of even more recent origin (mortgages; company shares etc.).
In contrast to this formal rationalisation of canon law and of secular
law, the rulers of the imperium, as Weber called the State of this period,
often preferred a more substantive rationalisation which took account of
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the political and social necessities as well as of the material conditions and
of any ethical concepts which purely formal rationality tends to ignore.
But these exterior influences of the law were also systematized to the ex-
tent to which the centralized imperium developed a bureaucracy. Among
the exterior ethical influences was the modern form of natural law (as op-
posed to the classical natural law which was the foundation of canon law):
the idea that there are inviolable innate rights or natural human rights. This
idea is the foundation of modern individualism and of the modern concept
of the contract, the social contract as well as the contract between two in-
dividuals. The last (provisional) stage, however, was the formally rational
law of the German Pandectists of the nineteenth century. On the whole,
according to Weber,
«the formal qualities of the law emerge as follows: arising in primitive legal
procedure from a combination of magically conditioned formalism and irra-
tionality conditioned by revelation, they proceded to increasingly specialized
juridical and logical rationality and systematization, passing through a stage
of theocratically and patrimonially conditioned substantive and informal ex-
pediency. Finally they assume, at least from an external viewpoint, an in-
creasingly logical sublimation and deductive rigor and develop an increasing-
ly rational technique in procedure». (ES: 882).
This very short summary of Weber’s very rich historical analyses may
serve as the basis of a typology of law. Most commentators believe that
Weber constructed a rather simple typology, based on two oppositions: 1.
Is the creation or the discovery of law rational or irrational? And 2. Is it
rational or irrational from a substantive or a formal point of view? By
combining the different possibilities, one arrives at four types of law:
a) Irrational law from a substantive point of view. In this case decisions
are made on the basis of immediate feelings about a concrete case
without recourse to general norms; no distinction is made between le-
gal and extralegal criteria. This is a kind of traditional law, sometimes
characterized by Weber as qadi-justice. (with reference to Muslim
judges).
b) Irrational law from a formal point of view. Here the judge formalises
his sentence, but he does it on the basis of means which are not con-
trollable by reason: oracles, ordeals, responsa. Weber also refers to re-
vealed law.
c) Rational law from a substantive point of view. This refers to the cre-
ation of legal rules which do not result from simple logical generalisa-
tion but which are based on extra-juridical norms such as a sacred
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book, an ideology ( such as the Soviet legal system) or utilitarian con-
siderations.
d) Rational law from a formal point of view. The judge arrives at his deci-
sion by means of the internal juridical logic and on the basis of abstract
rules within the systematized legal code.
Without doubt, these are ideal types which one encounters only rarely in
their pure form, for reality is generally more complex. But these types
have a heuristic value which permits to discern in which direction (e.g.:
more formal or more substantive?) a given legal system orients itself. It is
nevertheless surprising to what extent Weber’s interpreters have disagreed
in the application of these ideal types. English common law may serve as
an example. Rossi121 affirmed that English common law is rational from a
substantive point of view; Freund122, on the other hand, considered it for-
mally rational; Rheinstein123 wrote that English common law approaches a
law type which is irrational from a substantive point of view; and Kron-
man124 arrived at the conclusion that English comon law is mixed: it is ra-
tional if compared to oracles, but irrational if compared to the systema-
tised law of the Pandectists.
But there are also those who seem to save the situation. Treiber and
Rheinstein have suggested that Weber’s typology does not contain four
but rather five categories for, quite in conformity with Weber’s text (ES:
657), they subdivide formally rational law into two subcategories: either
the legally relevant characteristics are of a tangible nature and are percep-
tible as sense data (external characteristics of facts, e.g, the execution of a
signature), or they derive from a logical analysis of their meaning when
fixed legal concepts have been formulated. Thus, there may be formally
rational law which is casuistic and another kind of formally rational law
which is constructed as a legal system. Both these kinds of formally ratio-
nal law (the «external characteristics» variety and the systematic abstrac-
tion variety) diverge from laws characterized by substantive rationality
121 Pietro Rossi «Die Rationalisierung des Rechts und ihre Beziehung zur
Wirtschaft» in: M. Rehbinder & K.P. Tieck (ed.)
Max Weber als Rechtssoziologe, Berlin: Duncker & Humblot 1987, p. 52
122 Julien Freund «La rationalisation du droit selon Max Weber» Archives de
philosophie du droit vol. 23 (1978), p. 69
123 M. Rheinstein Max Weber on Law in Economy and Society Harvard University
Press 1954, p. L
124 A. Kronman Max Weber London: Edward Arnold 1983, p. 89
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(ES: 657). Indeed, Weber’s typology of law can be systematized by the
following diagram.























be controlled by reason;
e.g. ordeal
Even if one takes account of this more nuanced typology, it is necessary to
add another precision which is tied to the difficulty of translating the Ger-
man text into English. In the translation provided in Economy and Society
(ES: 656) one finds the sentence «all formal law is, formally at least, rela-
tively rational». But there are two different German words which have
been translated by the English word «formal»: these words are 1) «for-
mal» which may be translated by «characterized by the form or by formal-
ity», and 2) «formell» which might mean «in relation to the form or to for-
mality».125 In fact, the German sentence in question does not only distin-
guish between the formal side and the substantive side of law, but it also
asserts that the creation or the discovery of a legal system can be charac-
terized by the aspect of the system which is emphasized. Thus, a given le-
gal system can be considered as formal if the formal aspects are dominat-
ing the substantive aspects.
In this way Weber arrives at three distinctions: The first distinction op-
poses qadi-justice, based on the unique situation of an individual case, to
judgments based on norms and general principles. This is the distinction
between rational and irrational law. The second distinction opposes a law
which separates legal and extra-legal norms, to a law which blends ethical
and legal norms. This is the distinction between formal and substantive
125 The German text reads: «Formell mindestens relativ rational ist jedes formale
Recht.» W.G. p. 326
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law. Finally, the third distinction opposes a law which attaches importance
to empirical and tangible characteristics of factual situations, to another
kind of law where juridical characteristics are underscored by logical in-
terpretation within a legal system of thought. This is the opposition be-
tween two kinds of rationality within the realm of formal law.
Weber used this typology in order to answer the question as to why the
purely logical construction of law was produced only in certain parts of
the Occident, a logical construction which was the result of the transfer of
Roman law into a new cultural environment. Weber described how Roman
law was cleansed of all national characteristics and «elevated into the
sphere of the logically abstract» (ES: 854), starting from the occasionally
brilliant remarks of the Roman jurists and ending up in the creation of
purely systematic categories such as «legal transaction» or «declaration of
intention» and the proposition that what the jurist cannot conceive has no
legal existence. Weber also showed that the consequences of purely logi-
cal constructions were often irrational with regard to the expectations of
commercial interests and to the needs of ordinary life, and he particularly
insisted on the fact that the internal rationalization of law, its Eigengesetz-
lichkeit, is always in conflict with those ideas which are related to substan-
tive law and with non-juridical elements (ethical, religious or political)
and which try to suggest solutions which appear more equitable or legiti-
mate in a given historical context.
The Carriers of the Rationalization of Law
Among the phenomena which made the rationalization of law possible,
there was writing and literacy. They made it possible to set down prece-
dents and to reduce the irrational interpretation and decisions of legal
questions. They also made it possible to produce codes like the Decalogue
or the Twelve Tables, thus making the law more coherent. Just like the
priests were the carriers of the rationalization of religion, legal experts
were responsible for the rationalization of law.
«From a theoretical point of view, the general development of law and proce-
dure may be viewed as passing through the following stages: first, charismatic
legal revelation through «law prophets»; second, empirical creation and find-
ing of law by legal honoratiores (cautelary jurisprudence and adherence to
precedent); imposition of law by secular or theocratic powers; fourth and fi-
nally, systematic elaboration of law by persons who have received their legal
training in a learned and formally logic manner.» (ES: 882)
CHAPTER V THE WORLD RELIGIONS AND THE LAW
166
If one leaves aside the irrational charisma of legal prophets and the legal
teaching in clerical schools which leads to a substantive rationalisation of
law, it is possible to state that two kinds of juridical formation have
shaped Western law. In England the teaching of law was traditionally of-
fered by practicians, a technical training in the empirical sense of the term,
while in Germany and France theoretical teaching was offered in the uni-
versities. English lawyers belonged to four inns of court and had to submit
to strict corporate etiquette. Admission to the bar was a corporate
monopoly. This was a craft-like specialization, based on a practically use-
ful scheme of contracts and actions; no general concepts were formed by
abstraction or by legal interpretation. In the purely empirical conduct of
legal practice one moved from the particular to the particular and perhaps
to analogies (ES: 787).
In continental Europe, because of the existence of a large number of
princely courts and the decentralization of the administration of justice, a
powerful guild or corporation of lawyers was not created. Lawyers re-
ceived their education in universities. This was a learning of abstract
norms of systematic character, stimulated by Roman law and removed
from the daily needs of possible clients. The professors were theorists of
law rather than practicians.
By opposing the English common law and the continental law Weber
tried to show how the formal qualities of legal traditions can be influenced
by the carriers of the law (Trägerschichten), i.e., by intrajuridical factors.
On the European Continent the development of the law led to a logical
systematization resulting from the intrinsic intellectual needs of the legal
theorists formed in universities (ES: 855). In these intellectual needs of the
doctors of law can be found the roots of the Eigengesetzlichkeit of conti-
nental European law.
Weber rejected the Marxist idea that the law is a reflection or the super-
structure of the economy. No human activity and no sphere of social life,
according to him, can be reduced to another. In other words, legal
concepts are developed independently and may then sometimes be used in
an economic context. Particularly in the Occident the law mostly resulted
from interior conditions: the needs of the carriers of law as theorists and
the political interests of the state which utilizes them. The theorists of law
(priests, professors, legal advisors) and the political interests of the princes
determined the orientation of the law (formal or substantive). It is also im-
possible to say, according to Weber, that the rationalisation of the law will
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necessarily lead to economic rationalisation126 and it is therefore not pos-
sible to agree with Rheinstein that in Weber’s writings the categories of
legal thought have «evidently» been conceived as parallels of the cat-
egories of economic behaviour.127 Rather, Weber tried to show that the
forms of thinking have a greater significance and independence than what
is ordinarily believed. One can only say that the economic structures offer
sometimes a chance for the legal concepts to spread once they have been
invented.
The «England Problem»
1. In general, the English literature on Weber’s sociology of law has react-
ed rather negatively to Weber’s classification and interpretation of the
common law. Assuming that Weber wanted to study the relationship be-
tween law and economics (or between modern legal systems and capital-
ism), or the contribution of juridical ideas to the rise of capitalism, and in
the conviction that one of capitalism’s major geographic origins must cer-
tainly be found in England, anglo-saxon authors arrived at the conclusion
that Weber considered the English common law as inferior to continental
law or continental law as superior to English law and that this is a major
difficulty for his theory.128 Berman bluntly stated that Weber’s treatment
of the English common law is ultimately flawed.129 They have overlooked
Weber’s comment that, wherever the two kinds of administration of jus-
tice and of legal training had the opportunity to compete with one another,
126 In this context Weber mentioned the amateurish notion of the littérateurs that Ro-
man law promoted the development of capitalism, for the character of legal insti-
tutions of modern capitalism were completely unknown under Roman law and
are of medieval origin (shares, bonds, bills of exchange etc.), and, moreover, Ro-
man law never took roots in England (PW: 149, footnote).
127 Rheinstein 1954: LVIII
128 For instance Martin Albrow «Legal Positivism and Bourgeois Materialism: Max
Weber’s View of the Sociology of Law», (1975) 8 British Journal of Law and
Society 14 -31, p. 22 and Bryan Turner For Max Weber; Essays on the Sociology
of Fate. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul 1981, p. 332
129 In: Stephen Turner The Cambridge Companion to Weber (2000: 230). It is per-
haps noteworthy that continental writers do not seem to have addressed the so-
called «England problem» at all.
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for instance in Canada, the common law has come out on top (ES: 892).
Moreover, several general comments can be made in this context:
1. As has been shown in the preceding pages, Weber distinguished be-
tween two kinds of formally rational law, the English and the continental
law, and also clearly stated that modern capitalism prospers equally and
manifests essentially identical economic traits under legal systems which
differ considerably from each other. (ES: 890)
2. Terms like rationalisation and formally rational law are ideal types
and not ideals. That they are not ideals becomes clear if one remembers
Weber’s ambivalent attitude with regard to the rationalization of economic
life, the «iron cage» which makes the soul wither away. As ideal types, on
the other hand, they are heuristic concepts which accentuate unilaterally
certain aspects of reality in order to make it appear coherent. In reality,
however, both continental and common law contain aspects which may
not be very formal and rational.
3. The critics who point to the «England Problem» neglect the distinc-
tion which Weber made between a legal order and empirical regularity,
the law as a system of thought and the sociology of law. Rationalisation
on the level of the law as a legal system does not necessarily imply a ratio-
nalisation on the level of empirical events or behaviour and, conversely, a
rationalisation on the empirical level or of the maxims of the «players»
does not necessarily lead to a more rational legal system. It is possible that
this distinction between the sociological and the juridical point of view
can more easily be made with regard to the continental law based on codes
than with regard to the common law with its greater capacity to adapt to
changing values and its closer relationship with substantive law.130 What
Weber called the Eigengesetzlichkeit in the continental law systems would
be much more difficult to find in the countries of the common law. This
would also explain the explicit criticism of Albrow131 who believes that
130 Quite justifiably Michel Coutu (1995, p. 163) has complained that certain com-
mentators, writing about the «England problem», did not sufficiently distinguish
between the empirical and the dogmatic validity of legal propositions. He even
suggests that the rationality on the level of legal dogma has no direct connection
to empirical legal and rational economic behaviour (ibid. p. 152). The lack of a
clear distinction between legal dogma and empirical behaviour might explain H.
Berman’s and Charles Reid’s surprising critique that Weber saw law, as he saw
fortifications or a market, as a «fact» and that he failed to examine the values that
are represented in law (Berman & Reid 2000, p. 237).
131 Martin Albrow 1975, p. 27
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the distinction between the sociological and the juridical points of view is
not well founded, and the implicit criticism of all those anglo-saxon au-
thors (like Kronman) who simply ignore or neglect this contrast. The dis-
tinction between the two levels of the study of law makes also possible a
comparison with a similar distinction in Weber’s sociology of religion: the
coherent and logical dogmatic teaching of the Calvinists was based on the
ideas of a transcendent God and of predestination. But this dogma which
logically would have led to fatalism does not explain the empirical econo-
mic behaviour of the Calvinists which was rather oriented by the idea of
proof in the sermons and counselling of the Protestant ministers.
It is well known that according to Weber the capitalistic enterprise
needs a calculable law on which it can rely «as if it were a machine». It
needs a legal system which can guarantee contracts and investments, and
this was particularly true in the early times of modern capitalism when the
enterprise had to struggle against the hostility of previous kinds of law.
What is less clear, however, is the meaning of the term «calculable law» in
the discussions on the relationship between law and economy, for the no-
tion of the predictability in law can have - as Coutu (1995) has alteady
suggested - two meanings: 1. On the systematic level it can refer to the
possibility to deduct a juristic consequence of a given norm by logical ma-
nipulations; and 2. on the empirical level it may suggest an adequate rela-
tionship between a maxim of behaviour and real behaviour or a real judge-
ment. The first level is the dogmatic level, the second is the sociological
level to which one refers when one says that the capitalistic economy
needs a calculable law. According to Weber, this kind of calculability is
just as well achieved by the common law which is formal and empirical
and tied to precedent as by the systematic and logically coherent law of
the Continent (ES: 855).
In England and elsewhere the economy needs clearly defined legal
concepts which only a formal law can provide. The concept of legal per-
sonality and all forms of limited liability which developed out of the com-
menda and the societas maris were useful in this context. But modern so-
ciety is foremost an individualistic and contractual society. Weber dis-
cussed the freedom of contract in some detail. Before the rise of modern
capitalism there existed mainly the status contract which led to a complete
juridical modification of a person’s social position and created a personal
relationship (for instance the relationship between lord and vassal). This
type of contract, according to Weber, was tied to magical and religious
concepts: one felt dependent on a supernatural power which threatened
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those who acted contrary to the oath which concluded such a contract. The
modern contract, on the other hand, called purposive contract by Weber,
which in other times and places existed mainly to regulate relationships
between clans or nations, became important after the decline of self-suffi-
cient kin groups and the rise of the market economy. It contributes to the
dissolution of traditional relationships between individuals and is based on
impersonal relationships. It is of no importance whether modern contrac-
tual relationships are defined and supported by a formally systematic legal
system or by the more empirical common law. Both types of law are part
of an individualistic society which accepts the freedom of contract be-
tween individuals, and both are formal laws which guarantee the stability
and predictability of procedure.
But there is a phenomenon in anglo-saxon countries which diminishes
the formal character of the common law: the concept of reasonableness.
Reason, which in the past was tied to religious concepts of an eternal order
of nature, has turned into the «reasonable» adaptation to the laws of the
country. According to Weber (ES: 870), the concept of «reasonable» con-
tains the meaning of rational in the sense of practically useful, and it im-
plies the idea that nature or reason do not want to lead to absurd conse-
quences. These utilitarian ideas which clearly favorise commerce tend to
show, according to Weber, that the common law is closer to the ideal type
of substantive law than the continental civil law.
Retrospective Considerations
Modern law is separated from religion, but it has close ties with the politi-
cal domain and the state. Substantively rational law has coexisted with the
most diverse political structures: patrimonial kingdoms, the cities of the
Middle Ages, the welfare state and the socialist state; it has also coexisted
with the most diverse economic structures: non-capitalist economies, po-
litical, adventure, and colonial capitalism. Its principles may be diverse,
but they have one characteristic in common: they are extra-juridical. This
type of justice is rational in the sense of adherence to fixed substantive
principles; its ideal type is the Solomonian judgement, or, as Weber wrote,
Sancho Panza (in the novel Don Quixote) when he happened to be gover-
nor (ES: 845). English common law, although formally rational according
to Weber, has a certain proximity to substantively rational law and has co-
existed not only with modern capitalism in England, but also with adven-
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turer capitalism and political capitalism in the colonies. Formally rational
law in the systematized continental sense, on the other hand, must be asso-
ciated with the modern state and with modern rational capitalism. It was
born since the systematizing efforts under the emperor Justinian in the
sixth century, developed after the reception of Roman law in the Middle
Ages and flourished in the code civil in France and the school of the Pan-
dectists in Germany.
There is, however, in Weber’s opinion a tension between the ideal of
justice as it exists in substantively rational law, and the ideal of legal secu-
rity and calculability of formally rational law, and this to the extent that, as
formal rationalization increases, substantive irrationality also grows.132 In-
deed, formal justice inevitably violates the ideals of substantive justice.
There are efficiency, calculability and impersonality on the one hand, fra-
ternity and personal relationships on the other, and Weber did not at all
consider formal rational law in an optimistic way, but rather - to use a for-
mulation of Julien Freund - as an expression of pessimism which orga-
nizes despair.
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What are the developmental conditions of the formally rational law of the
Occident? Only a comparison with the laws of the other world religions
132 This has later been underscored by G. Radbruch (1980, p. 41), who had been a
member of Weber’s discussion circle in Heidelberg. He quoted from Bentham’s
panegyric about legal security: it makes foresight possible, the foundation of all
planning, of all work and of all saving; it brings about that life is not only a se-
quence of events, but that it has continuity. But the tension between the ideal of
justice and legal security (Rechtssicherheit) may lead, according to Radbruch, to
a situation which can be characterized by the sentence summum ius summa ini-
uria (unconditionally and strictly applied law can in extreme cases lead to com-
plete injustice).
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will render them visible. While in Western countries since the Middle
Ages the sacred law is separated from secular law, so that the secular law
and the juridical order can follow their own inner logic and systematiza-
tion, supported by their own carrier strata, one finds in the context of the
other world religions a conglomerate of mostly non-differentiated reli-
gious and legal prescriptions and therefore non-formal types of law, a non-
differentiation of administrative and legal procedures, and large areas of
social life governed by customary law. These legal systems will be shortly
considered here.
It should be clear that when we talk about the laws of the world reli-
gions, we do not consider complexes of ideas that are considered valid and
can be analysed by legal scholars. Although such legal ideas may be im-
portant on another level, on the sociological level we are concerned with
maxims which are adopted by legal actors and followed more or less con-
sistently. As such they constitute a part of the exterior conditions which
influence peoples’ conduct of life and particularly their economic be-
haviour (as opposed to the interior conditions: the mentality or the spirit of
the people). Weber also talked of the exterior form, as opposed to the inte-
rior spirit.133
133 W. Gephard believes that the talk about the law as a form makes no sense for
there are levels of relevance of the influence of empirical legal orders (Gephard,
W. Gesellschaftstheorie und Recht 1993, p. 503). Without a doubt, the empirical
legal order is not a form in contrast to something else as a matter, as Weber him-
self wrote, but it is one of the external/exterior determinants of the behaviour of
the acting human being (CMW : 220), in contrast to the «spirit» which motivates
from the inside. With Kant, Weber thought that law is heteronomous and charac-
terized by exterior force and constraints. It is true that Weber asked about the ex-
tent to which empirical legal orders are of causal importance for cultural phe-
nomena and that he thought that for instance the facts that constitute the Sistine
Madonna as a historical individual are irrelevant from a legal point of view
(CMW : 221), but it remains that he considered empirical legal orders as relevant
in regard to economic behaviour, even if it is true that not all the forms of social
phenomena are as restraining as an iron-cage as it is possible to either adapt to it
or to try to violate it.
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The Laws in Non-Occidental Cultures
China
In China there was no class of jurists nor any specific legal training. Chi-
nese law did not arise from any religious revelation but rather from the
code of conduct of a secular aristocracy. The high officials, the mandarins,
had received a classical education and, to the extent to which they were
involved in jurisdiction, they did not pronounce their decisions according
to formal rules, but they took account of the concrete situtation and of the
quality of the people before them. A specialised officialdom was lacking
because of the magical idea according to which the virtue of the emperor
and of the officials (their classical education and the performance of the
prescibed ceremonies) keeps everything in order.
In a patrimonial state such as China the administration of justice can be
rational in the sense of obeying firm principles, but this is not a rationality
resulting from a formally precise and systematic construction of norms
and thus is not calculable. It rather is of a substantive kind which is based
on political or ethical principles. In fact, patrimonial law is imbued with
substantive norms, and general administration and legal administration
cannot be distinguished (ES: 844). Criteria of reasonableness, expediency
and favor prevail, and Weber here used the concept of qadi-justice (RC:
102).
The power of the sibs in China was unbroken, and personal rather than
formal legal relationships continued to dominate. The villages were large-
ly self-administered according to local custom, based on the concept of
piety (xiao) and with the help of informal dispute settlements within the
sibs or clans. In fact, the clans were the most important source of private
law and their agreement was often necessary in the case of a transfer of
property. There was thus a relative absence of formal legal processes and
the development of a private legal profession was discouraged as disrup-
tive of the cosmic order. Moreover, among the ordinary Chinese there was
a predisposition on grounds of expense, uncertainty and risk not to set off
the rather brutal offical legal machinery.134
1.
134 The relative absence of formal legal processes in traditional China was well de-
scribed by Fei, Hsiao-tung in From the Soil. The Foundations of Chinese Society
(transl. By G. Hamilton & Wang Zheng, U. of California Press 1992). He de-
scribed a society in which considerations of order, and not laws and individual
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The cities, because of the lack of the legal concept of corporation (RC:
91), were unable to show any autonomous legal development135. In offi-
cial law, the cities existed only as organizations for enforcing the family
liabilities for taxes and other charges (ES: 726). Commercial questions
were hardly mentioned in the imperial codes and were mostly regulated by
the associations of craftsmen and merchants.136 In case of arbitration, nei-
ther party might be granted an outright victory because of considerations
of «face».
Formal calculable law did not exist, even with regard to property. We-
ber noted the possibility that a man who sold his house to another might
return after some time and demand to be admitted as a non-paying tenant
because he had since become poor (GEH: 342). Because of this lack of
calculability Weber spoke of the irrationality of Chinese justice, related to
patrimonial factors and the desire to preserve the honour and the «face» of
all parties. On the whole, a rationally calculable functioning of administra-
tion and jurisdiction which is necessary for commercial capitalism did not
exist, although politically determined capitalism quite often did flourish
(RC: 103).
Even the Constitution of 1982 is different from the Occidental «rule of
law» model; it does not assume that the State should control every activity
and in this regard it is similar to the old Confucian division of legal activi-
ty between informal social justice and the official imperial code. Law is
studied as a branch of administration and mediation and compromise are
used by the state itself.137
rights predominate – and where order means that each person must uphold the
moral obligations of his ties with others. Ke ji fu li (subdue the self and follow the
rites) is an old Chinese proverb, and Confucius wrote : what is necessary is to
cause people to have no litigation (Analects, book 12, chapter 13). Fei further
wrote that any litigation was considered shameful because it indicated a lack of
proper education (ibid. 103), and the people who file cases in the courts of the
modern judicial system are the same people recognized in the country side as be-
ing morally corrupt.
135 According to Karl Bünger, also the concept of limited company did not exist in
China until quite recently because it limits the principle that debts must be paid.
Even in modern times Chinese judges had difficulties with this concept.
(Karl Bünger «Das chinesische Rechtssystem und das Prinzip der
Rechtsstaatlichkeit» in W. Schluchter, Max Webers Studie über Konfuzianismus
und Taoismus Frankfurt a.M. 1983.)
136 S. van der Sprenkel, Legal Institutions in Manchu China. London 1977, p. 89
137 Vide Menski 2000 : 530
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India
Weber believed that in classical India all law was, according to Hindu
doctrine, contained in the sacred books called the dharmasutras and dhar-
mashastras, redacted by the priests (brahmins)138, whereas profane (cus-
tomary) law was limited to the particular laws of certain professions and
castes. These profane laws of the guilds and castes were not rationalized
or systematized as they were not influenced by any intellectual or profes-
sional carriers (priests or others); in fact, there was no legal profession.
The means of coercion was the exclusion from the guild or caste.
Proofs were sometimes formal, but irrational (magical ordeals), and often
non-formal (hierocratically influenced). A disappointed creditor had magi-
cal procedures at his disposal: he would seat himself in front of the
debtor’s house and starve himself to death, thus compelling his sib to re-
venge him against the debtor. (ES: 678).
Because of the doctrine of karma (which derived one’s place in the
hierarchical system of castes from actions in previous lives), the juxtaposi-
tion of different ethics, even sharply contrasting with each other, did not
pose a problem; moreover, society was ideally divided into four hereditary
categories: the brahmins (priests), ksatriyas (political representatives),
vaishyas (pursuing commerce and agriculture) and shudras (servants),
each category having its own dharma (religious duty, obligation). The
dharma of the ksatriyas, for instance, was quite Machiavellian: in the epic
Mahabharata, Arjuna must kill his relatives in battle to fulfill his dharma.
But there was no place for the development of any kind of superior nor-
mative order, like the natural law concept in the Occident (RI: 144) which
might have initiated a rationalization of the law139; there were diverse
138 These sacred «law books», concerned with the position of status groups and prac-
tical problems of life (ES: 792), did, however, not contain law in the modern Oc-
cidental sense of the term, but rather rules of guidance which were not binding
and served as residual sources of law when no customary rules could be found.
One might talk of a co-existence of local customary practice and the textual mod-
el. In the Manavadharmashastra (Manu 8. 41) one reads that a king who knows
the sacred law (dharma) must inquire into the customary laws (caritra) of castes,
districts, guilds and families and thus settle the peculiar law of each. Vide Mens-
ki, Werner Hindu Law Beyond Tradition and Modernity, Oxford University Press
2003, Chapter 3. Vide also Lingat (1967 : 197 sqq.).
139 Scholars of India have questioned this ; they contend that, although there may be
a difference in the material content, the dharma is a kind of natural law or an ide-
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ethics and customary laws, but there was no universal or absolute law.
And there was no legally constructed state which might have provided le-
gal guarantees for economic activities, for the all-pervading dharma doc-
trine did not provide an incentive for legal rationalization. There were roy-
al edicts, but the king did not make law but was supposed to enforce the
respective dharma and customary laws of the various groups. If from time
to time a capitalistic development seemed to blossom, this was due to the
power of the guilds and other groups which organized the use of arbiters
and private tribunals. Nevertheless, credit relationships normally existed
only among sib-members, and joint liability of partners was lacking as any
law of corporations was rather undeveloped (RI: 52).
Weber did not mention the complicated development of Indian law af-
ter the arrival of the East India Company, for instance the ruling of the
governor Warren Hastings in 1772 that in all suits regarding inheritance,
caste and religious usages the laws of the Koran with respect to Muslims
and the laws of the dharmashastras with respect to the Hindus should be
adhered to, assuming that Hindu law can be found in books despite the
crucial rôle of custom. Even in the apparently westernized Constitution of
India – which remains remote for most rural Indians – many of the legal
postulates of the old customary system (particularly with regard to person-
al laws) could not be legislated away. This Constitution of 1950 even
specifies (III, 13, 3 a) that law includes custom having in the territory of
India the force of law, and it also contains an article on fundamental duties
(51 A), relating to the promotion of harmony and compassion and remind-
ing the reader of the edicts of the emperor Ashoka. In fact, even Gandhi’s
stance against Western individualism and human rights was based on such
legal postulates.
Buddhist Countries and Japan
Although Weber mentioned the legislative influence of Buddhist ethics in
Southeast Asia (e.g. the protection of slaves), he also stated that a holy
«law» as an object of particular learning could not develop because of
al law (Dumont, 1966, p. 333) or at least a functional equivalent of natural law.
Decisive is its critical distance from customary law, royal edicts and practiced ju-
risprudence (Dieter Conrad Zwischen den Traditionen Stuttgart : Fritz Steiner
1999, p. 360).
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Buddhist ritual formalism and its ethic of conviction. These all too short
comments need to be expanded on the basis of more recent research relat-
ed to Thailand or Siam.
The Code of the Great Seals of 1805 consisted of a body of general
rules, derived from the Siamese dhammasattam, a sacred and immutable
code, first assumed to have been compiled under the legendary king Ma-
hasammata (the great elected), and of royal ordinances which were not sa-
cred and could be repealed. Royal ordinances could become permanent
laws and part of the Code not because they emanated from kings, but only
to the extent to which they were considered as illustrations or derivations
of the eternal sacred law; they drew their authority from their conformity
with the dhammasattam and merely supplemented it. Generally, though,
the orders or proclamations of a ruler were only valid during his reign but
could be reaffimed by his successor. Thus, the king was thought to be an
upholder of cosmic law, he could give orders but not make law. Therefore,
Siamese law was not considered as arbitrarily created by human authority
or as the product of a legislative process. The calculability of the function-
ing of the legal process and legal security, so important for the develop-
ment of modern capitalism, were in no way guaranteed.
Moreover, there were also what might be called autonomous legal do-
mains: wide areas of unwritten customs of inveterate character, relating to
family, commercial relationships and to the Order of the Buddhist monks
(sangha). On the whole, according to Lingat140, there was no place in Siam
for what we call modern law before the kings Mongkut and Chulalong-
korn in the nineteenth century introduced Western – influenced legal
codes.
Weber also treated Japan in his section on Buddhism, and it is true that
Buddhism had, together with Confucianism, a strong influence on
Japanese legal principles and unofficial law already since the Constitution
of 604, formulated under crown prince Shotoku, which mentioned the
Buddha, the Dharma and the Sangha. Nevertheless, more recent authors141
have insisted on the antilegal mentality of the Japanese and that Japanese
law has largely been customary law, and Masaji Chiba has called Japan a
Shinto society, pointing to the buraku spirit and the «community constitu-
tion» of local communities as well as to the prevalence of conciliation and
140 ,Robert Lingat «Evolution of the Conception of Law in Burma and Siam», 38.1
The Journal of the Siam Society (1950), p. 26.
141 D. F. Henderson Conciliation and Japanese Law Seattle 1965
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mediation, for «the notion that a justice measured by universal standards
can exist independent of the will of the disputants is alien to the
Japanese»142. Since the Meiji reforms there exists an interrelation and in-
teraction between received Western laws (Prussian and, since the end of
World War II, American law) and indigenous law.
Islam
Islamic law, Weber wrote, is a law of jurists which is a necessary condi-
tion of formalization and rationalization, although it is not a sufficient
condition. The Koran may not be a code of law, but it contains sacred le-
gal postulates, whereas human law is considered to be of an inferior kind,
acceptable only if it is in accordance with Allah’s will.143 The independent
interpretation of Koran and hadith (collection of the prophet’s sayings)
was not seen as permissible after the «closing of the gates of ijtihad» in
the tenth century, as prophetic legal capacity was now only attributed to
the founders of the four orthodox law schools, and the consensus (ijma) of
jurists became the basis of validity of any law.
Whereas in the Christian tradition and in canonical law the concept of
the Pope’s infallibility ex cathedra and the Church Councils were able to
initiate adaptations and systematizations of the law, this was not possible,
even in unavoidable cases, in the Islamic and particularly in the Shia tradi-
tion, except for the price of unsystematic casuistry and trickery144, as We-
ber said. Systematic law making with formal concepts was impossible, be-
cause the holy law could not be disregarded, nor could it be adapted to
new situations which arose in practice. The assumption of the absolute
correctness of the holy law (sharia) rendered impossible the formal ele-
ment of occidental law which attributes a potential of rationalization and
142 Quoted from M. Chiba, Asian Indigenous Law. London 1986, p. 335
143 Since Shafi (9th century legal scholar) a common methodology of interpretation
has largely been accepted by all legal schools and the sources of law are seen in a
hierarchical order: Koran, hadith (example of the prophet), consensus (of the
community and of legal scholars) and analogical reasoning. This hierarchical
view made the complete separation of sacred and secular law impossible.
144 To evade the sharia ban on interest (riba), the creditor, instead of lending the cap-
ital with interest, would buy something from the debtor for the exact amount of
the capital payable in cash, and then resell it to him for a price amounting to the
capital plus the interest, payable at a future date.
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of legality to the correct procedure. In Islam, the law is aimed at substan-
tive justice or principles which is opposed to Weber’s concept of formal
rational law.
With regard to commercial activities, the concepts of corporation and of
juristic person145 ( the business corporation, but, in fact, the concept of
corporation in the Occident also extends to cities. guilds, universities etc.)
were lacking, concepts which were of major importance for the capitalistic
development of the Occident, but lacking were also the conceptual precon-
ditions which allow the construction of a secular state as an «Anstalt»
which is separated from religious life.146 On the contrary, the arbitrariness
and unpredictability of the patrimonial rulers had the effect of strengthen-
ing the influence of sacred law, for instance by the immobilization of
property in the form of waqfs to religious institutions which provided rev-
enues to the founder and were protected against seizure by secular authori-
ties (ES: 1096)147. Although Weber did not mention it, the Islamic rulers
have always had the right to make administrative regulations and to set up
the so-called mazalim courts which applied the rulers’ regulations and
even custom as long as they remained under the ambit of the sharia.
Official scholars, the mufti, gave authoritative legal opinions to the
judges (qadi), but, like oracles, these opinions were given without any
statement of rational reasons and thus increased the irrationality of the sa-
cred law (ES: 821). The qadis (judges), on the other hand, interpreted the
Koranic and hadith provisions largely as matters of personal discretion.
Weber’s term qadi-justice which he applied also to other legal traditions
has its origin here. 148 In the Shiite tradition (particularly in Persia) the ju-
145 This point is based on J. Schacht An Introduction to Islamic Law. Oxford 1964,
p.155, whose analysis largely follows in Weber’s footsteps. Moreover, while We-
ber mentioned only in passing the prohibition of interest taking in Islam
(ES: 583), - and not only of usury, as the English translation suggests -, Schacht
is more explicit and also describes the various devices used in evading this prohi-
bition (ibidem p. 78).
146 The state in Weberian terms: By means of agreed upon or imposed statutes ratio-
nally ordered institution (Anstalt), if for the enforcement of this order an appara-
tus for legal coercion exists.
147 Madrasas (Islamic colleges) were founded as charitable trusts under the law of
waqf ; the founder could appoint himself as head, and nothing inimical to the
spirit of Islam was allowed to be taught there. In this way, of cause, the sciences
did not gain any institutional autonomy.
148 The Islamic tradition has also inspired Weber to formulate another concept: sul-
tanism (arbitrary exercise of patrimonial power).
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risdiction of individual judges does not even seem to have been clearly
fixed, for the parties could choose from among a number of judges from
competing schools. (ES: 823)
Thus it was the religiously determined organization of the Islamic patri-
monial states and the weakness of all legal guarantees of the patrimonial
justice system which impeded a capitalistic development.
Today, at least in some countries, the closed doors of ijtihad may be
slightly ajar as the so-called neo-ijtihad movement demands more inde-
pendent judgement to adapt to the modern world.
Jewish Law
The positive law of Israel was created through berith with Jahwe and it
was not impossible that it might be changed again, for it was not an eternal
order like the dharma in India. The Torah and the interpretative holy tradi-
tion were considered as a norm in all areas of life. Like in Islam, the norm
applied to coreligionists only, but, unlike the situation in Islam, the carri-
ers of this legal tradition were not a dominating class or group but rather a
pariah people. Commerce with outsiders was partially governed by re-
laxed ethical norms although the Jews tried to adapt themselves to the le-
gal norms obtaining in their social and political environment.
In the pre-Christian centuries there developed the scholarly treatment of
legal questions and the legal technique of consulting jurists (interpreters of
the Torah) in Jerusalem and Babylon under an exilarch whose jurisdiction
was officially recognized by the Parthian and later by the Islamic rulers,
for the Jews enjoyed judicial autonomy and communal leaders imposed
internal discipline and prevented Jews from resorting to non-Jewish
courts. Only after the extinction of the office of the exilarch in the tenth
century Western Judaism freed itself from the Eastern influence and from
what Weber called the speculative and dialectical treatment of the Torah
(ES: 825).
To obey the law was now all that mattered whereas magic was cast
aside. But, besides the elimination of magic Weber pointed to the degree
of systematization as a criterion for rationalization. Logically coherent
systematization (ES: 828), though, was prevented by the technical nature
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of Jewish legal interpretation (AJ: 414) 149 based on common sense and
concrete casuistry while there was no opportunity for genuinly construc-
tive rational thought and the formation of rational concepts as practiced by
the Roman jurists. No distinction was made between legal and ethical or
religious norms.
Weber considered it improbable that some legal instruments or tech-
niques of capitalistic commerce were invented by the Jews or that they
found in Jewish sacred law an appropriate context for their development.
Restrictions on interest taking according to Deuteronomium 23, 21 were,
in case of commercial credits, circumvented by the formation of a contract
between bank and credit-taker (isqa) which interpreted the interest as a
kind of profit-sharing. Contracts entered into for a lawful purpose were
recognized and enforced even if a transgression was committed in drawing
them up (e.g. written on a Sabbath), for the freedom of stipulation was as-
sumed. It was thought that the Torah did not establish civil norms as ius
cogens but rather as dependent on the will of the parties to the transaction,
a ius dispositivum. 150
To obey God’s laws was the duty of Israel and of every Jew. But, as
Guttmann who interpreted Weber’s work on ancient Judaism, pointed
out151, the Jews in their pariah situation did not feel responsible for the ex-
isting economic and political order where they lived (tax farming, slavery,
political capitalism) and adapted to it to the extent that their laws and ritu-
als permitted it. In this they were different from the Puritans who wanted
to subject the world to God’s domination. Therefore, the rational develop-
ment of Jewish law was limited although the observation of the law and
not ritual was the highest legal and religious duty.
149 Vide : Deuteronomium 4, 2 as well as the Talmud : Shabbat 63 a («a verse cannot
depart from its plain meaning» ) and Sanhedrin 86 a (the necessity to consider the
total context).
150 Menachem Elon «Law, Jewish» in: Dictionary of the Middle Ages vol. 7, p. 489
151 Julius Guttmann «Max Webers Soziologie des antiken Judentums» in: W.
Schluchter Max Webers Studie über das antike Judentum. Frankfurt a. M. 1981,
p. 326
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The Law within Russian Orthodoxy
Before the Revolution of 1917 there existed in Russia customary law, the
legal codes imposed by the respective rulers, ecclesistical law and in the
past the law of the city republics. Customary law was followed by the
largest part of the population, the peasantry; it regulated mainly questions
of property and of peace and order in the family and the mir (peasant com-
mune).
The main legal codes, starting with the Russkaia Pravda (eleventh cen-
tury), then the the Sudebnik (1497), the Sobornoe Ulozhenie (1649) and
the Polnoe Sobranie Zakonov in the nineteenth century were imposed
from above by the patrimonial rulers and often contained at least some
foreign (Byzantian, Western) ideas. The application of these codes in daily
life may be characterized by three observations: 1. Judicial procedures of-
ten involved «God’s justice», i.e. the judicial duel (supervised by state of-
ficials) and ordeals (water and iron). While in the West the Lateran Coun-
cil ( 1215) had eliminated the ordeal from court procedure, Russia retained
it well into Muscovite times and thus retained a formally irrational proce-
dure. 2. As has been mentioned by many scholars152, although the law
codes, e.g. the Sudebnik, paid particular attention to bribery, they were un-
able to eradicate it; in fact, justice often was but another name for the gen-
eration of income for the officials involved. 3. The law codes were occa-
sionally supplemented or partially modified by decrees (ukaz) of the rulers
which might be incoherent and modified again by subsequent decrees, par-
ticularly since Peter the Great, as the tsars were not tied by their own de-
crees. All this, of course, did not contribute to the formation of a calcula-
ble rational legal system.
With regard to legal concepts directly affecting economic life, Weber
pointed out that Russian law recognized liturgical collective liability and
the corresponding collective rights of the compulsory organizations (of the
village commune, mir, and of craftsmen, artel, and merchant guilds), but
152 Daniel Kaiser The Growth of Law in Medieval Russia. Princeton University Press
1980, p. 121 and Leroy-Beaulieu L’Empire des Tsars et les Russes Paris: Robert
Laffont 1990, p. 659
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that it did not know of the rational concept of the corporation as it was de-
veloped in the Occident (ES: 726) 153
The government also created merchant guilds with liturgical responsi-
bilities. In all cases of liturgical responsibility the hard-working members
shared duties with the lazy ones – and this did not stimulate hard work.
Property was generally tied to services so that allodial property was
largely absent. Moreover, there was no tradition of contractual agreements
as it had been implanted in the Occident by feudalism. More generally it
may be said that the idea of (commercial) contract can only flourish where
the culture is ready for it. This was not the case in Russia, as Procaccia has
shown on the basis of a comparison of Russian and Western iconography:
there was no individualism in Russia, Eastern Orthodoxy had only con-
tempt for worldly riches while in the West wealth was worthy of aspira-
tion, and there was no tradition of empirical enquiry based on experience
in Russia.154 Interest taking, though, was permitted already since the
Russkaia Pravda.155
The population of the city republics of Novgorod and Pskov, governed
by their own veche (general assembly) before their privileges were elimi-
nated by the tsar Ivan III, lived by customary law and the Russkaia Prav-
da, but Hanseatic tradesmen in Novgorod had their own court with terri-
torial immunity and their own law, the Skra.156 Disputes between the na-
tive Russian population and the foreigners were the moving force behind
ever new regulations.
153 Thomas Owen The Corporation under Russian Law 1800-1917. Cambridge U.
Press 1991 describes the restrictive policies in Russia with regard to the received
law of corporations in order to saveguard the essence of the Russian autocracy.
154 Procaccia (2007) opposes Russia’s «icon society» (the Orthodox icon as a win-
dow to the Russian spirit) to the Western contract society. There was, according
to him, no individualism in Russia as the art of portraiture never materialized
there ; and there was no empirical enquiry as there existed no illusion of perspec-
tive on a two-dimensional surface as in Western Renaissance painting, but rather
a reverse perspective in Rublev’s Holy Trinity in which the depicted event is
shown as happening outside of the laws of human existence.
155 Weber pointed out that in periods of natural economy the Christian Church con-
doned the taking of interest and that the persecution of usurious lending arose on-
ly with the incipient development of actual capitalist instruments. What was in-
volved, according to him, was the struggle in principle between ethical rational-
ization and the process of rationalization in the domain of economics (ES: 584).
156 Feldbrugge Law in Medieval Russia. Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff 2009
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Ecclesiastical (canon) law governed clerics and lay persons residing on
church property as well as matrimonial law. This law was written law and
it required written documentation. As such, it was able to influence some
areas of secular law (inheritance, testimony) where documentary proof
was required for evidentiary puposes. But it was not able to initiate a more
general shift towards more rational modes of proof as in Occidental ju-
risprudence.
In Russia there was no scholarly interest in law before at least the sev-
enteenth century, and then it was based on Byzantine law and particularly
the Ecloga157 rather than on Roman law. A formally rational law was not
developed because Orthodox canon law remained stifled under Russia’s
caesaro-papistic rule. According to Weber, the patrimonial codifications
of the nineteenth century before the liberation of the serfs constituted
largely the status law of the small privileged strata and left untouched the
peasantry (ES: 858).
Canon Law
The Christian emperors of Constantinople, characterized by Weber as cae-
saro-papistic, convoked the general church councils and they confirmed
the decisions of these councils which then became part of the canon law.
In the novella 131 the emperor Justinian also decreed that the canons of
the previous ecumenical councils should have the status of law and thus be
incorporated into the legal order of the state. This meant that holy canons
might be abolished by imperial decrees158 and that in any case state laws
were applicable within the Church concerning all questions in regard to
which no canon law had been passed. No clear independent canon law de-
velopment could take place159, at least in regard to the exterior or adminis-
2.
157 D. Kaiser The Growth of the Law in Medieval Russia. Princeton U. Press 1980, p.
173
158 W. Hartmann & K. Pennington (ed.) The History of Byzantine and Eastern
Canon Law to 1500. Washington: Catholic University of America Press 2012, p.
128
159 In the ninth century the Patriarch Photios in the Eisagoge tried to at least relative-
ly separate the duties of the imperium and of the sacerdotium (considering the
politeia as the body and the church as the form), but these finally remained, in the
view of the Eastern Church, two principles (archai according to Leo Diaconus, a
Byzantine historian) and not two powers (potestates) as was later claimed during
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trative aspects of church life (Constantine was, according to Eusebius, the
overseer of exterior church matters160 ); no law schools, even of the Islam-
ic sort, existed, and it is not surprising that many collections of church
laws came to be called nomocanons, an expression of the fusion of imperi-
al and church laws, as they contained both imperial and canon laws. East-
ern canon law, according to Weber, remained unchanging and without in-
fluence on economic life.
But important changes took place after the Schism between the Eastern
and the Western Church and in the course of the Investiture Struggle and
the Papal Revolution. Gratian, in his Decretum (Concordia discordantium
canonum, 1140 A.D.) which distinguished between divine law, (Stoic)
natural law, ecclesiastical laws, secular laws, and customs, on this basis
created a hierarchized and systematized body of ideas and laid the founda-
tion of Western canon law which differed significantly from the canon law
of the East. It implied the idea that customs must yield to natural law so
that custom lost its sanctity.161 Moreover, a clear dualism between secular
and canon law developed, avoiding all hybrid structures as they exist in
other sacred law traditions. In the medieval universities the teaching of
secular law and canon law was separated.
The jurists did not concern themselves with responsa as elsewhere, but
with conciliar resolutions and Papal decretals (and even created such
sources by deliberate forgery: the Donation of Constantine and the Pseu-
do-Isidorian Decretals). Canon lawyers created the term positive law (laid
down by human law makers, distinct from divine law and natural law).
Legislation was thus produced by rational enactment and inconvenient
previous regulations (as in the case of usury) could even be set aside ra-
tione temporum habita (because of the circumstances of the time). A de-
cisive factor was the unique organization of the Catholic Church as a ra-
tional compulsory institution (Anstalt) with rationally defined bureaucratic
offices (ES: 828)162.
the Investiture Struggle in the West.. The Leo Diaconus text can be found in B.
G. Niebuhr (ed.) 1828 : 101 sq.
160 It is true, though, that there has been some debate about the Greek expression
επίσκοπος των εκτός regarding the question whether it refers to matters or peo-
ple.
161 Berman (1983) p. 145
162 The Church included elements of the concept of Anstalt into the older concept of
corporation. The concept of corporation in Roman law implied the separation of
collective and individual property (ES: 715); the concept of Anstalt (often trans-
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But, as Weber mentioned (ES: 830), the theoretical claim to an all-em-
bracing substantive regulation of the entire conduct of life which all sys-
tems of theocratic law share had few effects in the Occident because
canon law had a serious secular competitor in Roman law since the «redis-
covery» of Justinian’s Digests.
Weber believed that the practical impact of canon law on commercial
law was minimal, and there was indeed a strong opposition against all
claims of the canon lawyers to settle secular affairs. With regard to legal
contributions Weber wrote that the canonist concept of corporation opened
the way to the concept of the state as a legal institution. But the canon
law’s main influence on secular law lay in the field of procedure and
proof, in particular by an inquisition operating ex officio which tried to es-
tablish the true facts of a case. Procedure was now considered as part of
natural law, and not of custom or positive law. In his Dictatus Papae
(1075) the pope Gregory VII had declared that no one should dare to con-
demn one who appeals to his apostolic chair. But, as it was clear that an
appeal from a decision of an ordeal (considered to be a judgement of God)
was impossible, it followed logically that the old system of irrational proof
by hot iron and water could not be used any longer and only proof based
on evidence became acceptible.163 Since the Fourth Lateran Council
(1215) written records of proceedings had to be kept in ecclesiastical
courts and clerics were not allowed to participate in ordeals.
European Secular Law
Roman Law
When the Pandects (Digests) of the Roman emperor Justinian had been
«rediscovered» in the eleventh century, the reception of Roman law creat-
ed a profession of jurists who graduated from universities like Bologna
and were employed throughout Europe. Already in Rome a secular literary
stratum of legal advisors had developed a secular law (ius as opposed to
3.
lated as institution), a legal concept developed much later, implies that it can act
legally only though its organs, that its members have no influence on its manage-
ment (ES: 707) and that it is bound by formal rational law.
163 K. Pennington «Due Process, Community and the Prince in the evolution of the
ordo iudiciarius» in: Rivista Internazionale di Diritto Comune vol. 9 (1998), p. 12
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fas), and as there was no sacred law with any binding force and the mind
was unencumbered by any theological or ethical concerns, as Weber wrote
(ES: 854), the purely logical elements of legal thinking had increased.
The formal and logical qualities of Roman law brought it to supremacy
in Europe 164 with the help of the Bologna-trained jurists and legal glos-
sators165 - except in England where there existed already a national system
of legal training – while the substantive Roman law incited little interest.
In fact, all specific legal concepts of modern capitalism (shares, bill of ex-
change, commercial company, land register, mortgage etc.) originated in
the Middle Ages and not in Rome.
Natural Law
Natural law, according to Max Weber, is the sum total of all those norms
which are valid independently of, and superior to, all positive law, and
which provide the very legitimation for the binding force of any positive
law (ES: 867). It is, Weber continued, the only consistent type of legitima-
cy of a legal order which remains once religious revelation and the sacred-
ness of tradition have lost their force. The lex naturae (natural law) was a
creation of Stoic philosophers. It was taken over by Christianity not in its
original form (a golden age and a blissful state of equality of all human
beings), but in its relative interpretation for the purpose of constructing a
bridge between its own ethics and the norms of the world: political subor-
dination, the diversity of status and even slavery had to be accepted, ac-
cording to relative natural law theory, as facts of life after the Fall and as
remedies for men’s viciousness. As such, natural law was a cultural and
not an ethical value.166
164 The prevalence of formal legal thinking even led to the theological idea that the
relationship between God and man is a legally definable relationship and that sal-
vation is settled by a legal process (Anselm) (ES: 553).
165 Weber’s view has been complemented by Breuer’s observation that Roman law
left more scope to the individual than the laws of other advanced civilizations (in
China the individual was «hors la loi»), and a connection between individuals
needed to be found on a formal level (Stefan Breuer «Imperium und Rechtsord-
nung in China und Rom» in: S. Breuer & H. Treiber (eds.) Zur Rechtssoziologie
Max Webers. Opladen 1984, p.110 )
166 Weber spoke of cultural ideals which the individual wants to realize, as opposed
to ethical duties which he ought to fulfill (CMW : 104).
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Modern natural law theory stems from ideas indigenous to England that
every member of the community has certain inherent natural rights (the
rights of the barons in the Magna Carta, the rights of every human being in
the seventeenth and eighteenth century). It led to the social contract theo-
ries of the seventeenth and eighteenth century, according to which society
is the result of the decisions of autonomous individuals and as such artifi-
cially constructed. On the other hand, it was also influenced by certain Pu-
ritan sects. Jellinek, whom Weber mentioned approvingly, had shown this
with regard to religious freedom in the Virginia Bill of Rights where he
found the idea that inalienable innate rights of the individual have a reli-
gious and not a political origin.167 In any case, Weber insisted that only the
Occident has known «natural law» and with it the complete elimination of
personal laws and of the ancient maxim that special law prevails over gen-
eral law (ES: 883).
Natural law can be either formal or substantive. In its formal version it
had individualistic aspects and led to the principle of freedom of contract
and the full development of the concept of property on the basis of con-
tractual transactions. The substantive version was introduced by socialist
theory and social welfare legislation which justified the acquisition of
wealth by one’s own labour only.
The «just price» of labour was one of the more important natural law
elements of economic doctrine. Weber described how the labour value
price corresponding to the subsistence principle was gradually replaced by
the competitive price, considered as the «natural price» in the same mea-
sure as the market economy progressed. Among the Puritans and through-
out the whole puritanically influenced Anglo-Saxon world this principle
became dominant whereas the price which did not rest on competition in a
free market (but was based on social welfare considerations) was consid-
ered «unnatural» (ES: 872/3).
Depending on the concept of nature and the concept of law, the most
contrasting interpretations of natural law have been advanced. Neverthe-
less, Weber believed that many axioms of natural law have been discredit-
ed and lost their capacity to provide the metaphysical basis of legal sys-
tems as legal positivism advances irresistibly. Its continued significance
lies in the fact that natural law dogmas have strengthened the tendency to-
167 Georg Jellinek Die Erklärung der Menschen- und Bürgerrechte. München:
Duncker & Humblot 1895 p. 57
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wards logically abstract law or the power of logic in legal thinking (ES:
873/4).
Continental European Law
By the end of the Middle Ages the courts in continental Europe had adopt-
ed the canonical judicial procedure based on Roman law (ordo iudiciar-
ius). Moreover, Roman legal concepts were cleansed of all national asso-
ciations and made more abstract; purely systematic categories such as «le-
gal transaction» were created. Law was not taught by observing the ac-
tions of legal practitioners (judges) or by studying particular cases (as it
was done in the English inns of court), but by professional teachers who
expounded on rules of law contained in authoritative texts. These teachers
considered it as their task to construe legal situations in a logically impec-
cable way and to see in law a logically consistent and gapless complex of
norms (ES: 855). Thus, the logical systematization and Eigengesetz-
lichkeit168 of the law was the consequence of the intrinsic intellectual
needs of the legal theorists and not always in step with the practical condi-
tions of life and commercial interests. The law was now thought to be con-
tinually transformable and devoid of all sacredness of content. The school
of the Pandectists in the nineteenth century around Carl von Savigny was
characteristic of this tendency in continental European jurisprudence.
The practical need for a calculable law, Weber wrote, did not play any
considerable rôle, for this need may be gratified as well by a formal em-
pirical case law as in England where the judges are bound by precedents
and thus by calculable schemata (PW: 148); nevertheless, the rationaliza-
tion and systematization of the law and the increasing calculability of the
legal process constituted one of the most important conditions for the exis-
tence of economic enterprise which cannot do without legal security (ES:
883).
But, on the other hand, there have been anti-formalistic tendencies and
a movement against the methodology of the Pandectists. The enlightened
despotism and patrimonialism of the eighteenth century led to more sub-
stantive justice (e.g. Prussia’s Allgemeines Landrecht), even though the
168 ES: 885 translates: «intrinsic necessities of logically consistent formal legal
thinking».
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formal qualities of the Roman law tradition can account for the fact that
the patrimonial justice elements of continental Europe did not lead to the
path of patrimonial administration as elsewhere so that the law retained its
juristically formal character (ES: 853). Later, postulates of human dignity,
good morals and bona fides as well as the idea of the welfare state led to
more substantive justice, challenging juristic formalism so that – in nine-
teenth century Germany – systematization and codification could only be
achieved in special fields with special interests, e.g. commercial law and
the law of negotiable instruments (ES: 858). Nevertheless, the cultural sig-
nificance of formal rational law was for Weber beyond any doubt.
Some legal concepts which were developed in the Middle Ages became
unique to the Occident. In Florence and other medieval business-oriented
cities the old identity of household and workshop/office and their solidary
responsibility fell apart; fraternal relationships were replaced by business
relationships and contracts, and business partners were not necessarily
household members any more. Moreover, business activites were per-
formed in a separate enterprise. This may at the beginning have happened
in ad-hoc groupings for long-distance trade like the commenda169, but
soon it became more permanent. Crucial was the separation of household
and business not only on a spacial level but also for accounting and legal
purposes, and the development of a corresponding body of laws such as
commercial register, separate property of the firm, appropriate bankruptsy
laws.170 In its most rational form this meant the complete separation of the
legal sphere of the household members from the separately constituted le-
gal sphere of the business entity, its legal personality (ES: 707), and led to
the development of the concepts of limited liability and to joint stock cor-
porations in Germany and the corresponding legal constructions else-
where.
The codification of a rational law system and its administration by
trained officials was related to and dependent on the development of the
modern institutional state (Anstaltsstaat) (ES: 653). Until modern times it
169 In the Middle Ages, the commenda was an undertaking in which a person made
commercial use of the goods of another person, and at that other person’s risk, in
exchange for a share of the profit (HCP : 65).
170 ES: 379; In this context, Weber pointed to the fact that in China the joint liability
of the family stood behind the debts of the individual, and that laws on a separate
property of the firm seem to be absent. Credit was until recently dependent on the
kinship group (ES: 380).
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has been known only in the Occident and it can be characterized by what
has been called a double monopolization: 1. The monopolization of law
and law-making by the state and the elimination of all non-state and non-
positive law and 2. the monopolization of the legitimate use of physical
force in the enforcement of the legal order.
The first monopolization had as a consequence that all local bodies of
law as well as the laws of personally limited application which are seen as
different from the body of rational law claiming universal validity were
put on the defensive. Where reason wants to reign, Weber wrote, all law
which has for its existence no other justification than the fact that it exists,
especially customary law, must disappear or will at least be regarded as
inferior.171 Perhaps not surprisingly, Weber wrote of the half-mystical
concept of customary law and did not consider it very useful (ES: 319).
All modern codifications have been at war with customary law (ES: 856).
Elsewhere Weber wrote that modern economic life has destroyed all sta-
tus-determined associations which used to be the carriers of law, and has
led to the monopolization of one universalist coercive institution (ES:
337).
In Germany, the modern institutional state was called a Rechtsstaat (a
state ruled by law) where the political authority made the laws and was
bound by them. The basic form and source of law was now legislation
rather than custom or precedent or equity; the positivist tendencies in nine-
teenth century continental Europe (Weber’s Europe) did not presuppose a
fundamental law which is derived from a source outside or above the state
so that law in the large sense (Recht, droit, ius, pravo) was identified with
law in a narrower sense (Gesetz, loi, lex, zakon). 172
The fundamental characteristics of bureaucratic administration under
formally legal domination were a. continuous rule-bound conduct of offi-
cial business, b. the establishment of spheres of competence, c. the princi-
ple of hierarchy, d. specialized training, e. the separation of ownership
171 Since Weber’s time this tendency seems to have spread even to international law.
Weber had considered international law as an expression of a common culture
(RI : 145), but in a quarrel between Thailand and Cambodia, both of common
Buddhist traditions and customs, the International Court of Justice neglected to
take account of them. Vide Buss 2010.
172 Harold Berman «The Rule of Law and the Law-Based State» in: W.E. Butler (ed)
Russian Legal Theory 1996, p. 451
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from the means of production, f. no appropriation of positions and g. writ-
ten records (ES: 217).
The situation in the common law countries to which we shall now turn
was slightly different because the rule of law there implied that the basic
principles of justice (Magna Carta, Bill of Rights, due process, civil liber-
ties in America) may not be infringed by the law making authorities. It
was also different, to a degree, because the continental Anstaltsstaat be-
came rather a quasi-Anstalt in England as the state had no legal personali-
ty (only the Crown had it), and this permitted a stronger position for the
individual than on the Continent.173
English Common Law
The kind of legal trainig which English lawyers and judges received in the
Inns of Couts produced, according ot Weber, a formalistic treatment of the
law, preoccupied with precedents and analogies (ES: 787). English law
finding is not, traditionally, like that on the European continent, the appli-
cation of legal propositions logically derived from statutory texts. No sys-
tematic and comprehensive treatment of the law has taken place; rather, as
Weber said, a practically useful scheme of contracts and actions was
aimed at. Weber considered the common law as formal, but also as an es-
sentially empirical art based on external criteria where one can still ob-
serve the charismatic character of law finding (ES: 890), and he explained
that no general concepts were formed by abstraction or by logical interpre-
tation of meaning. In a purely empirical way, he wrote, the practitioner of
common law always moves from the particular to the particular.
Weber distinguished two kinds of formal law. The relevant charcteris-
tics of a legal question may be of a tangible nature, i.e., perceptible as
sense data, or they may be formulated through the logical analysis of
meaning and legal concepts in the form of highly abstract rules (ES: 657).
This makes the difference between the English common law and European
continental law.
In passing, Weber also mentioned the quite patriarchal and highly irra-
tional jurisdiction of the justices of the peace, a kind of qadi-justice quite
173 Siegfried Hermes has described Weber’s view of the Anstaltsstaat in England in
much more detail ( S. Hermes ««Staatsbildung durch Rechtsbildung» in : Anter/
Breuer Max Webers Staatssoziologie Nomos : Baden-Baden 2007).
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unknown on the Continent (ES: 891), and the legal dualism, produced by
the co-existence of common law and Equity in the Court of Chancery.174
Equity as well as the concept of reasonableness moved the English law
tradition closer to the side of substantive law.
A Retrospective View of European Secular Law
As has been seen, Weber considered modern European secular law as for-
mally rational. This formal rationality has two versions: Continental law
which systematizes and English common law which works on a empirical
basis. Formal rational law is enforced by the state as Anstaltsstaat (again
in two slightly different versions), a universalist coercive institution which
represses all other kinds of law, in particular customary law. Formal ratio-
nal justice was for Weber (who in this matter quoted approvingly another
legal scholar, R. v. Jhering - ASS: 480) the enemy of arbitrariness and the
twin sister of liberty, it was a framework to regulate formally free people.
This modern secular law, influenced by natural law ideas, has an affini-
ty to individualism in contractual relations. Before the rise of the modern
capitalistic society there existed mainly the status contract which created
personal relationships and produced a complete legal modification of sta-
tus or social position of the persons involved (e.g. in the feudal contract).
But to the extent that parental groupings declined and the economic sys-
tem became more market oriented, the purposive contract (which in the
past mainly described the relationships between clans or nations) has be-
come acceptable in vast areas of social life. It contributes to the dissolu-
tion of traditional relationships for the purpose of economic exchange and
assumes the existence of formally rational law.
While in the English Middle Ages legally binding private contracting
had been possible only in circumscribed circumstances which were recog-
nized by a writ (a form of action), modern purposive contracts trace their
life in England to Slade’s Case (1602) and on the European continent
174 Weber considered Equity as substantive rational justice, similar to Solomonian
judgements or judgements by Sancho Panza when he happened to be governor
(ES: 845). In sixteenth century England it was argued, based on Aristotle, that the
nature of the equitable is a correction of law where it is defective owing to its
universality. Vide J. H. Baker An Introduction to English Legal History. London
1971, p.42.
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around the same time to Leonardus Lessius who stated that a promise has
a binding force. Only since then the parties were free to formulate their
agreements as they wished and they did not any more depend for their va-
lidity on a simultaneous exchange. Quite in line with the Zeitgeist, Adam
Smith in his The Wealth of Nations (1776) wrote that self-interest gener-
ates social welfare, and the state and the courts were willing to protect pri-
vate agreements (contracts) so that the whole market economy was now
based on commercial contracts entered into by individual interests.
The rationalisation of occidental law has been a formal rationalisation
which does not guarantee a correspondent substantive rationalisation. Fre-
quent eruptions of substantive considerations and demands, however, pro-
duce an increasing tension between legality and legitimacy or between ef-
ficacy, calculability and impersonality on the one hand, and personal rela-
tions, fraternity and equality on the other. Max Weber did not look at the
rationalisation of law and rationalisation in general in an optimistic way
but rather saw it as an expression of the organization of despair.
4. Coda on Modern Comparative Law
While in the last hundred and fifty years occidental law, sometimes in its
more formal version and at other times with more substantive elements,
has been adopted in most Asian countries, it has by no means simply re-
placed the traditional Asian laws. Western legal positivism is often consid-
ered to have a reductionist perspective which excludes the deeper struc-
tures of the law (legal culture, language, religion, custom). Quite often,
therefore, traditional Asian law functions to undermine provisions of the
newly introduced Constitutions that attempt to separate the State from reli-
gion and tradition; it supplements, modifies and undermines State law,
thus becoming what has been called unofficial law. This is why Masaji
Chiba (1986) distinguishes even in modern Asian countries between 1. of-
ficial law (which may contain religious law, e.g. Islamic or Hindu law,
and also the traditional laws of family and guilds insofar as officially sanc-
tioned), 2. unofficial law which is not officially sanctioned but accepted in
practice by general consensus and often studied as customary law, and 3.
traditional legal postulates (sacred truths, national philosophies) which
found or justify official or unofficial law.
All this has produced new orientations in historical comparisons since
the advent of globalization. Not single societies or cultures, but their rela-
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tionships, borrowings, or adaptations to each other, or the clashes between
them, have often become the subject matter of the comparative sociology
of law for far from creating uniformity worldwide, the reception of West-
ern laws has led to a complex pluralization and hybridization of legal sys-
tems all over the world.175 The idea of multiple modernities176 which as-
serts that modernity and Westernization are not identical and which distin-
guishes between ideological and institutional premises has become a
powerful tool of understanding. Weber perhaps anticipated these ideas by
his distinction between spirit and form and by his suggestion that societies
which have been unable to create capitalism or its spirit may well be able
to adopt its (legal and administrative) system from the outside. This is per-
haps what Schluchter177 has called Weber’s second thesis. While the first
thesis relates to the development of modern occidental rationalism out of
its own historical sources, the second thesis is concerned with the possibil-
ities and difficulties of its spreading throughout the world.178
175 Werner Menski Comparative Law in a Global Context London 2000, chapter 1.
An example can be found in the work of R. Sakrani (2009) who describes the hy-
brid legal structure in Tunesia where the formal character of occidental law col-
lides with the lack of formality of Muslim law and where there are even differ-
ences with regard to the concept of contract (2009 : 201). Only good faith and the
belief in the essential identity of the human spirit may be able to hold this togeth-
er (2009 : 204).
176 Of particular importance in this context is the work of S.N. Eisenstadt, e.g. his
article published in 2000.
177 Schluchter 2006 : 316.
178 Weber wrote that the Chinese may more easily adopt modern capitalism than the
Japanese (RC:248) and the Japanese more easily than the Hindus (RI:325).
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The «Author’s Introduction» as a Conclusion
Basic Literature:
«Author’s Introduction» in: Max Weber The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capital-
ism transl. by T. Parsons 1930, introduced by A. Giddens. London: Routledge 2004,
pp. XXIX-XLI
«Vorbemerkung» in: Max Weber Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Religionssoziologie vol. 1
Tübingen: Mohr (Siebeck) 1920 pp.1-16
Weber’s «Preceding Remark» prefaces the whole collection of the Col-
lected Essays in the Sociology of Religion. It is one of Weber’s last texts,
and it does appear like a conclusion to these Collected Essays. The Eng-
lish translation, also entitled «Author’s Introduction», has often been in-
cluded, albeit misleadingly, with the English text of the Protestant Ethic
and the Spirit of Capitalism. Weber here states that he intends to explain
problems of universal history and to ask himself to what combination of
circumstances the fact should be attributed that in Western civilization
cultural phenomena have appeared which, «as we would like to think», are
of universal significance. He makes it clear that he, as the son of modern
European civilization, necessarily and justifiably chooses a culture-related
perspective which admittedly is only of a heuristic value179, although he
may not have doubted that European culture was of universal significance
because of the effects which it continued and continues to have on other
cultures. But universal significance does not imply universal validity
1.
179 Certain modern authors have attributed to Weber an orientalist or «westocentric»
ideology in Edward Said’s sense. Sara Farris, for instance, accuses Weber of an
unsympathetic and unflattering depiction of Asiatic «non-personalities» who lack
the characteristics of the Western type of personality (Farris 2013: 207). Clearly,
these authors are not aware of the fundamental distinction between normative eu-
rocentrism which Weber avoided, and heuristic eurocentrism which he consid-
ered justified and even necessary from a methodological point of view. There
should be no question that the conditions under which a science develops are one
thing, and that the objective status of its discoveries or statements is another.
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Only in the Occident, he wrote, there exists a science which we today
recognize as valid; elsewhere one does not always find rational proof, the
rational experiment and the rational concept.
Only in the Occident there is rational harmonic music and, in fact, the
rationalization of art by the utilization of the spatial perspective, and the
utilization of the Gothic vault in architecture.
Only in the Occident there is trained and specialized personnel in a
sense and to a degree which approaches its present dominant place in our
culture, the trained official, the pillar of both the modern State and of the
economic life - the cage in which we have to live. Only here we find the
State itself with a rational written constitution and an administration
bound to rational rules of law, administered by trained officials.
And the same is true of the most fateful force in our modern life, capi-
talism. How should modern capitalism be characterized?
The impulse to acquisition, the pursuit of the greatest possible amount
of money and any acquisition by force has nothing to do with capitalism,
for the auri sacra fames (the greed for gold) is as old as the history of
mankind. Capitalistic economic action is rather based on the expectation
of profit by the utilization of formally peaceful means. It is found where
the acquisition is rationally pursued, and where a calculation of capital in
terms of money is made with an initial and final balance. But even in this
sense there has been capitalism in all civilizations, in China, India, Baby-
lon, Egypt and elsewhere in the shape of money lenders, colonial en-
trepreneurs and as tax-farming and adventurer capitalism. But in modern
times the Occident has developed a capitalism in form and direction which
has never existed elsewhere: the rational capitalistic organization of for-
mally free labour. It is connected to the idea of the citizen. The concept of
the citizen and of the bourgeois did not exist elsewhere although there
have been all sorts of legal differences between town and country in other
cultural areas.
One can certainly name other important developmental elements of
modern capitalism: the separation of the business from the household, ra-
tional bookkeeping, the legal separation of corporate from personal prop-
erty, but all these peculiarities of modern capitalism derive their signifi-
cance from their association with the capitalistic organization of labour
(formally free labour) or rather: the bourgeois capitalism with its rational
organization of free labour, for exact calculation is possible only on the
basis of free labour.
CONCLUSION
198
The peculiar modern Western form of capitalism has been strongly in-
fluenced by the development of technical possibilities and that means: by
the peculiarities of modern science. On the other hand, the development
(not: the origin) of these sciences received important stimulation from
economic incentives and these, in turn, are derived from the peculiarities
of the social order of the Occident: the rational structure of law and ad-
ministration. For modern rational capitalism has need not only of the tech-
nical means of production, but of a calculable legal system and of an ad-
ministration working on the basis of formal rules. And where did that law
in its formalistic perfection come from? Capitalistic interests have no
doubt helped to prepare the way for the predominance in law and adminis-
tration of a class of jurists trained in rational law, but these interests did
not create that law. And why did not capitalistic interests produce a similar
outcome in China or India? Why did not the scientific, the political or the
economic development there enter upon the path of rationalization which
is peculiar to the Occident?
In all the above-mentioned cases it is a question of the specific rational-
ism of Western culture. Now, by the term «rationalization» very different
things may be understood. Not only the most diverse spheres of life can be
rationalized - mystical contemplation as well as war or economic activity -
and each of these spheres may be rationalized in terms of very different
ultimate values. And what is rational from one point of view may well be
irrational from another. To characterize the differences of the various civi-
lizations it is then necessary to search what spheres of social life are ratio-
nalized and in what direction. Weber’s concern was therefore to work out
and to explain the special peculiarity of Occidental rationalism, and partic-
ularly of its modern form.
Obviously, every such attempt at explanation must take account of the
economic conditions. But the opposite causal relationship must not be left
out of consideration. The explanation of economic rationalism must not
only take account of rational techniques and rational law, but also of the
ability and disposition of humans to adopt certain types of practical ratio-
nal conduct. Magical and religious forces and the ethical ideas of duty
based upon them have always been among the most important formative
influences of conduct. Weber is concerned with these forces.
In the Protestant Ethic Weber had attempted to consider only one side
of the causal relationships, namely the influence of certain religious ideas
on the development of an economic ethos. The later studies on «The Eco-
nomic Ethics of World Religions» attempted to investigate both causal re-
1. The «Author’s Introduction» as a Conclusion
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lationships as far as it seemed necessary to find points of comparison with
Western development. For it is Western development which in the last
analysis is intended to be analysed further, and only in the described way
does it seem possible to attempt a causal attribution of those elements of
the Occidental economic ethic which differentiate it from others. Weber’s
studies of the world religions, presented and analysed here in chapter III,
do not claim to be complete analyses of civilizations. On the contrary, in
every case they emphasize those elements in which it differs from Western
civilizational development, for, in the final analysis, Weber was concerned
with the understanding of Western culture.
Specialists like sinologists, indologists or semitists will have to make a
final judgement about the factual correctness of the analyses. Weber was
well aware of his limitations, being obliged to work with available transla-
tions. He undertook the studies only because expert studies with his spe-
cial purpose and from his particular point of view were not available.180
Finally, Weber also admitted that the results of ethnographic research have
hardly been used by him, but he believed that this might be excusable be-
cause he was mainly concerned with the religious ethics of the social stra-
ta which were the culture carriers of their respective regions.
Commentary
It was Weber’s ultimate intention to describe and to explain the distinctive
character of the whole of Occidental culture, the particular kind of ratio-
nality which pervaded all areas of life: the rational-methodical conduct of
life, the rational capitalist enterprise, the rational state, the formally ratio-
nal law, rational science, and the rational music based on harmonic
chords. In order to achieve this goal he had compared the Occidental cul-
ture with the major other cultures and had tried to show why the above-
mentioned phenomena had not occurred in those cultures.
2.
180 One is reminded here of Weber’s remark in his «The ‹Objectivity› of Knowledge
in Social Science and Social Policy» that by relating known facts to known view-




With regard to science Weber pointed out that only the Occident’s degree
of scientific development is today considered as valid, although his writ-
ing on science is rather limited. In «Science as a Vocation» (FMW: 129 –
156) he traced a short history of science, starting with the rational proof
and the rational concept in ancient Greece,181 followed by the rational ex-
periment in art (Leonardo and the experimenters in music who wanted to
raise art to the level of science) during the Renaissance period, without
which further scientific development would have been impossible. Since
the School of Chartres (twelfth century)182 and since Abélard it was
thought that through rational knowledge of the structure of the created
world and thus by reason alone the individual scholar could achieve or
contribute to the knowledge of the creator. There was no suggestion that
individual reason was to submit to the consensus of scholars, as in Islam,
or to the fellowship of the sobornost’ (consensus ecclesiae) which alone
can make true understanding possible in Eastern Christianity.
Weber’s summary history of science can perhaps be complemented by
Berman’s contention183 that legal science as it developed in the eleventh
and twelfth century under the impact of the Papal Revolution may be re-
garded as a progenitor of modern Western science, and this on the level of
the value premises (objectivity, skepticism), on the organizational level
(the newly emerging institution of the university as a corporation with le-
gal personality and with free research and teaching), and on the method-
ological level (the law was systematized as an integrated body of knowl-
edge so that the validity of particular legal rules could be demonstrated by
their consistency with the system as a whole). To this should be added the
emperor Frederick Barbarossa’s authentica habita (1158), a legislative act
which was issued for the protection of students studying Roman law in
Bologna (as opposed to clerical students studying canon law), and which
181 Elsewhere Weber also mentioned the mathematical thought which is the Greeks’
everlasting contribution to modern science and which was lacking, according to
him, in China and India. (RI: 161)
182 R. Klibansky «The School of Chartres» in M. Clagett et al. (ed.) Twelfth Century
Europe and the Formation of Modern Society U. of Wisconsin Press 1966
183 H. Berman (1983) p. 151
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strengthened the autonomy of the university as a corporation.184 It rescued
the independent study of Roman law from the threat of absorption by its
rival, canon law.185
According to Berman, neither the classical period of modern science
(Galileo, Kepler, Newton) nor the later advances would have been possi-
ble without the methods developed by the early jurists and without inde-
pendent universities which could enact their own statutes.
With the Puritan spirit of the «man of a vocation» (Berufsmenschentum)
specialization entered the milieu of science, and the application of science
to practical goals, and with specialized personnel, is mainly a Protestant
achievement (AC: 129). The needs of industry (Weber mentioned particu-
larly the mining industry in RC: 151) assisted the intellectual forces in
transferring the experiment to the natural sciences, and the relationship of
science to the economy did contribute to the process of modern capitalistic
development but also to the growing impersonality of the economic
sphere. And although Western science was in Weber’s opinion unique, his
attitude with regard to it was ambivalent. He pointed to the disenchant-
ment of the world by science186 and its rejection of the religious idea that
the world may have a meaning (FMW: 154). But in Weber’s opinion sci-
ence cannot replace religion. Quoting from Nietzsche’s Zarathustra, he
sarcastically criticized the «last men who invented happiness» and he
turned to Tolstoi in whose opinion science is meaningless because it gives
no answer to the question: «what shall we do and how shall we live?»
(FMW: 143).
Architecture, Art, and Music
In architecture, art, and music Weber was interested in the determination
of the technical instruments employed for a given definite purpose al-
though, of cause, the history of art does not recognize a «progress» with
184 Such autonomy of the university was of cause non-existent elsewhere, for in-
stance in the Islamic colleges (madrasas).
185 Walter Ullmann Scholarship and Politics in the Middle Ages London: Variorum
Reprints 1978, p. 136
186 The disenchantment of the world had already begun with the old Jewish prophets
who had repudiated all magical means of salvation (PE: 61), but the Puritans and
then science then completed this process.
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respect to the aesthetic evaluation of works of art. The development of the
Gothic style was the result of the technically successful solution of an ar-
chitectural problem in connection with the building of vaults over spaces
of a particular kind (CMW: 322). The discovery of perspective in painting
was made during the Renaissance (although perspective of a different kind
existed in traditional China) as a path to true nature (FMW: 142).
In his sociology of music (RSM) or, as he called it himself, in his histo-
ry of music Weber asked why music oriented to harmony was developed
only in Europe. He mentioned briefly the technical-rational preconditions
for European musical culture: the modern system of notation (since Guido
of Arezzo in the eleventh century), the setting down of the notes’ relative
time values, and a fixed scheme of bars so that the progression of the indi-
vidual parts of a polyphonic piece in relation to each other becomes clear
and unambiguous - which alone makes polyphonic compositions possible.
All this, as Weber wrote to his sister Lili in August 1912, (MWG II/7 vol.
2: 638), was the work of monks.
But this was not enough. Weber’s central concern was to characterize
the peculiarity of the modern European tonal system in comparison with
the tonal systems of other cultures and times (e.g. Indian ragas or the pen-
tatonic system in China or ancient Greece). He found this peculiarity in
chordal harmony and in the equal tempering of the pitch of the intervals
between the twelve tones of the European scale. The Pythagorean «com-
ma», a small, scarcely audible interval, symbol of the unrationalized pure
tones of nature, was «eliminated» through a rational solution, the equally
tempered pitch of the intervals (FMW: 281) since A. Werckmeister around
the year seventeen hundred, so that greater rationality of the whole tonal
system was now achieved and, for instance, the transposition of a melody
from one key to another became possible. J.S. Bach explored the poten-
tials of this newly established tuning method in his «The Well-Tempered
Clavier». Our until recently exclusive education toward modern harmonic
music is quite essentially supported by the piano.
But of course, Weber was well aware that the aesthetic sphere, includ-
ing music, is a «life force» whose being is emotional and arational and of-
ten a means of ecstasy, in inner tension with all attempts of rationalisa-
tion.187 Music, wrote Weber, offers the power of this-worldly salvation
187 Christoph Braun «The Science of Reality of Music History: on the Historical
Background of Max Weber’s Study of Music» in: Sam Whimster (ed.), Max We-
ber and the Culture of Anarchy London: MacMillan 1999, 177-195
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from the routines of everyday life and from theoretical and practical ratio-
nalism (FMW: 342). There is indeed an inner tension , an irreconcilable
conflict between Weber’s music study which traces the rational solutions
in Western music and his «Intermediate Reflection» where he writes about
music in a very different way. Weber was not only a theoretician of ratio-
nality.188
Formally Rational Law and the Puritan Conduct of Life
Not the explanation of modern science as such nor the rationalization of
music was Weber’s primary concern, but rather what he considered the
most fateful force in our life, modern capitalism, today’s economic order
with its rational organization of free labour. on the basis of rational sci-
ence and technology, invested capital and machine production, and ratio-
nal calculable law. What was his answer?
Harold Berman has praised Weber for confirming that the Investiture
Struggle of the late eleventh and early twelfth century laid the foundations
for the separation of church and state, that the new canon law was the first
modern legal system, that the reciprocity of rights and duties of lord and
vassal distinguished Western feudalism from that of eastern societies, and
that the western city of the twelfth century was unique in conferring con-
stitutional rights upon its citizens. Yet, Berman wrote, Weber was prevent-
ed from drawing the right conclusions from these facts by his historiogra-
phy which postulates a sharp break in the sixteenth century between the
Middle Ages and modern times.189 Berman did not spell out precisely
what the right conclusions might be, but he clearly did not envision the
possibility that there might be several great transformations in the history
of a culture and even in different spheres of that culture, and that, more-
over, there might be a meaningful adequacy between the results of these
transformations. In fact, Weber saw two major transformations in the Oc-
cident as mutually reinforcing preconditions of the development of mod-
188 The philosopher Karl Jaspers who had been strongly influenced by Weber even
during Weber’s life time, seems to have come to the conclusion (after new reve-
lations about Weber’s personal life) that Weber’s personal rationality revealed a
complete openness to experience and its struggles, and not an essential oneness.
Vide: Henrich’s article in Mommsen & Osterhammel (eds.) 1987, p.542
189 Berman 1983, p. 550
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ern capitalism. In the eleventh and twelfth centuries the Papal Revolution
created the exterior preconditions, and between the sixteenth and eigh-
teenth centuries the «Puritan Revolution» created the inner preconditions.
Between the thesis of a mainly institutional transformation in the Middle
Ages and the thesis of a transformation of the mentality after the Reforma-
tion Weber saw no contradiction. Each of these conditions developed in-
dependently and at different moments in history, but Weber saw an elec-
tive affinity (Wahlverwandtschaft) between them, creating a situation in
which both favoured each other and a development of high inner homoge-
nousness could set in.
In Asian religions there was customary law, qadi justice, formally irra-
tional and substantively irrational law, even substantively rational law, but
not formally rational and calculable law without which there may be ad-
venturer or speculative trading capitalism, but no rational enterprise with
fixed capital. And Asian religions offered magical, ritualistic and contem-
plative methods of salvation, there was the Indian bhakti and the institu-
tional grace of Catholicism, but nowhere, with the possible exception of
some sects (the Jainas in India and the Skoptsy in Russia) the methodical
innerworldly ascetic work ethic can be found. (A schematic table can be
found in the appendix).
Why did only the Occident develop a specifically «rational» culture
with a particular formal orientation which in Weber’s opinion has been of
universal-historical significance? At the root of this development was the
inner adequacy and even the mutual intensification of the kind and orien-
tation of two rationalizations: the formal rationality of the exterior circum-
stances of life (the politico-legal circumstances) and the innerworldly
practical rationality of the inner motivations of the Protestants. Having de-
veloped independently of each other, they created together the structure
and the spirit of modern Western capitalism, supported, moreover, by ra-
tional science and technology. But this is not all, for the Protestant ethic in
its secularized form was congenial and well suited not only for the modern
capitalistic enterprise, but also for the officials of the bureaucratic state,
based in turn on formally rational law, and for modern institutionalized
and specialized science and technology. The specialized man of a vocation
(Berufsmensch) has a cultural significance well beyond the economic
sphere.
This double rationalization (the practical rationality of the Protestant
ethic and the formal rationality of occidental law), supported by the goal-
oriented rational technology, is the fate of our age, and it implies bureau-
2. Commentary
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cratization and specialization on the exterior level, and disenchantment
and dehumanization/unbrotherliness on the interior level even as rou-
tinization has set , the religious roots have to a large extent died out and a
secularized ethos, the spirit of capitalism, of the Beruf, is now left in the
«iron cage» in which we are condemned to live. More than other times
and circumstances, perhaps, Weber’s statement that what is rational, or
logically consistent, has some degree of power over humans (FMW: 324),
characterizes the modern occidental situation. Weber showed no blind en-
thusiasm for this outcome, and he disdainfully wrote about today’s «spe-
cialists without spirit, sensualists without heart» (PE: 124). His fundamen-
tal question remained: how can we live within modern «rational» culture
and under modern capitalism which gives priority to the law of the market
over ethical values? He wrote that «if one wishes to evaluate any ordering
of societal relationships, one must in the last resort … examine it with re-
spect to the type of human being that it gives the best chances of becom-
ing dominant, by way of external selection or inner selection of motives»
(CMW: 321)190. Not the well-being of the people of future generations,
but what kind of people they will be, what type of personality is encour-
aged by social development, was the question which moved Weber’s
thinking. He hoped that those characteristics which we think of as consti-
tuting the human greatness and nobility of our nature may survive in the
future (PW: 15). The stagnation and ossification which characterized the
decline of the Roman Empire and the imposition of a strict pax Romana
were for him a discouraging example.
The Contemporary Relevance of Weber’s Comparative Sociology
Weber’s comparative studies can even today be more than a quarry of in-
teresting concepts or a series of fragmented studies; they are also more
than an array of hidden interlocking strategies and procedures which pro-
vide causal explanations of unique cases and developments, as Kalberg
suggests.191 Their subjects are the major religious cultures of the world
seen from the viewpoint of universal history, in which various complexes
190 Quoted from «The Meaning of ‹Value Freedom› in the Sociological and Econo-
mic Sciences» in CMW.
191 Kalberg 1994: 193
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of ideas and processes of rationalisation performed the role of switchmen
which guided the respective interests.
Certainly, as Weber wrote in his essay on «Science as a Vocation»
(CMW: 349 / 350), the (cultural) sciences can provide knowledge of tech-
niques for controlling life (the concepts found in Weber’s collected writ-
ings, used as a quarry), they can also provide methods of reasoning (strate-
gies, procedures, as for instance Kalberg suggests), but, last not least, they
can provide clarity and compel the individual to give an account to him-
self of the ultimate meaning of his conduct within his own cultural
Weltanschauung as compared to all others, they make us realize that the
inner consequences of our cultural choices in terms of meaning lead us,
figuratively speaking, to serve this god and to offend that other god. We-
ber claimed that this is of value in our personal life. The historical and
comparative sciences of culture are based on the assumption that it is in-
teresting and responsible to participate in this awareness of ourselves as
cultured beings or Kulturmenschen (CMW: 345), and that this is possible
not by recourse to general laws, but only by reference to historical constel-
lations, seen in the context of universal history. The Western Kultur-
mensch might then realize that different rationalities are deployed within
the distinct spheres and orders of modern society (science, economy, law,
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